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汉明谈一流研究:伟大工作不是等来的,而是主动做对题、押对注、讲明白

这篇演讲最有价值的判断是:一流研究不是主要靠天才或运气,而是靠持续选择重要且可进攻的问题、长期高强度投入并主动经营环境;但它也明显带着精英幸存者偏差,不能被当成人人通用的成功公式。
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2026-04-26 原文链接 ↗
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核心观点

  • 重要问题比努力更关键 汉明最站得住的判断是“如果你不做重要的问题,就很难做出重要的工作”,而且他进一步把“重要”限定为“既有高价值又有可行进攻路径”,这个定义比空喊“做大事”更实用,也更残酷,因为它直接否定了大量安全但低杠杆的忙碌。
  • 运气重要,但不是免责条款 他明确反对把伟大成果全归因于运气,这个判断基本成立,因为顶尖产出在同一批人身上反复出现,说明“准备好的头脑”确实能提高命中率;但他对个人可控性的强调偏强,容易低估平台、时代、资源和身份结构带来的巨大差异。
  • 伟大工作依赖一整套可训练习惯 他认为勇气、驱动力、对模糊性的容忍、长期情感投入、开放交流、每周固定思考“大问题”、把缺陷改写成资产,这些都比单纯聪明更决定上限;这个判断很有启发,但也带有明显的“贝尔实验室高自由度精英环境”前提,不是脱离语境就能复制。
  • 做出来不够,还得让别人看懂并采用 汉明对“推销成果”的强调非常正确,科研、产品和组织工作都一样,清晰写作、正式表达、非正式说服和问题 framing 决定了成果能否进入公共认知;把“我做得好,世界自然会看见”当真,是幼稚而不是清高。
  • 职业成就常败给做错题和人格摩擦 他最尖锐的判断之一是,很多有才华的人失败,不是因为不努力,而是因为长期做不重要的问题、沉迷局部勤奋、不会借系统之力,还把自我表达、愤怒或控制欲当原则;这话不好听,但对大组织里的知识工作者尤其有效。

跟我们的关联

  • 对 ATou 意味着什么、下一步怎么用 对 ATou 来说,最直接的意义不是“更拼”,而是建立“重要问题清单”机制;下一步可以每周固定 1 次 Great Thoughts Time,只审视三件事:现在在做的是不是高杠杆题、有没有真实进攻路径、哪些工作只是忙但不重要。
  • 对 Neta 意味着什么、下一步怎么用 对 Neta 来说,这篇文章等于在强调“问题定义权高于执行勤奋”;下一步应把研究、产品、策略问题区分成“高价值可进攻 / 高价值不可进攻 / 低价值可进攻”三类,优先下注第一类,并保留一组长期待机的大问题。
  • 对 Uota 意味着什么、下一步怎么用 对 Uota 来说,最值得吸收的是“开门工作”和“会推销”的判断:闭门优化短期效率高,长期容易做偏;下一步应主动增加跨人群输入、加强非正式表达和对外叙事,把工作从“做完”提升到“被看见、被接住、可复用”。
  • 对三者共同意味着什么、下一步怎么用 这篇演讲共同指向一个动作:把“孤立任务完成”升级为“方法、框架、可累积资产生产”;下一步每做完一件事都追问一句:这是一次性交付,还是能成为一类问题的通用解法。

讨论引子

1. “重要问题 + 可进攻路径”这个标准,会不会让人过度保守,错过真正高风险高回报的新方向? 2. 汉明强调顺着系统、教育老板、别轻易和体制开战,这到底是成熟现实主义,还是在默许结构性不公? 3. 如果不处在贝尔实验室这种高密度精英环境,普通人该怎样人为制造“会打雷的山顶”?

Image 1Image 2Image 3 Image 4: Richard Hamming: You and Your Research 1986 年 3 月 7 日于贝尔通信研究中心的演讲。我的演讲题目是 You and Your Research。这不是讲如何管理研究,而是讲你个人如何做研究。我也可以就前一个主题讲一场,但这次不是。这次讲的是你。我讲的不是普通、平常的研究,我讲的是伟大的研究。为了描述伟大的研究,我有时会说诺贝尔奖级别的工作。它不一定真的要拿到诺贝尔奖,但我指的是那类我们公认具有重大意义的工作。比如相对论,比如香农的信息论,再比如许多卓越的理论,我说的就是这种事。

那么,我为什么会来做这项研究呢。在洛斯阿拉莫斯,我被找去负责运行别人已经搭起来的计算机,好让那些科学家和物理学家回去做他们真正的工作。我看出自己只是个跑腿的。我看出,虽然在身体上我和他们没什么不同,但他们就是不一样。说得直白一点,我嫉妒。我想知道,他们为什么和我这么不同。我近距离见过费曼。见过费米和特勒。见过奥本海默。见过汉斯·贝特,他是我的上司。我见过不少非常有本事的人。于是我开始非常在意,那些真正做成事的人,与那些本来也许能做成事的人,到底差别在哪里。

后来我到了贝尔实验室,进了一个产出极高的部门。当时博德是部门主管,香农也在那里,还有其他一些人。我继续追问,为什么,差别到底是什么。再后来,我通过读传记、自传,向别人提问题,比如,你是怎么做到这件事的。我试图弄清这些差别到底是什么。我的这场演讲,说的就是这个。

为什么这场演讲重要。我觉得它重要,是因为据我所知,你们每个人都只有这一生可活。哪怕你相信轮回,这一世对下一世也帮不上什么。既然如此,为什么不在这一生里做点有分量的事,不管你怎么定义有分量。我不会替你下定义,你知道我在说什么。我主要讲科学,因为这是我研究过的领域。但据我所知,而且别人也这么告诉我,我说的很多话适用于很多领域。多数领域里的卓越工作,特征都很相似,不过我这里还是只谈科学。

为了谈到你个人,我必须用第一人称来讲。我得让你先放下谦虚,对自己说,是的,我想做一流的工作。我们的社会并不鼓励人主动立志去做真正优秀的工作。你好像不该这么想。好运应该自己落到你头上,你是碰巧才做成了大事。这种说法很蠢。我要说,为什么你不能主动去做点重要的事。你不必告诉别人,但难道不该对自己说一句,是的,我想做点重要的事吗。

为了进入第二阶段,我还得放下谦虚,用第一人称讲我见过什么、做过什么、听过什么。我会讲到一些人,其中有些你们认识。我希望我们离开这里之后,你们不要到处引述我刚才说的某些话。

我想先从心理上讲,而不是从逻辑上讲。我发现最大的反对意见是,人们认为伟大的科学都是靠运气。全是运气。那就想想爱因斯坦。注意看,他做出了多少件了不起的事。难道全是运气。是不是重复得有点太多了。再看香农。他不只是做了信息论。在那之前几年,他还做过别的好东西,还有一些至今仍被锁在密码学保密体系里的成果。他做了很多好东西。你一再看到,一个出色的人做出的不止一件事。偶尔确实有人一生只做成一件事,这个我们后面会讲,但很多时候是会反复出现的。我认为,单靠运气解释不了一切。

我会引用巴斯德的话,运气偏爱有准备的头脑。我觉得这正好说出了我的看法。运气这个因素确实存在,但又并不真是那回事。有准备的头脑,迟早会发现某个重要的问题,并且把它做出来。所以说,是的,有运气。你具体做成哪一件事,带点运气。但你会做成某件事,这不是运气。

举个例子,我到贝尔实验室后,有段时间和香农共用一间办公室。正好在他做信息论的时候,我在做编码理论。我们两个人在同一个地方、同一时间做出这些事,这件事很可疑,说明那种氛围就在空气里。你可以说,是的,这是运气。可你也可以反问,那为什么当时贝尔实验室那么多人,偏偏是这两个人做出来了。是的,一部分是运气,一部分是有准备的头脑。但这个一部分,就是我接下来还要讲的另一部分。

所以,虽然我后面还会多次回到运气这个话题,但我想先把这件事说清楚。不能把运气当成你能不能做出伟大工作的唯一标准。我认为你对它有一定控制力,虽然不是完全控制。最后我再引用牛顿的话。牛顿说,如果别人像我一样努力思考,他们也会得到类似的结果。

你会看到的一个特点,而且很多人都有,包括伟大的科学家,就是他们年轻时通常就有独立思考,并且有勇气追下去。比如爱因斯坦,大概在 12 岁或 14 岁的时候,问过自己一个问题,如果我以光速前进,去看一束光波,它看起来会是什么样子。他知道电磁理论说,不可能有一个静止的局部极大值。但如果他和光同速前进,他就会看见一个局部极大值。在 12 岁、14 岁,或者差不多那个年纪,他就能看出这里有矛盾,一定有哪里不对,光速这件事有某种古怪之处。后来他创立狭义相对论,这只是运气吗。很早以前,他就在思考这些碎片时,已经摆下了一些拼图。

不过这只是必要条件,不是充分条件。我接下来讲的所有这些因素,都是既有运气,也不只是运气。

再说脑子好不好。听起来当然不错。这个房间里大多数人,脑子大概都绰绰有余,足够做一流的工作。但伟大的工作不是只有聪明。聪明可以用很多方式衡量。在数学、理论物理、天体物理里,聪明往往在很大程度上和操纵符号的能力相关。所以典型的智商测验通常会把这些人测得很高。可在别的领域,情况就不同。

比如比尔·普凡,就是做区域熔炼的那个人。有一天他来到我办公室,脑子里模模糊糊有个想法,知道自己想要什么,手头也有一些方程。很明显,这个人不太懂数学,表达能力也不强。他的问题倒是挺有意思,于是我把它带回家,做了一点工作。后来我教会他怎么用计算机,让他自己去算答案。我给了他计算的力量。后来他一路做下去,起初在本部门几乎没得到什么认可,但最后他把这个领域的奖几乎都拿遍了。一旦起步顺了,他的羞怯、笨拙、不善表达,都慢慢退去了,他在许多方面都变得更有产出。当然,他也变得更会表达了。

我还能举另一个类似的人。我希望他今天不在场,他叫克洛格斯顿。我是在和约翰·皮尔斯小组一起做问题时认识他的,我当时觉得他不怎么样。我问那些曾和他一起上学的朋友,他读研究生时也这样吗。他们说,是的。要是我,大概会把这人开掉。但 J. R. 皮尔斯很聪明,把他留下了。后来克洛格斯顿做出了 Clogston cable。此后好点子就源源不断地出来了。一次成功给了他信心和勇气。

成功科学家的一个特征,就是有勇气。一旦你鼓起勇气,相信自己能做重要的问题,那你就能做。如果你觉得自己不行,那几乎肯定就不行。香农在这点上尤其突出。你只要想想他的那个主要定理就知道了。他想创造一种编码方法,但不知道怎么做,于是他搞了个随机码。接着他卡住了。然后他问了一个几乎不可能的问题,平均而言,一个随机码会做成什么样。接着他证明,平均码可以任意地好,因此至少存在一个好码。除了一个有无穷勇气的人,谁敢这样想。这就是伟大科学家的特点,他们有勇气。他们在难以置信的情形下也会继续往前走,继续思考,而且一直思考下去。

年龄也是一个因素,尤其物理学家特别在意。他们总说,你必须年轻时做出来,否则就永远做不出来。爱因斯坦很早就做出了成果,那些量子力学的人在做出最好工作时,年轻得令人讨厌。大多数数学家、理论物理学家和天体物理学家,在年轻时做出了我们认为最好的工作。不是说他们老了以后做不出好工作,但我们最看重的,往往是他们早年的成果。另一方面,在音乐、政治和文学里,我们常常认为他们最好的作品反而出现在晚年。我不知道你所在的领域落在这条尺度上的什么位置,但年龄确实有些影响。

不过我想解释一下,为什么年龄看起来会有这种影响。首先,一旦你做出一些好工作,你会发现自己进了各种委员会,再也没法做更多工作了。你可能会像我看到布拉顿那样。他拿诺贝尔奖那天,奖项公布后,我们都聚集在阿诺德礼堂,三位获奖者都上台讲话。第三位是布拉顿,他几乎眼含热泪地说,我知道所谓的诺贝尔奖效应,我不会让它影响我,我还是会做原来的沃尔特·布拉顿。我当时心想,这很好。可几周之后我就看出,那东西已经在影响他了。现在他只能做大问题。一个人出了名之后,就很难再去做小问题。这就是香农后来出问题的地方。做完信息论之后,你还能拿什么来加演。伟大的科学家常常犯这个错误。他们没有继续去种下那些小橡子,而大橡树恰恰是从这些橡子里长出来的。他们想一上来就做成大事。可事情并不是这么运转的。所以,这也是为什么你会发现,早早得到认可,反而像是把人给阉割了。

事实上,我愿意引用一句我多年最喜欢的话。在我看来,普林斯顿高等研究院毁掉的优秀科学家,比它培养出来的还多。这个判断,是看他们去之前做了什么,以及去之后又做了什么。不是说他们后来就不行了,而是说,他们去之前是卓越,去之后只剩下优秀。

这就引出了另一个话题,也许顺序有点乱,就是工作条件。大多数人以为最好的工作条件,其实并不是。很明显不是,因为人们在工作条件很差时,反而常常最有产出。剑桥物理实验室有一段很好的时期,当时他们几乎是在棚屋里干活,却做出了一些最好的物理。

我讲个自己的故事。很早的时候我就明白,贝尔实验室不会按传统方式,给我一大群程序员,让他们用绝对二进制去给计算机编程。很明显,他们不会给。可那时候大家都是这么干的。我完全可以去西海岸,在飞机公司找份工作,毫不费劲。但那些令人兴奋的人在贝尔实验室,而那些飞机公司里的人不是。我想了很久,我到底该不该走,我怎么才能把两个世界的好处都拿到。最后我对自己说,汉明,你不是一直觉得机器几乎什么都能干吗,那为什么不能让它们自己写程序呢。起初看起来像个缺陷的东西,逼得我很早就走进了自动编程。很多时候,一个看似缺点的东西,只要换个角度看,反而会变成你最大的资产之一。当然,你第一次看到时,多半不会这么想。你当时只会说,天哪,我永远都拿不到足够的程序员,那我还怎么做出伟大的编程。类似的故事还有很多,格蕾丝·霍珀也有。

我觉得,如果你认真看,就会发现,伟大的科学家常常是把问题稍微转了个方向,就把缺陷变成了资产。比如很多科学家在发现自己做不出来一个问题之后,最后开始研究为什么做不出来。然后他们就把问题反过来看,说,当然,这其实就是它真正的样子,于是得到一个重要结果。所以理想工作条件这件事非常奇怪。你想要的那种条件,不一定真的最适合你。

再说驱动力。你会发现,大多数伟大的科学家都有惊人的驱动力。我在贝尔实验室和约翰·图基共事了十年。他的驱动力极强。我进实验室大概三四年后,有一天突然发现,约翰·图基比我还小一点。约翰是天才,而我显然不是。于是我冲进博德的办公室,说,怎么可能有人和我差不多年纪,却懂得比约翰·图基还多。他往椅背上一靠,把手放到脑后,微微一笑,说,汉明,你要是这些年像他那样拼命工作,你知道的东西会多得让你吃惊。我灰溜溜地走出了办公室。

博德的意思是这样的。知识和产出像复利。两个人能力差不多,其中一个人比另一个人多努力 10%,那么前者的总产出会超过后者两倍还不止。你知道得越多,就学得越多。学得越多,就越能做事。越能做事,机会也越多。这几乎就是复利。我不想给你具体利率,但那是个非常高的利率。两个人能力完全一样,其中一个人如果每天都能比另一个人多挤出一个小时来思考,那么从一生来看,他的产出会高得惊人。

我把博德的话记在了心里。之后几年,我花了更多时间,努力让自己再多用点劲。结果我确实发现,工作能做得更多。我不太想当着我太太的面承认,但我有时候确实有点忽略她,因为我得学习。要是你真打算把想做的事做成,就必须忽略一些别的东西。这个毫无疑问。

说到驱动力,爱迪生讲过一句话,天才是百分之九十九的汗水,加百分之一的灵感。他可能有点夸张,但意思是,扎实的工作,持续地做,会把你带到非常远的地方。持续地付出努力,再加上一点更聪明的投入,这才有用。问题也正在这里。驱动力如果用错地方,是到不了任何地方的。我一直想不明白,为什么我在贝尔实验室那些很优秀的朋友,工作和我一样努力,甚至更努力,最后却没有多少可拿出来说的成果。努力用错地方,是很严重的事。只靠勤奋不够,必须用得明智。

还有另一个特质,我也想讲讲,那就是对模糊性的容忍。我花了一段时间才意识到它的重要性。大多数人喜欢相信某件事非真即假。伟大的科学家对模糊性容忍得很好。他们对理论的相信程度,足够让他们继续做下去;他们对理论的怀疑程度,也足够让他们注意到错误和缺陷,从而再往前迈一步,建立新的替代理论。你如果太相信,就永远看不到裂缝。你如果太怀疑,就根本不会开始。这需要一种极美的平衡。

但多数伟大的科学家,都很清楚自己的理论为什么对,同时也很清楚其中有哪些细微的不合拍之处,他们不会忘记这些地方。达尔文在自传里写过,他发现自己必须把每一条看起来和自己信念相矛盾的证据写下来,不然它们会从脑子里消失。当你发现某些表面上的漏洞时,你得足够敏感,把这些东西记住,并且一直留意,看它们能如何被解释,或者理论该怎么改才能容纳它们。这些地方,往往正是最伟大的贡献所在。伟大的贡献很少只是多加一位小数。

说到底,这是情感上的投入。大多数伟大的科学家都对自己的问题全情投入。那些没有真正投入的人,很少能做出杰出的、一流的工作。当然,再说一次,情感投入本身并不够。但它显然是必要条件。我想我可以告诉你原因。所有研究创造力的人,最后都会被逼到同一句话,创造力来自潜意识。不知怎么地,它突然就出来了。它就是突然出现。我们对潜意识知道得很少,但有一点你应该很清楚,你的梦也来自潜意识。而你也知道,你的梦在相当程度上是在重组你白天的经历。如果你一天又一天地深深沉浸在某个主题里,完全投入其中,你的潜意识除了处理这个问题,也没别的事好干。于是某天早上你醒来,或者某天下午,答案就在那里了。那些没有投入到当前问题中的人,潜意识会跑去干别的,于是出不了大成果。

所以,管理自己的办法就是,当你手上有真正重要的问题时,不要让别的东西占据你注意力的中心,你要让自己的思维一直围着这个问题转。让你的潜意识饿着肚子,逼着它去做你的问题。这样你晚上能安稳睡觉,早上起来免费拿到答案。

刚才艾伦·奇诺维思提到,我以前常在物理那桌吃饭。我原来跟数学家一起吃,后来发现数学我已经知道不少了,其实没学到太多东西。物理那桌,正如他所说,是个很刺激的地方,不过我觉得他夸大了我在那里的贡献。听肖克利、布拉顿、巴丁、J. B. 约翰逊、肯·麦凯这些人说话,非常有意思,我也学到了很多。可惜后来诺贝尔奖来了,升职也来了,剩下的只是一群残渣。没人想要那些剩下的人。那我当然没必要继续和他们一起吃。

餐厅另一边有一桌化学家。我和其中一个人,大卫·麦考尔,一起工作过。而且当时他正在追我们秘书。我走过去说,我能不能加入你们。他们总不能说不。于是我跟他们吃了一阵子。然后我开始问,你们这个领域里重要的问题是什么。过了一周左右,我又问,你们正在做哪些重要问题。再过一阵子,有一天我走进去,对他们说,如果你们做的事并不重要,而且你们自己也不觉得它会通向什么重要的东西,那你们为什么还在贝尔实验室做它。那以后我就不太受欢迎了,只好另找人一起吃饭。

那是春天。到秋天,大卫·麦考尔在走廊里拦住我,说,汉明,你那句话扎进我心里了。我整个夏天都在想,也就是我这个领域里真正重要的问题是什么。他说,我没有改变我的研究,但我觉得这件事很值得。我说,谢谢你,大卫,就走了。几个月后我注意到,他当了系主任。前几天我又注意到,他成了美国国家工程院院士。我还注意到,他成功了。而同桌其他那些人的名字,我从没再在科学圈里听见过。他们没法问自己一句,我这个领域里重要的问题是什么。

如果你不做重要的问题,那你很难做出重要的工作。这显而易见。伟大的科学家会非常认真地想清楚,他们领域里有哪些重要问题,并且一直留意该怎么下手。

我要提醒你一句,重要问题这个说法必须小心界定。某种意义上说,物理学里最突出的三个问题,在我待在贝尔实验室期间,从来没人做过。所谓重要,意思是只要做出来,诺贝尔奖和你想要的任何金额的钱都稳了。我们没有去做的是,第一,时间旅行。第二,瞬间传送。第三,反重力。它们不是重要问题,因为我们没有可行的攻击路径。一个问题之所以重要,不是因为结果有多大,而是因为你有一个合理的进攻办法。这才让它重要。我说大多数科学家没有在做重要问题,我指的是这个意义上的不重要。

据我观察,普通科学家几乎把所有时间都花在那些他们自己也不认为重要的问题上,而且他们也不相信这些问题会通向重要问题。前面我说过要种橡子,日后才会长成橡树。你不可能总是精确知道自己该站在哪,但你至少可以待在某些可能发生事情的地方。即便你相信伟大的科学只是运气,那你也可以站在会打雷的山顶上,而不必躲在安全的山谷里。可普通科学家几乎总是在做例行、安全的工作,所以产出不多。就是这么简单。你如果想做伟大的工作,就必须做重要的问题,而且你应该心里有数。

基于这个想法,在约翰·图基等人的一再催促下,我最后养成了一个习惯,我叫它 Great Thoughts Time。每周五中午去吃午饭后,我只谈伟大的想法。所谓伟大的想法,就是像这样的问题,计算机会在整个 AT&T 里扮演什么角色。计算机会怎样改变科学。比如我当时观察到,十个实验里有九个是在实验室里做的,十个里只有一个在计算机上做。我有一次对几位副总裁说,这个比例会反过来,也就是十个里有九个实验会在计算机上完成,十个里只有一个在实验室里。他们知道我是个疯数学家,毫无现实感。我知道他们错了。后来事实证明他们错了,我是对的。他们建了很多根本不需要的实验室。我之所以看出计算机正在改变科学,是因为我花了很多时间去问,计算机会对科学产生什么影响,我又能如何推动这个变化。

我问自己,这会怎样改变贝尔实验室。有一次在同一场演讲里我还说过,在我离开之前,贝尔实验室里会有超过一半的人和计算机密切交互。现在你们每个人都有终端了。我认真想的是,我的领域要往哪走,机会在哪里,什么事值得做。我应该去那些地方,这样我才有机会做出重要的事。

多数伟大的科学家都知道很多重要问题。他们手里大概有 10 到 20 个重要问题,一直在等着找到进攻路径。一旦出现一个新想法,你会听见他们说,嗯,这对那个问题有关系。然后他们就会把别的都放下,扑上去做。

我现在可以给你讲个可怕的故事。别人讲给我的,但我不能保证它是真的。有一次我在机场,和一个来自洛斯阿拉莫斯的朋友聊天,说裂变实验当年恰好先在欧洲发生真是运气,因为那促使我们在美国开始造原子弹。他说,不对。在伯克利,我们当时已经积累了一堆数据,只是因为还在搭更多设备,所以没来得及去处理那些数据。如果我们当时把那些数据处理了,我们就会发现裂变。他们已经把东西拿在手里了,却没有追下去。结果他们成了第二名。

伟大的科学家一旦机会打开,就会扑上去追。他们会把别的事都扔掉。他们能把其他东西清出去,追着一个想法不放,是因为他们早就把这件事想透了。他们的头脑已经准备好了。一看见机会,就上。很多时候当然也不会成,但你只要抓住其中少数几次,就足够做出伟大的科学。某种意义上说,这还挺容易。最大的诀窍之一,就是活得久一点。

还有一个特征,我也是过了一阵子才注意到。我观察那些开着门工作的人和关着门工作的人。我发现,如果你把办公室门关上,今天和明天你确实能做更多工作,而且你的短期产出会超过大多数人。但十年以后,不知怎么回事,你就不太知道哪些问题值得做了。你辛苦做出来的工作,在重要性上总有点偏。那个开着门工作的人,会不断被打断,但他也偶尔会得到一些线索,知道这个世界现在是什么样,什么东西也许重要。

我没法证明这里的因果关系,因为你也可以说,关门只是封闭心态的象征。我不知道。但我可以说,开门工作的人,和最后做出重要事情的人之间,相关性相当高,虽然关门工作的人常常更努力。问题就在于,他们总是差一点点做错题,不是差很多,但足够让他们错过名声。

我还想讲另一个题目。它来自一首歌,你们很多人应该都知道,不在于你做什么,而在于你怎么做。我先讲自己的一个例子。在绝对二进制时代,我被骗着用数字计算机去做一个连最好的模拟计算机都做不出来的问题。而且我还真算出了答案。后来我仔细一想,对自己说,汉明,你迟早得给这个军方项目交报告。你花了这么多钱,总得有个交代。每个模拟机单位都会拿你的报告去挑刺,看能不能找出毛病。我当时做积分的方法,说难听点,确实很烂,但答案是出来了。然后我意识到,问题的真相并不只是把答案算出来。真正的问题,是第一次并且毫无争议地证明,我能在模拟计算机最擅长的地盘上,用数字机器赢它。我于是重做了解法,建立了一套漂亮而优雅的理论,也改变了我们计算答案的方式,结果数值并没有不同。最后发表出来的报告里,是一种优雅的方法。多年以后,这个方法被称作 Hamming's Method of Integrating Differential Equations。现在它多少有点过时了,但在当时那确实是个很好的方法。通过稍微改写一下问题,我做成的是重要工作,而不是琐碎工作。

同样地,在早年用阁楼上那台机器时,我一个问题接一个问题地解。成功的不少,失败的也有几个。有个星期五,我解决完一个问题回家,奇怪的是,我并不高兴,我很沮丧。我看到的人生像是一长串一个接一个的问题。想了很久之后,我决定,不,我不该只是单件生产一个可变产品。我应该关心明年所有的问题,而不只是眼前这个。通过改变提问方式,我依然得到同样甚至更好的结果,但我改变了事情的性质,也因此做了重要的工作。我开始进攻那个更大的问题,我怎样征服机器,怎样处理明年所有的问题,哪怕我现在还不知道那些问题会是什么。我该怎么为它做准备。我该怎么做眼前这个问题,才能在未来保持领先。我怎样遵守牛顿那条规则。牛顿说,如果我比别人看得更远,那是因为我站在巨人的肩膀上。如今我们是踩在彼此的脚上。你应该以这样一种方式完成你的工作,让别人能够在上面继续搭建,好让他们真的能说,是的,我站在某某人的肩膀上,所以我看得更远。科学的本质是累积的。很多时候,只要把问题稍微改一下,你做出来的就可能是伟大的工作,而不只是好的工作。

我后来给自己定了个原则,除非一个孤立问题能代表一整个类别,否则我再也不去解孤立问题。如果你多少懂点数学,你就知道,努力去推广,常常意味着解法反而更简单。很多时候,只要停下来对自己说,这确实是他想要解决的那个问题,但它其实只是某某类问题的一个典型。是的,我完全可以用一种远优于当前个案的办法,把整类问题一起解决。因为我此前是陷在不必要的细节里了。抽象化这件事,常常会让事情变简单。而且,我也把这些方法存了起来,为未来的问题做准备。

这一部分结束前,我想提醒你一句,差劲的工人才会怪工具,好手会拿着手头现有的东西把活做下去,并尽可能给出最好的答案。我建议你通过改变问题,通过换个角度看事情,能极大改变自己最后的产出。因为你可以把工作做成一种别人真能接着往上搭的样子,也可以做成一种下一个人必须几乎从头再做一遍的样子。这不只是工作本身的问题,还包括你怎么写报告,怎么写论文,整个态度。把事情做得宽一点、一般一点,并不比只做一个很特殊的个案更难。而且满足感和回报都大得多。

现在我讲到一个很令人不舒服的话题。只把事情做好还不够,你还得把它卖出去。对科学家来说,推销这个词很别扭。它很难看。你觉得自己不该干这种事。世界本来就该在那里等着,当你做出伟大的成果时,大家应该冲出来欢迎它。可事实是,每个人都忙着做自己的事。你必须把你的成果呈现得足够好,好到别人愿意放下手头的事,来看你做了什么,把它读完,然后回来对你说,是的,这东西真不错。

我建议你翻期刊时,自己问问,为什么有些文章你会读,有些你不会读。你最好把报告写成这样,当它发表在 Physical Review 或你想发的任何地方时,读者翻页的时候,不会只是翻过你那几页,而会停下来读你的。如果他们不停下来看,你就得不到认可。

推销这件事里有三件必须做的事。你得学会写得清楚、写得好,这样别人才会读。你还得学会做比较正式的演讲。你也必须学会做非正式的表达。我们过去有很多所谓的 back room scientists. 在会议上,他们一言不发。等到三周后决策都做完了,他们再交上来一份报告,说为什么应该做这个做那个。可那时候已经晚了。他们没法在激烈会议的正中间,在事情正热的时候,站起来说,我们应该这样做,理由是这些。你也必须掌握这种沟通形式,而不只是准备好的演讲。

我刚开始时,一上台演讲几乎会生理性不适,紧张得厉害。我意识到,要么我得学会流畅地做演讲,要么我的整个职业生涯都会因此残掉一大块。第一次 IBM 请我去纽约晚上做演讲时,我决定我要讲一场真正好的演讲,一场别人想听的演讲。不是技术细节,而是一个更宽的演讲。讲完后,如果他们喜欢,我就轻描淡写地说一句,你们什么时候想听,我都可以来讲。结果,我因此得到了大量在有限听众面前练习演讲的机会,也克服了害怕。更重要的是,我也因此能够研究,什么方法有效,什么方法无效。

而在参加各种会议时,我早就在研究,为什么有些论文会被记住,大多数不会。技术人员总想讲一场范围非常窄、非常技术化的报告。可大多数时候,听众想听的是一场更宽泛的报告,他们想要比讲者愿意给的更多综述和背景。所以很多报告都没效果。讲者报出一个题目,突然就一头扎进自己解决的细节里。台下能跟上的人很少。你应该先画出一幅整体图景,说明为什么它重要,然后再慢慢勾勒你做了什么。这样更多人会说,是的,乔做了这个。或者,玛丽做了这个。我真看懂了它在哪里。是的,玛丽这场讲得真好,我明白玛丽做了什么。人们倾向于讲一种范围极小、非常安全的报告。通常这没有效果。而且,很多报告的信息量远远过大。所以我说,推销这件事,其实很明显。

我来总结一下。你必须做重要的问题。我不承认一切都只是运气,但我也承认,运气成分确实不小。我认同巴斯德那句,运气偏爱有准备的头脑。我非常赞成自己做过的那件事。多年来每个星期五下午,只想伟大的想法。这意味着我把 10% 的时间投入到理解领域里更大的问题上,也就是哪些重要,哪些不重要。早年我发现,自己明明相信的是 this,可一整周却都在朝 that 方向走。这很愚蠢。如果我真觉得行动应该在那边,为什么我却往这边走。我不是该改目标,就是该改行为。于是我改了自己的做法,开始朝我认为重要的方向走。就这么简单。

现在你可能会告诉我,你并不能控制自己被要求做什么。刚开始也许确实不能。但一旦你取得一定成功,找你出结果的人会多到你根本应付不过来。那时你就有了一些选择权,虽然不是完全的。

关于这一点,我给你讲个故事,这也关系到如何教育你的老板。我有个老板叫谢尔库诺夫,他现在仍然是我的好朋友。有个军方的人来找我,硬要我在周五前给他答案。可我那时已经把计算资源投入到为一组科学家实时处理数据上了,我正埋在一堆短小、重要的问题里。这个军方的人要我在周五下班前把他的事做完。我说,不行,我周一给你。我周末可以做,但我现在不做。他跑去找我的老板谢尔库诺夫。谢尔库诺夫对我说,你必须先给他跑,他周五前必须拿到。我说,我为什么要。他说,你必须。我说,行,谢尔盖,那你周五下午就坐在办公室里,看着这个人是怎么走出那扇门的。

我在周五下午晚些时候把答案给了那位军方人士。然后我走进谢尔库诺夫办公室坐下。那人走出去时,我说,你看见了吗,谢尔库诺夫,这个人手里什么都没拿,但我已经把答案给他了。周一早上,谢尔库诺夫给那人打电话,问,你周末来加班了吗。我几乎能听到电话那头的停顿。那个人脑子里一定在飞快盘算接下来会发生什么。但他知道真要来加班就必须签到,他最好别说谎,所以他说没有。从那以后,谢尔库诺夫就说,截止时间由你来定,你也可以改。这一课就够他明白,为什么我不想让大项目挤掉探索性研究,为什么我有理由拒绝那些会吞光全部科研计算资源的紧急活。我想做的,是用这些资源去算大量小问题。

再举一个早年的例子。那时我的计算能力非常有限,而且在我的领域里,很明显,数学家根本用不着机器。但我需要更多机器能力。每次我不得不对别的领域的科学家说,不行,我没有足够机器能力时,他们都会抱怨。我就说,你去告诉你的副总裁,汉明需要更多计算能力。过了一阵子,我能看出上面发生了什么。很多人都在对我的副总裁说,你手下那个人需要更多计算能力。结果我拿到了。

我还做了第二件事。早期计算年代里,我们把仅有的一点编程力量借给别人帮忙时,我会说,我们的程序员没有得到应得的认可。你发表论文时必须感谢那位程序员,不然以后别再来找我帮忙。那位程序员要被点名感谢,她很辛苦。过了几年,我翻了一整年的 BSTJ 文章,数有多少比例提到了某位程序员。我把结果拿给老板,说,这就是计算在贝尔实验室里扮演的中心角色。如果 BSTJ 重要,那这就说明计算有多重要。他只好让步。

你可以教育你的老板。这很难。但在这场演讲里,我只从下往上看,不从上往下看。我讲的是,哪怕高层管理挡着你,你仍然可以怎样得到自己想要的东西。你也必须在那里把你的想法卖出去。

现在我来到最后一个问题,努力成为伟大的科学家,值得吗。要回答这个问题,你得去问那些人。只要你绕过他们的谦虚,大多数人都会说,是的,做出真正一流的工作,并且自己知道它是一流的,那种感觉比酒、女人和歌加在一起还好。要是是女性,她会说,比酒、男人和歌加在一起还好。而且你看看那些老板,他们总是会回来,或者索要报告,想参与那些发现发生的瞬间。他们老挡路。所以显然,那些做过这种事的人,还想再做一次。当然,这是一个有偏样本。我从来不敢去问那些没有做出伟大工作的人,他们对此感觉如何。不过我依然认为,这个挣扎是值得的。

我非常明确地觉得,努力去做一流工作是值得的。因为真相是,价值更多在挣扎本身,而不在结果。努力把自己塑造成某种样子的过程,本身就值得。成功和名声,在我看来,只像是股息。

我已经告诉过你怎么做了。既然这么简单,为什么还有这么多有才华的人失败。比如直到今天,我仍然觉得,贝尔实验室数学部里有不少人,比我更有能力、天赋也更好,但他们的产出没有我多。当然也有人产出比我多。香农就比我多,还有其他一些人也做了很多。但和许多条件比我更好的人相比,我依然是高产的。为什么会这样。他们到底出了什么事。为什么那么多本来大有希望的人,会失败。

其中一个原因,是驱动力和投入。那些能力没那么强、但真正投入进去做伟大工作的人,往往比那些本事很大、却只是浅尝辄止的人做得更多。后者白天工作,回家干别的,第二天再回来工作。他们没有那种对真正一流工作显然必需的深度投入。他们会做出很多好工作,但别忘了,我们说的是一流工作。这里是有区别的。优秀的人、非常有才华的人,几乎总能做出好工作。我们谈的是那种突出的工作,那种能拿诺贝尔奖、能被真正记住的工作。

第二个原因,我觉得,是人格缺陷。举一个我在欧文遇见的人为例。他曾经是某个计算中心的主任,临时借调去当大学校长的特别助理。很明显,他前途极好。有一次他带我进办公室,给我展示他如何处理信件、如何管理来往文件。他指出秘书有多低效。他把信件都堆得到处都是,但他知道每样东西在哪。他还能在自己的文字处理机上把信写出来。他很得意,说这办法多妙,不受秘书干扰,他能多做多少工作。后来我背着他去找了秘书。秘书说,我当然帮不了他。他不把邮件给我,我没法登记。我不知道他把东西扔在地板的哪里。我当然帮不了他。

于是我去对他说,你看,如果你坚持现在这种方法,只靠自己一个人能做多少就做多少,那你也就只能走到你单打独斗能走到的地方。你如果学会和这个系统协作,你就可以走到整个系统能支持你走到的地方。可他再也没走得更远。他的人格缺陷在于,他想要完全控制,不愿承认你需要系统的支持。

这种事你会一再看见。优秀的科学家宁愿和系统对着干,也不肯学会怎么和系统一起工作,并利用系统能提供的一切。其实系统能给你的东西很多,只要你学会怎么用。它需要耐心,但你完全可以学会把系统用得很好,也可以学会怎么绕开它。毕竟,如果你想得到一个 No,那太容易了。你去找老板,马上就能拿到一个 No。如果你真想做成一件事,别问,直接做。把既成事实摆到他面前。别给他机会说 No。但如果你想要一个 No,那就太容易得到了。

另一个人格缺陷是自我张扬。这里我讲讲自己的经历。我从洛斯阿拉莫斯出来后,早年在纽约麦迪逊大道 590 号用一台机器,那只是我们租时间用的。我当时还穿西部风格的衣服,大斜口袋、波洛领结之类的一整套。我隐约注意到,自己得到的服务没有别人好。于是我开始测量。你走进去排队等轮到自己,我感觉自己拿不到公平待遇。我就问自己,为什么。IBM 的副总裁不可能特地交代,给汉明找麻烦。是底下那些秘书在这么做。出现空档时,她们会立刻去找人插进去,但她们出去找的是别人。为什么。我又没得罪她们。答案是,我的穿着不符合她们认为这种场合的人该有的样子。问题就这么简单,我穿得不对。

于是我得做个决定。我是要坚持自我,继续按自己喜欢的样子穿,让这件事持续不断地消耗我职业生涯中的精力。还是我要让自己的外表看起来更合规一些。最后我决定,我要努力让自己显得更符合期待。结果我一这么做,服务立刻就好多了。到了现在,我成了个上了年纪、挺有特色的怪老头,反而比别人得到更好的服务。

你应该按照听众的期待来穿。如果我要去 MIT 计算中心演讲,我就会戴波洛领结,穿旧灯芯绒夹克之类的。我很清楚,不能让衣着、外表、举止挡在我真正关心的事情前面。太多科学家觉得自己必须彰显自我,必须按自己的方式来。他们一定要这样,一定要那样,于是终生都在为此付出持续的代价。约翰·图基几乎总是穿得很随便。他走进一个重要办公室后,往往要过很久,对方才意识到,这个人是一流人物,最好认真听。从很久以前开始,约翰就一直得克服这种敌意。这完全是浪费精力。

我不是说你必须 conform。我说的是,看起来 conform,会让你轻松很多。如果你选择在各种地方自我表达,说我要按我的方式来,那你就在整个职业生涯中持续不断地付出小额代价。而这一生累积下来,就是大量根本没必要的麻烦。

我花一点心思给秘书讲笑话,待人友善,结果换来了极好的秘书支持。比如有一次,不知出于什么愚蠢原因,默里山那边所有复印服务全都卡死了。别问我怎么做到的,反正就是卡死了。我有东西急着要处理。我的秘书打电话给霍姆德尔那边的某个人,跳上公司车,花一个小时赶过去,复印完又赶回来。这就是回报。因为平时我会努力让她开心一点,给她讲笑话,待她友善。那一点额外的投入,后来都回报到我身上了。

一旦你明白自己必须利用系统,并认真研究怎样让系统替你工作,你就学会了怎样把系统调整到符合你的需要。否则你也可以终生和它持续对抗,像打一场小规模却从不宣战的战争。我觉得约翰·图基为此付出了非常惨重而没必要的代价。他本来就是天才,但我认为如果他愿意稍微配合一点,而不是不断彰显自我,事情会更好,也简单得多。他就是要一直按自己想要的样子穿。这不仅适用于穿衣,也适用于一千件别的事。人们会一直和系统对着干。当然,也不是说一次都不该干。

有次他们把图书馆从默里山中间搬到最远的一头,我一个朋友申请要一辆自行车。组织当然不傻。他们拖了一阵子,回了他一张园区地图,说请你在这张图上标出你要走哪些路径,这样我们才能替你办保险。又过了几个星期,他们又问,自行车你准备放哪里,又要怎么锁,我们才能怎么怎么样。他最后终于明白,自己当然会被文牍程序活活拖死,于是就认了。后来他升成了贝尔实验室总裁。巴尼·奥利弗是个能人。

他有一次给 IEEE 写信。当时贝尔实验室官方书架层高就是那么高,而当时 IEEE Proceedings 的刊物尺寸更高。既然你没法改官方书架层高,他就给 IEEE 出版负责人写信,说鉴于贝尔实验室里有这么多 IEEE 会员,而且官方空间高度就是这样,期刊尺寸应该改。他把这封信拿给老板签字。结果签了字的复写件倒是回来了,但直到今天他也不知道原件到底有没有寄出去。

我不是说你不该做一些改革姿态。我是说,根据我对能人的观察,他们不会把自己卷进这种战争里。他们玩一小下就收手,然后继续去做自己的工作。许多二流人物会因为和系统赌一口气而彻底陷进去,最后打成战争。他把精力浪费在愚蠢的项目上。

现在你会对我说,总得有人改变系统吧。我同意,总得有人来改。问题是,你想成为哪一种人。你是想成为改变系统的人,还是想成为做一流科学的人。你到底想成为哪一种。你得想清楚,当你和系统对着干时,你在做什么。你是出于玩笑想走多远,又要为这件事浪费多少力气。我的建议是,让别人去改系统,你去把自己变成一流科学家。你们当中极少有人有能力既改革系统,又成为一流科学家。

当然,我们也不能永远让步。有些时候,适度反叛是合理的。我观察到,几乎所有科学家都享受某种程度上捉弄系统的乐趣。问题的本质是,你不可能只在一个地方原创,而在别的地方完全不原创。原创,本来就意味着和别人不一样。你不可能成为一个原创的科学家,却在其他方面完全没有任何原创性特征。但很多科学家让自己在别处的小怪癖,付出了远远高于必要程度的代价,只是为了满足一点自我。不是说一切自我表达都不行,我反对的是其中一部分。

另一个毛病是愤怒。科学家常常会生气,而这根本不是处理事情的方式。可以拿它来取乐,但别动怒。愤怒是错位的。你应该顺着系统、配合系统,而不是一直和系统较劲。

你还应该努力去看事情积极的一面,而不是消极的一面。我前面已经给过你几个例子,还有很多很多类似的例子。面对一个既定局面,我只是换了个看法,就把一个原本像缺陷的东西变成了资产。我再给你一个例子。我是个自负的人,这毫无疑问。我知道,大多数请了学术休假去写书的人,最后都不能按时写完。所以在离开之前,我告诉了所有朋友,等我回来时,那本书一定已经写完了。对,我一定会写完。我绝不能灰溜溜地空手回来。我用自己的自尊,逼自己按想要的方式行动。我先把事情吹出去,这样我就不得不做到。后来我多次发现,像一只被逼到墙角的老鼠那样,我的能力往往比我自己以为的还强。

我发现,先说一句,哦,没问题,我周二就把答案给你,哪怕我压根不知道怎么做,也常常有用。到了周日晚,我就会非常拼命地想,周二到底怎么交差。我经常把自己的面子押上去。有时也会失败,但正如我说的,像一只被逼到墙角的老鼠一样,我很惊讶自己居然经常干得还不错。

我觉得你需要学会利用自己。你需要知道,怎样把同一个局面从一种看法切换到另一种看法,以提高成功概率。

人类的自我欺骗非常非常常见。你可以用无数种方式扭曲一件事,骗自己,让它看起来像别的样子。别人问你,为什么你没做成某某事,这个人总会有一千条借口。你去看科学史,通常总有十个人几乎同时站在那个点上,而最后拿到回报的,是第一个做到的人。剩下那九个人会说,我也想到过,但是我没去做,等等等等。借口多得很。你为什么不是第一个。你为什么没有做好。别找借口。别骗自己。你要对别人说多少借口我都不介意。但对你自己,你最好诚实一点。如果你真的想成为一流科学家,你就得了解自己,了解自己的弱点、强项,以及那些糟糕的毛病,比如我的自负。你怎样把缺点变成资产。你怎样把一个人手不足的局面,变成一个反而推动你走向正确方向的局面,而那偏偏正是你需要做的。

我再说一遍。回顾历史时,我看到的成功科学家,都是通过改变视角,把原本的缺陷变成了资产。

总结一下。我认为,为什么那么多人明明已经接近伟大却没有成功,其中一些原因是,他们没有做重要的问题,他们没有情感上的投入,他们没有努力把困难的问题改写成另一种更容易做但依然重要的局面,而且他们总是在给自己找借口。他们总说,一切只是运气。我已经告诉你,这件事有多简单。我也告诉你该怎么改。那就出发吧,去成为伟大的科学家。

问答

A. G. 奇诺维思:刚才那 50 分钟,是一场高度浓缩的智慧和观察,背后是一个非凡职业生涯积累下来的东西。我几乎数不过来有多少观点一下子戳到了要害。有些还特别应景。比如对更多计算能力的呼吁,今天早上我就从好几个人那里反复听到,都是这个。所以这话今天依然完全说中,虽然你说这些类似的话,已经是二三十年前的事了,迪克。从你的演讲里,我们每个人都能抽出很多教训。就我来说,以后在走廊里转的时候,我希望在贝尔通信研究中心能少看到一些紧闭的门。这是我觉得特别有意思的一点。非常非常感谢你,迪克,这真是一段精彩的回顾。现在我开放提问。我相信很多人都想接着问迪克刚才提到的一些点。

汉明:先回应一下艾伦·奇诺维思关于计算的事。我当时把计算放在研究部门里,整整十年我都在对管理层说,把那台 !&@#% 机器从研究部门里弄出去。我们被迫不停地跑任务。我们根本没法做研究,因为忙着操作和维护这些计算机。最后这话终于传过去了。他们决定把计算从研究部门挪到别的地方。至少可以说,我那时非常不受欢迎。我甚至有点惊讶大家没踢我的小腿,因为每个人都觉得自己的玩具被拿走了。我走进艾德·戴维的办公室,对他说,听着,艾德,你必须给研究人员一台机器。如果你给他们一台很大的机器,我们又会回到以前的麻烦里,忙着让它运转,忙到没空思考。给他们你能给的最小的机器,因为他们都是很有本事的人。他们会学会怎样在小机器上做成事情,而不是靠大规模计算。就我个人看,这就是 UNIX 诞生的方式。我们给了他们一台不算大的机器,他们决定让它去做伟大的事。于是他们必须搞出一个系统来干这个。这东西就叫 UNIX。

A. G. 奇诺维思:这一点我必须接一下。在我们现在这个环境里,迪克,当我们还在和一部分由监管者带来的、或者说监管要求下的文书流程纠缠时,有一句话是某位被逼急了的助理副总裁说出来的,我后来一用再用。他气呼呼地说,UNIX 从来就不是一个可交付物。

问题:个人压力呢。它会不会带来差别。

汉明:会,当然会。如果你没有情感投入,那倒不会。我在贝尔实验室的大多数年份里,都有将要溃疡的征兆。后来我去了海军研究生院,松了一点,现在身体好多了。但如果你想成为伟大的科学家,你就得接受压力。你可以过一种舒服日子,你可以做个好好先生,也可以当个伟大的科学家。可好好先生总是最后一个,里奥·杜罗彻就是这么说的。你如果想过一种愉快、轻松、充满娱乐的生活,那你当然能过上那样的生活。

问题:关于勇气这件事,没人会反对。但像我们这些头发灰了的,或者已经站稳脚跟的人,不用太担心这个。可现在年轻人中,我感觉到的是,在一个高度竞争的环境里,他们对冒险这件事真的很焦虑。对此你有什么建议吗。

汉明:我再引用一点艾德·戴维的话。艾德·戴维担心的是,我们社会普遍失去了某种胆气。我确实觉得,我们经历过不同的时期。从战争中出来,从我们在洛斯阿拉莫斯造出原子弹出来,从我们造出雷达出来,一批非常有胆量的人进入了数学部门和研究部门。他们刚刚亲眼见过事情被做成。他们刚刚赢下了一场非凡的战争。我们有理由有勇气,所以我们也确实做成了很多事。我没法再造出那种局面。我不能因此责怪这一代人没有那种东西,但我同意你的说法。我只是没法把责任压在他们身上。在我看来,他们似乎没有那种追求伟大的欲望,他们缺少去做这件事的勇气。但我们当时有,是因为我们身处一个特别有利于产生这种勇气的环境。我们刚刚经历了一场极其成功的战争。战争期间,有很长一段时间局势很糟,非常非常艰难,这点你也清楚。而我觉得,胜利给了我们勇气和自信。这也就是为什么你会看到,从四十年代后期到五十年代,实验室有惊人的高产,而这种高产正是被更早的那些经历点燃的。因为很多人更早时被迫学会别的东西,我们被迫学会那些自己不想学的东西,我们被迫开着门,后来才能把学到的东西用出来。这是事实。我也没法改变它,我同样没法责怪这一代人。这就是事实。

问题:管理层有没有什么能做、或者该做的事。

汉明:管理层能做的很少。如果你想谈如何管理研究,那是另一场完全不同的演讲。我可以再讲一个小时。但这场演讲说的是,不管管理层做什么,不管有什么阻力,个人怎样依然能做出非常成功的研究。你该怎么做。我只是把我观察到的人们是怎么做的说出来而已。就是这么简单,也这么难。

问题:头脑风暴应该是个日常过程吗。

汉明:有一段时间这事很流行,但看起来没什么效果。对我自己来说,我觉得和别人交谈是有益的。但正式的头脑风暴会很少值得。我确实会专门去找某个人,说,你看,我觉得这里一定有点什么。这是我看到的……然后我们就来回聊。但你得挑有本事的人。再借一个类比,你知道临界质量这个概念吧。材料够多了,就达到临界质量。还有一种东西,我以前叫它吸音棉。吸音棉一多,你抛出一个想法,他们只会说,是,是,是。你真正想要的是让临界质量转起来。对方会说,是啊,这让我想到某某。或者,你有没有想过这个,或者那个。你和别人交谈时,要把那些吸音棉清出去。他们也许是好人,但只会说,哦对对对。你要找到那些会反过来刺激你的人。比如你没法和约翰·皮尔斯聊几句而不被迅速激发。我以前还和一群别的人聊。比如艾德·吉尔伯特,我常常去他办公室问问题,听他说,然后带着被激发的状态回来。我非常小心地挑选,和谁一起头脑风暴,不和谁一起。因为吸音棉是一种诅咒。他们只是很好的人,占满了整个空间,除了把想法吸掉之外,什么也不贡献。新想法不会回响,只会死在那里。是的,我觉得和人交谈是必要的。我认为那些关着门工作的人在这点上失败了,所以他们没法把自己的想法磨得更锋利。比如别人随口说一句,你有没有注意过那边那个东西。我本来完全不知道,于是我可以过去看看。别人给你指了方向。这次来这里,我已经发现了几本回家后必须读的书。我会和别人聊,也会问问题,只要我觉得他们能回答我、能给我一些我不知道的线索。我就会出去看。

问题:在分配时间时,你是怎么在阅读、写作和真正做研究之间权衡的。

汉明:我在年轻时相信,你至少该花和原始研究一样多的时间,去打磨和呈现它。也就是说,至少 50% 的时间要花在呈现上。这个比例非常非常大。

问题:图书馆工作该投入多少精力。

汉明:这要看领域。不过我可以这么说。贝尔实验室有个人,非常非常聪明。他总在图书馆里,什么都读。你要找参考文献,就去问他,他会给你一大堆引用。但在我形成这些理论的过程中,我得出了一个判断,长期来看,不会有任何一个效应以他的名字命名。现在他已经从贝尔实验室退休,是个兼职教授。他非常有价值,我不是在否认这一点。他写过一些很好的 Physical Review 论文。但没有任何效应以他命名,因为他读得太多了。如果你总在读别人做过什么,你就会按他们的方式思考。你如果想有新的、不同的想法,那就该像很多有创造力的人那样,把问题先弄得足够清楚,然后在你自己把这个问题想透之前,拒绝去看任何答案。先自己想,你会怎么做,你怎样稍微改一下问题,让它变成真正该做的问题。所以,是的,你需要跟上进展。你更应该通过阅读去知道问题在哪里,而不是去抄答案。阅读是必要的,它让你知道正在发生什么、什么是可能的。但靠阅读去找答案,似乎不是做出伟大研究的方式。所以我给你两个答案。你要读,但关键不在于读多少,而在于你怎么读。

问题:你怎么让自己的名字和某些东西绑定在一起。

汉明:靠做出伟大的工作。我给你讲讲 hamming window 这个例子。我以前老拿图基开玩笑,挤兑过他很多次。有一次他从普林斯顿打电话到默里山找我。我知道他当时正在写功率谱的东西。他问我,介不介意他把某个窗口叫作 hamming window。我对他说,得了吧,约翰。你明明知道我只做了很小一部分,但你自己也做了很多。他说,是啊,汉明,但你贡献了很多零碎的小东西,你配得上一些认可。于是他就把它叫作 hamming window。接着我再补一句。我以前老拿真正的伟大去逗约翰。我说,真正的伟大,是当你的名字像 ampere、watt、fourier 那样,变成小写字母。hamming window 就是这么来的。

问题:迪克,你愿意谈谈做演讲、写论文和写书这三者的相对效果吗。

汉明:从短期看,如果你想明天就刺激到某个人,论文很重要。如果你想要长期的认可,在我看来,写书贡献更大,因为我们大多数人需要方向感。在这个知识几乎无限的时代,我们需要方向,才能找到路。我告诉你什么叫知识无限。从牛顿到今天,知识大致每 17 年翻一倍。我们之所以还能应付,主要是靠专业分化。照这个速度,再过 340 年,就是 20 次翻倍,也就是一百万倍。那时每一个现在的学科,都会裂成一百万个专业。这不可能发生。知识的当前增长速度,最终会把自己噎死,除非我们有新的工具。我相信,那些试图消化、协调、去掉重复、去掉低效方法,并清楚呈现底层思想的书,才会是未来一代真正看重的东西。公开演讲是必要的。私下交流是必要的。论文也是必要的。但我倾向于认为,从长期看,那些删掉不必要内容的书,比那些什么都告诉你的书更重要。因为你并不想知道一切。通常的回答是,我并不想知道那么多关于企鹅的事。你只想知道本质。

问题:你提到了诺贝尔奖的问题,以及随之而来的名望对一些职业生涯造成的影响。这是不是更广泛的名气问题。一个人能怎么办。

汉明:你可以做的一些事是这样。大概每七年左右,在自己的领域里做一次相当明显的转向,哪怕不是彻底转向。比如我就定期从数值分析转到硬件,再转到软件,等等。因为你的想法会被用完。到了新领域,你得重新像个婴儿一样开始。你不再是那个大人物。你又可以回到起点,再次开始种那些会长成大橡树的小橡子。

我觉得香农把自己毁掉了。事实上,他离开贝尔实验室时,我就说过,香农的科学生涯到此结束了。我很多朋友因此很不高兴,说香农还是和以前一样聪明。我说,是的,他还是一样聪明,但他的科学生涯结束了。我至今都真心这么认为。你必须改变。过一阵子以后,你会疲惫。你会把自己在某个领域里的原创性用光。你需要去碰一点邻近的新东西。我不是说让你从音乐跳到理论物理,再跳到英国文学。我是说,在你的领域内部换一块地方,这样你才不会变陈旧。你当然没法靠强制规定每七年一换来真正解决问题,但如果可以,我会把它设成做研究的条件之一。你必须每七年换一次研究领域,当然要有一个合理的定义说明这意味着什么。或者到了十年,管理层有权强制你换。我会坚持要求改变,因为我是认真的。老家伙们的问题在于,他们练出了一套方法,就一直沿着它走下去。他们当初朝那个方向走是对的,但世界变了。新的方向在那里,可老家伙们还在沿着旧方向前进。你需要进入一个新领域,获取新视角,而且要在旧视角还没彻底耗尽之前去做。你是可以主动处理这件事的,但它需要努力和精力。你得有勇气说,是的,我要放下我那伟大的名声。

比如当纠错码的理论已经非常成型之后,我对自己说,汉明,你要停止读这个领域的论文。你要彻底无视它。你要逼自己去做别的,而不是靠这套东西继续滑行。我是故意拒绝继续留在那个领域里的。我甚至不读论文,就是为了强迫自己有机会去做别的。这就是我在管理自己,而这也是我整场演讲一直在讲的东西。因为我知道自己有很多毛病,所以我管理自己。我缺点很多,所以我有很多问题,也就是很多可以管理的空间。

问题:你会怎样比较研究和管理。

汉明:如果你想成为伟大的研究者,那你就不会一边当公司总裁一边做到。如果你想当公司总裁,那又是另一回事。我并不反对当公司总裁。我只是不想当。我觉得伊恩·罗斯做贝尔实验室总裁做得很好。我不是反对这件事。但你得清楚自己想要什么。而且,当你年轻时,你可能选择的是想成为伟大的科学家。但随着年龄增长,你可能会改变主意。比如有一天我去找老板博德,问他,你为什么要当部门主管。你为什么不只是做个优秀科学家。他说,汉明,我对贝尔实验室的数学应该是什么样,有一个愿景。我看出来,如果这个愿景要实现,那我就必须亲手把它做成。我就必须当部门主管。

当你的愿景,是你自己单枪匹马就能完成的东西,那你就该追它。等到有一天,你的愿景,也就是你觉得该做的事,已经大到不是你一个人能完成时,那你就得往管理走。愿景越大,你就得走到越高的管理层。如果你的愿景涉及整个实验室,或者整个贝尔系统,那你就必须走到那个位置上去把它做成。从底下很难做到。这取决于你的目标和欲望是什么。而随着人生变化,它们也会变。你必须准备好改变。我当初选择避开管理,是因为我更喜欢做那些自己一个人能做成的事。但那是我的选择,所以它天然带有偏见。每个人都可以做自己的选择。保持开放的心态。但一旦你选了路,看在老天的份上,你得清楚自己做了什么,也得清楚自己做了什么选择。别想两边都占。

问题:一个人对自己的期待有多重要。或者说,待在一个对你期待伟大成果的群体里有多重要。

汉明:在贝尔实验室,每个人都期待我做出好工作。这帮了大忙。大家都期待你把事做好,如果你有自尊,你就会把它做好。我觉得身边有一流的人非常重要。我总是主动去找最好的人。物理那桌一旦没了最好的人,我就离开。化学那桌也是一样。我总是尽量待在那些能力极强的人身边,这样我可以向他们学习,他们也会期待我交出伟大的结果。我认为,通过有意识地管理自己,我比 laissez faire 的方式做得好得多。

问题:你在演讲一开始,淡化了运气的重要性。但你似乎也有点轻轻带过了那些把你带到洛斯阿拉莫斯、带到芝加哥、带到贝尔实验室的环境因素。

汉明:这里面当然有运气。另一方面,我不知道那些没有发生的分支会怎样。除非你能证明别的分支不会同样成功,甚至更成功,否则我没法下判断。你做成的具体是哪件事,是不是有运气。当然有。比如我在洛斯阿拉莫斯见到费曼时,我就知道他将来会拿诺贝尔奖。我不知道会因为什么。但我非常清楚,这个人一定会做出伟大的工作。不管未来出现什么方向,这个人都会做出伟大的工作。后来他也确实做了伟大的工作。并不是说你只会在某个特定环境下做出一点伟大的工作,然后那只是运气。机会迟早都会有,而且有很多。那是一整桶机会。你在这个情形里抓住一个,于是你在那边成了伟大人物,而不是在这边。运气因素是有,但又不是那么回事。运气偏爱有准备的头脑。运气偏爱有准备的人。我并不保证成功一定发生。我会说,运气会改变赔率,但个人一方确实有明确的控制力。

那么,出发吧,去做伟大的工作。

Image 1Image 2Image 3 Image 4: Richard Hamming: You and Your Research Talk at Bellcore, 7 March 1986 The title of my talk is "You and Your Research." It is not about managing research, it is about how you individually do your research. I could give a talk on the other subject � but it's not, it's about you. I'm not talking about ordinary run-of-the-mill research; I'm talking about great research. And for the sake of describing great research I'll occasionally say Nobel-Prize type of work. It doesn't have to gain the Nobel Prize, but I mean those kinds of things which we perceive are significant things. Relativity, if you want, Shannon's information theory, any number of outstanding theories � that's the kind of thing I'm talking about. Now, how did I come to do this study? At Los Alamos I was brought in to run the computing machines which other people had got going, so those scientists and physicists could get back to business. I saw I was a stooge. I saw that although physically I was the same, they were different. And to put the thing bluntly, I was envious. I wanted to know why they were so different from me. I saw Feynman up close. I saw Fermi and Teller. I saw Oppenheimer. I saw Hans Bethe: he was my boss. I saw quite a few very capable people. I became very interested in the difference between those who do and those who might have done. When I came to Bell Labs, I came into a very productive department. Bode was the department head at the time; Shannon was there, and there were other people. I continued examining the questions, "Why?" and "What is the difference?" I continued subsequently by reading biographies, autobiographies, asking people questions such as: "How did you come to do this?" I tried to find out what are the differences. And that's what this talk is about. Now, why is this talk important? I think it is important because, as far as I know, each of you has one life to live. Even if you believe in reincarnation it doesn't do you any good from one life to the next! Why shouldn't you do significant things in this one life, however you define significant? I'm not going to define it � you know what I mean. I will talk mainly about science because that is what I have studied. But so far as I know, and I've been told by others, much of what I say applies to many fields. Outstanding work is characterized very much the same way in most fields, but I will confine myself to science. In order to get at you individually, I must talk in the first person. I have to get you to drop modesty and say to yourself, "Yes, I would like to do first-class work." Our society frowns on people who set out to do really good work. You're not supposed to; luck is supposed to descend on you and you do great things by chance. Well, that's a kind of dumb thing to say. I say, why shouldn't you set out to do something significant. You don't have to tell other people, but shouldn't you say to yourself, "Yes, I would like to do something significant." In order to get to the second stage, I have to drop modesty and talk in the first person about what I've seen, what I've done, and what I've heard. I'm going to talk about people, some of whom you know, and I trust that when we leave, you won't quote me as saying some of the things I said. Let me start not logically, but psychologically. I find that the major objection is that people think great science is done by luck. It's all a matter of luck. Well, consider Einstein. Note how many different things he did that were good. Was it all luck? Wasn't it a little too repetitive? Consider Shannon. He didn't do just information theory. Several years before, he did some other good things and some which are still locked up in the security of cryptography. He did many good things. You see again and again that it is more than one thing from a good person. Once in a while a person does only one thing in his whole life, and we'll talk about that later, but a lot of times there is repetition. I claim that luck will not cover everything. And I will cite Pasteur who said, "Luck favors the prepared mind." And I think that says it the way I believe it. There is indeed an element of luck, and no, there isn't. The prepared mind sooner or later finds something important and does it. So yes, it is luck. The particular thing you do is luck, but that you do something is not. For example, when I came to Bell Labs, I shared an office for a while with Shannon. At the same time he was doing information theory, I was doing coding theory. It is suspicious that the two of us did it at the same place and at the same time � it was in the atmosphere. And you can say, "Yes, it was luck." On the other hand you can say, "But why of all the people in Bell Labs then were those the two who did it?" Yes, it is partly luck, and partly it is the prepared mind; but "partly" is the other thing I'm going to talk about. So, although I'll come back several more times to luck, I want to dispose of this matter of luck as being the sole criterion whether you do great work or not. I claim you have some, but not total, control over it. And I will quote, finally, Newton on the matter. Newton said, "If others would think as hard as I did, then they would get similar results." One of the characteristics you see, and many people have it including great scientists, is that usually when they were young they had independent thoughts and had the courage to pursue them. For example, Einstein, somewhere around 12 or 14, asked himself the question, "What would a light wave look like if I went with the velocity of light to look at it?" Now he knew that electromagnetic theory says you cannot have a stationary local maximum. But if he moved along with the velocity of light, he would see a local maximum. He could see a contradiction at the age of 12, 14, or somewhere around there, that everything was not right and that the velocity of light had something peculiar. Is it luck that he finally created special relativity? Early on, he had laid down some of the pieces by thinking of the fragments. Now that's the necessary but not sufficient condition. All of these items I will talk about are both luck and not luck. How about having lots of brains? It sounds good. Most of you in this room probably have more than enough brains to do first-class work. But great work is something else than mere brains. Brains are measured in various ways. In mathematics, theoretical physics, astrophysics, typically brains correlates to a great extent with the ability to manipulate symbols. And so the typical IQ test is apt to score them fairly high. On the other hand, in other fields it is something different. For example, Bill Pfann, the fellow who did zone melting, came into my office one day. He had this idea dimly in his mind about what he wanted and he had some equations. It was pretty clear to me that this man didn't know much mathematics and he wasn't really articulate. His problem seemed interesting so I took it home and did a little work. I finally showed him how to run computers so he could compute his own answers. I gave him the power to compute. He went ahead, with negligible recognition from his own department, but ultimately he has collected all the prizes in the field. Once he got well started, his shyness, his awkwardness, his inarticulateness, fell away and he became much more productive in many other ways. Certainly he became much more articulate. And I can cite another person in the same way. I trust he isn't in the audience, i.e. a fellow named Clogston. I met him when I was working on a problem with John Pierce's group and I didn't think he had much. I asked my friends who had been with him at school, "Was he like that in graduate school?" "Yes," they replied. Well I would have fired the fellow, but J. R. Pierce was smart and kept him on. Clogston finally did the Clogston cable. After that there was a steady stream of good ideas. One success brought him confidence and courage. One of the characteristics of successful scientists is having courage. Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can. If you think you can't, almost surely you are not going to. Courage is one of the things that Shannon had supremely. You have only to think of his major theorem. He wants to create a method of coding, but he doesn't know what to do so he makes a random code. Then he is stuck. And then he asks the impossible question, "What would the average random code do?" He then proves that the average code is arbitrarily good, and that therefore there must be at least one good code. Who but a man of infinite courage could have dared to think those thoughts? That is the characteristic of great scientists; they have courage. They will go forward under incredible circumstances; they think and continue to think. Age is another factor which the physicists particularly worry about. They always are saying that you have got to do it when you are young or you will never do it. Einstein did things very early, and all the quantum mechanic fellows were disgustingly young when they did their best work. Most mathematicians, theoretical physicists, and astrophysicists do what we consider their best work when they are young. It is not that they don't do good work in their old age but what we value most is often what they did early. On the other hand, in music, politics and literature, often what we consider their best work was done late. I don't know how whatever field you are in fits this scale, but age has some effect. But let me say why age seems to have the effect it does. In the first place if you do some good work you will find yourself on all kinds of committees and unable to do any more work. You may find yourself as I saw Brattain when he got a Nobel Prize. The day the prize was announced we all assembled in Arnold Auditorium; all three winners got up and made speeches. The third one, Brattain, practically with tears in his eyes, said, "I know about this Nobel-Prize effect and I am not going to let it affect me; I am going to remain good old Walter Brattain." Well I said to myself, "That is nice." But in a few weeks I saw it was affecting him. Now he could only work on great problems. When you are famous it is hard to work on small problems. This is what did Shannon in. After information theory, what do you do for an encore? The great scientists often make this error. They fail to continue to plant the little acorns from which the mighty oak trees grow. They try to get the big thing right off. And that isn't the way things go. So that is another reason why you find that when you get early recognition it seems to sterilize you. In fact I will give you my favorite quotation of many years. The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, in my opinion, has ruined more good scientists than any institution has created, judged by what they did before they came and judged by what they did after. Not that they weren't good afterwards, but they were superb before they got there and were only good afterwards. This brings up the subject, out of order perhaps, of working conditions. What most people think are the best working conditions, are not. Very clearly they are not because people are often most productive when working conditions are bad. One of the better times of the Cambridge Physical Laboratories was when they had practically shacks � they did some of the best physics ever. I give you a story from my own private life. Early on it became evident to me that Bell Laboratories was not going to give me the conventional acre of programming people to program computing machines in absolute binary. It was clear they weren't going to. But that was the way everybody did it. I could go to the West Coast and get a job with the airplane companies without any trouble, but the exciting people were at Bell Labs and the fellows out there in the airplane companies were not. I thought for a long while about, "Did I want to go or not?" and I wondered how I could get the best of two possible worlds. I finally said to myself, "Hamming, you think the machines can do practically everything. Why can't you make them write programs?" What appeared at first to me as a defect forced me into automatic programming very early. What appears to be a fault, often, by a change of viewpoint, turns out to be one of the greatest assets you can have. But you are not likely to think that when you first look the thing and say, "Gee, I'm never going to get enough programmers, so how can I ever do any great programming?" And there are many other stories of the same kind; Grace Hopper has similar ones. I think that if you look carefully you will see that often the great scientists, by turning the problem around a bit, changed a defect to an asset. For example, many scientists when they found they couldn't do a problem finally began to study why not. They then turned it around the other way and said, "But of course, this is what it is" and got an important result. So ideal working conditions are very strange. The ones you want aren't always the best ones for you. Now for the matter of drive. You observe that most great scientists have tremendous drive. I worked for ten years with John Tukey at Bell Labs. He had tremendous drive. One day about three or four years after I joined, I discovered that John Tukey was slightly younger than I was. John was a genius and I clearly was not. Well I went storming into Bode's office and said, "How can anybody my age know as much as John Tukey does?" He leaned back in his chair, put his hands behind his head, grinned slightly, and said, "You would be surprised Hamming, how much you would know if you worked as hard as he did that many years." I simply slunk out of the office! What Bode was saying was this: Knowledge and productivity are like compound interest. Given two people of approximately the same ability and one person who works ten percent more than the other, the latter will more than twice outproduce the former. The more you know, the more you learn; the more you learn, the more you can do; the more you can do, the more the opportunity � it is very much like compound interest. I don't want to give you a rate, but it is a very high rate. Given two people with exactly the same ability, the one person who manages day in and day out to get in one more hour of thinking will be tremendously more productive over a lifetime. I took Bode's remark to heart; I spent a good deal more of my time for some years trying to work a bit harder and I found, in fact, I could get more work done. I don't like to say it in front of my wife, but I did sort of neglect her sometimes; I needed to study. You have to neglect things if you intend to get what you want done. There's no question about this. On this matter of drive Edison says, "Genius is 99% perspiration and 1% inspiration." He may have been exaggerating, but the idea is that solid work, steadily applied, gets you surprisingly far. The steady application of effort with a little bit more work, intelligently applied is what does it. That's the trouble; drive, misapplied, doesn't get you anywhere. I've often wondered why so many of my good friends at Bell Labs who worked as hard or harder than I did, didn't have so much to show for it. The misapplication of effort is a very serious matter. Just hard work is not enough - it must be applied sensibly. There's another trait on the side which I want to talk about; that trait is ambiguity. It took me a while to discover its importance. Most people like to believe something is or is not true. Great scientists tolerate ambiguity very well. They believe the theory enough to go ahead; they doubt it enough to notice the errors and faults so they can step forward and create the new replacement theory. If you believe too much you'll never notice the flaws; if you doubt too much you won't get started. It requires a lovely balance. But most great scientists are well aware of why their theories are true and they are also well aware of some slight misfits which don't quite fit and they don't forget it. Darwin writes in his autobiography that he found it necessary to write down every piece of evidence which appeared to contradict his beliefs because otherwise they would disappear from his mind. When you find apparent flaws you've got to be sensitive and keep track of those things, and keep an eye out for how they can be explained or how the theory can be changed to fit them. Those are often the great contributions. Great contributions are rarely done by adding another decimal place. It comes down to an emotional commitment. Most great scientists are completely committed to their problem. Those who don't become committed seldom produce outstanding, first-class work. Now again, emotional commitment is not enough. It is a necessary condition apparently. And I think I can tell you the reason why. Everybody who has studied creativity is driven finally to saying, "creativity comes out of your subconscious." Somehow, suddenly, there it is. It just appears. Well, we know very little about the subconscious; but one thing you are pretty well aware of is that your dreams also come out of your subconscious. And you're aware your dreams are, to a fair extent, a reworking of the experiences of the day. If you are deeply immersed and committed to a topic, day after day after day, your subconscious has nothing to do but work on your problem. And so you wake up one morning, or on some afternoon, and there's the answer. For those who don't get committed to their current problem, the subconscious goofs off on other things and doesn't produce the big result. So the way to manage yourself is that when you have a real important problem you don't let anything else get the center of your attention � you keep your thoughts on the problem. Keep your subconscious starved so it has to work on your problem, so you can sleep peacefully and get the answer in the morning, free. Now Alan Chynoweth mentioned that I used to eat at the physics table. I had been eating with the mathematicians and I found out that I already knew a fair amount of mathematics; in fact, I wasn't learning much. The physics table was, as he said, an exciting place, but I think he exaggerated on how much I contributed. It was very interesting to listen to Shockley, Brattain, Bardeen, J. B. Johnson, Ken McKay and other people, and I was learning a lot. But unfortunately a Nobel Prize came, and a promotion came, and what was left was the dregs. Nobody wanted what was left. Well, there was no use eating with them! Over on the other side of the dining hall was a chemistry table. I had worked with one of the fellows, Dave McCall; furthermore he was courting our secretary at the time. I went over and said, "Do you mind if I join you?" They can't say no, so I started eating with them for a while. And I started asking, "What are the important problems of your field?" And after a week or so, "What important problems are you working on?" And after some more time I came in one day and said, "If what you are doing is not important, and if you don't think it is going to lead to something important, why are you at Bell Labs working on it?" I wasn't welcomed after that; I had to find somebody else to eat with! That was in the spring. In the fall, Dave McCall stopped me in the hall and said, "Hamming, that remark of yours got underneath my skin. I thought about it all summer, i.e. what were the important problems in my field. I haven't changed my research," he says, "but I think it was well worthwhile." And I said, "Thank you Dave," and went on. I noticed a couple of months later he was made the head of the department. I noticed the other day he was a Member of the National Academy of Engineering. I noticed he has succeeded. I have never heard the names of any of the other fellows at that table mentioned in science and scientific circles. They were unable to ask themselves, "What are the important problems in my field?" If you do not work on an important problem, it's unlikely you'll do important work. It's perfectly obvious. Great scientists have thought through, in a careful way, a number of important problems in their field, and they keep an eye on wondering how to attack them. Let me warn you, "important problem" must be phrased carefully. The three outstanding problems in physics, in a certain sense, were never worked on while I was at Bell Labs. By important I mean guaranteed a Nobel Prize and any sum of money you want to mention. We didn't work on (1) time travel, (2) teleportation, and (3) antigravity. They are not important problems because we do not have an attack. It's not the consequence that makes a problem important, it is that you have a reasonable attack. That is what makes a problem important. When I say that most scientists don't work on important problems, I mean it in that sense. The average scientist, so far as I can make out, spends almost all his time working on problems which he believes will not be important and he also doesn't believe that they will lead to important problems. I spoke earlier about planting acorns so that oaks will grow. You can't always know exactly where to be, but you can keep active in places where something might happen. And even if you believe that great science is a matter of luck, you can stand on a mountain top where lightning strikes; you don't have to hide in the valley where you're safe. But the average scientist does routine safe work almost all the time and so he (or she) doesn't produce much. It's that simple. If you want to do great work, you clearly must work on important problems, and you should have an idea. Along those lines at some urging from John Tukey and others, I finally adopted what I called "Great Thoughts Time." When I went to lunch Friday noon, I would only discuss great thoughts after that. By great thoughts I mean ones like: "What will be the role of computers in all of AT&T?", "How will computers change science?" For example, I came up with the observation at that time that nine out of ten experiments were done in the lab and one in ten on the computer. I made a remark to the vice presidents one time, that it would be reversed, i.e. nine out of ten experiments would be done on the computer and one in ten in the lab. They knew I was a crazy mathematician and had no sense of reality. I knew they were wrong and they've been proved wrong while I have been proved right. They built laboratories when they didn't need them. I saw that computers were transforming science because I spent a lot of time asking "What will be the impact of computers on science and how can I change it?" I asked myself, "How is it going to change Bell Labs?" I remarked one time, in the same address, that more than one-half of the people at Bell Labs will be interacting closely with computing machines before I leave. Well, you all have terminals now. I thought hard about where was my field going, where were the opportunities, and what were the important things to do. Let me go there so there is a chance I can do important things. Most great scientists know many important problems. They have something between 10 and 20 important problems for which they are looking for an attack. And when they see a new idea come up, one hears them say "Well that bears on this problem." They drop all the other things and get after it. Now I can tell you a horror story that was told to me but I can't vouch for the truth of it. I was sitting in an airport talking to a friend of mine from Los Alamos about how it was lucky that the fission experiment occurred over in Europe when it did because that got us working on the atomic bomb here in the US. He said "No; at Berkeley we had gathered a bunch of data; we didn't get around to reducing it because we were building some more equipment, but if we had reduced that data we would have found fission." They had it in their hands and they didn't pursue it. They came in second! The great scientists, when an opportunity opens up, get after it and they pursue it. They drop all other things. They get rid of other things and they get after an idea because they had already thought the thing through. Their minds are prepared; they see the opportunity and they go after it. Now of course lots of times it doesn't work out, but you don't have to hit many of them to do some great science. It's kind of easy. One of the chief tricks is to live a long time! Another trait, it took me a while to notice. I noticed the following facts about people who work with the door open or the door closed. I notice that if you have the door to your office closed, you get more work done today and tomorrow, and you are more productive than most. But 10 years later somehow you don't know quite know what problems are worth working on; all the hard work you do is sort of tangential in importance. He who works with the door open gets all kinds of interruptions, but he also occasionally gets clues as to what the world is and what might be important. Now I cannot prove the cause and effect sequence because you might say, "The closed door is symbolic of a closed mind." I don't know. But I can say there is a pretty good correlation between those who work with the doors open and those who ultimately do important things, although people who work with doors closed often work harder. Somehow they seem to work on slightly the wrong thing � not much, but enough that they miss fame. I want to talk on another topic. It is based on the song which I think many of you know, "It ain't what you do, it's the way that you do it." I'll start with an example of my own. I was conned into doing on a digital computer, in the absolute binary days, a problem which the best analog computers couldn't do. And I was getting an answer. When I thought carefully and said to myself, "You know, Hamming, you're going to have to file a report on this military job; after you spend a lot of money you're going to have to account for it and every analog installation is going to want the report to see if they can't find flaws in it." I was doing the required integration by a rather crummy method, to say the least, but I was getting the answer. And I realized that in truth the problem was not just to get the answer; it was to demonstrate for the first time, and beyond question, that I could beat the analog computer on its own ground with a digital machine. I reworked the method of solution, created a theory which was nice and elegant, and changed the way we computed the answer; the results were no different. The published report had an elegant method which was later known for years as "Hamming's Method of Integrating Differential Equations." It is somewhat obsolete now, but for a while it was a very good method. By changing the problem slightly, I did important work rather than trivial work. In the same way, when using the machine up in the attic in the early days, I was solving one problem after another after another; a fair number were successful and there were a few failures. I went home one Friday after finishing a problem, and curiously enough I wasn't happy; I was depressed. I could see life being a long sequence of one problem after another after another. After quite a while of thinking I decided, "No, I should be in the mass production of a variable product. I should be concerned with all of next year's problems, not just the one in front of my face." By changing the question I still got the same kind of results or better, but I changed things and did important work. I attacked the major problem � How do I conquer machines and do all of next year's problems when I don't know what they are going to be? How do I prepare for it? How do I do this one so I'll be on top of it? How do I obey Newton's rule? He said, "If I have seen further than others, it is because I've stood on the shoulders of giants." These days we stand on each other's feet! You should do your job in such a fashion that others can build on top of it, so they will indeed say, "Yes, I've stood on so and so's shoulders and I saw further." The essence of science is cumulative. By changing a problem slightly you can often do great work rather than merely good work. Instead of attacking isolated problems, I made the resolution that I would never again solve an isolated problem except as characteristic of a class. Now if you are much of a mathematician you know that the effort to generalize often means that the solution is simple. Often by stopping and saying, "This is the problem he wants but this is characteristic of so and so. Yes, I can attack the whole class with a far superior method than the particular one because I was earlier embedded in needless detail." The business of abstraction frequently makes things simple. Furthermore, I filed away the methods and prepared for the future problems. To end this part, I'll remind you, "It is a poor workman who blames his tools � the good man gets on with the job, given what he's got, and gets the best answer he can." And I suggest that by altering the problem, by looking at the thing differently, you can make a great deal of difference in your final productivity because you can either do it in such a fashion that people can indeed build on what you've done, or you can do it in such a fashion that the next person has to essentially duplicate again what you've done. It isn't just a matter of the job, it's the way you write the report, the way you write the paper, the whole attitude. It's just as easy to do a broad, general job as one very special case. And it's much more satisfying and rewarding! I have now come down to a topic which is very distasteful; it is not sufficient to do a job, you have to sell it. "Selling" to a scientist is an awkward thing to do. It's very ugly; you shouldn't have to do it. The world is supposed to be waiting, and when you do something great, they should rush out and welcome it. But the fact is everyone is busy with their own work. You must present it so well that they will set aside what they are doing, look at what you've done, read it, and come back and say, "Yes, that was good." I suggest that when you open a journal, as you turn the pages, you ask why you read some articles and not others. You had better write your report so when it is published in the Physical Review, or wherever else you want it, as the readers are turning the pages they won't just turn your pages but they will stop and read yours. If they don't stop and read it, you won't get credit. There are three things you have to do in selling. You have to learn to write clearly and well so that people will read it, you must learn to give reasonably formal talks, and you also must learn to give informal talks. We had a lot of so-called back room scientists.' In a conference, they would keep quiet. Three weeks later after a decision was made they filed a report saying why you should do so and so. Well, it was too late. They would not stand up right in the middle of a hot conference, in the middle of activity, and say, "We should do this for these reasons." You need to master that form of communication as well as prepared speeches. When I first started, I got practically physically ill while giving a speech, and I was very, very nervous. I realized I either had to learn to give speeches smoothly or I would essentially partially cripple my whole career. The first time IBM asked me to give a speech in New York one evening, I decided I was going to give a really good speech, a speech that was wanted, not a technical one but a broad one, and at the end if they liked it, I'd quietly say, "Any time you want one I'll come in and give you one." As a result, I got a great deal of practice giving speeches to a limited audience and I got over being afraid. Furthermore, I could also then study what methods were effective and what were ineffective. While going to meetings I had already been studying why some papers are remembered and most are not. The technical person wants to give a highly limited technical talk. Most of the time the audience wants a broad general talk and wants much more survey and background than the speaker is willing to give. As a result, many talks are ineffective. The speaker names a topic and suddenly plunges into the details he's solved. Few people in the audience may follow. You should paint a general picture to say why it's important, and then slowly give a sketch of what was done. Then a larger number of people will say, "Yes, Joe has done that," or "Mary has done that; I really see where it is; yes, Mary really gave a good talk; I understand what Mary has done." The tendency is to give a highly restricted, safe talk; this is usually ineffective. Furthermore, many talks are filled with far too much information. So I say this idea of selling is obvious. Let me summarize. You've got to work on important problems. I deny that it is all luck, but I admit there is a fair element of luck. I subscribe to Pasteur's "Luck favors the prepared mind." I favor heavily what I did. Friday afternoons for years � great thoughts only � means that I committed 10% of my time trying to understand the bigger problems in the field, i.e. what was and what was not important. I found in the early days I had believedthis' and yet had spent all week marching in that' direction. It was kind of foolish. If I really believe the action is over there, why do I march in this direction? I either had to change my goal or change what I did. So I changed something I did and I marched in the direction I thought was important. It's that easy. Now you might tell me you haven't got control over what you have to work on. Well, when you first begin, you may not. But once you're moderately successful, there are more people asking for results than you can deliver and you have some power of choice, but not completely. I'll tell you a story about that, and it bears on the subject of educating your boss. I had a boss named Schelkunoff; he was, and still is, a very good friend of mine. Some military person came to me and demanded some answers by Friday. Well, I had already dedicated my computing resources to reducing data on the fly for a group of scientists; I was knee deep in short, small, important problems. This military person wanted me to solve his problem by the end of the day on Friday. I said, "No, I'll give it to you Monday. I can work on it over the weekend. I'm not going to do it now." He goes down to my boss, Schelkunoff, and Schelkunoff says, "You must run this for him; he's got to have it by Friday." I tell him, "Why do I?" He says, "You have to." I said, "Fine, Sergei, but you're sitting in your office Friday afternoon catching the late bus home to watch as this fellow walks out that door." I gave the military person the answers late Friday afternoon. I then went to Schelkunoff's office and sat down; as the man goes out I say, "You see Schelkunoff, this fellow has nothing under his arm; but I gave him the answers." On Monday morning Schelkunoff called him up and said, "Did you come in to work over the weekend?" I could hear, as it were, a pause as the fellow ran through his mind of what was going to happen; but he knew he would have had to sign in, and he'd better not say he had when he hadn't, so he said he hadn't. Ever after that Schelkunoff said, "You set your deadlines; you can change them." One lesson was sufficient to educate my boss as to why I didn't want to do big jobs that displaced exploratory research and why I was justified in not doing crash jobs which absorb all the research computing facilities. I wanted instead to use the facilities to compute a large number of small problems. Again, in the early days, I was limited in computing capacity and it was clear, in my area, that a "mathematician had no use for machines." But I needed more machine capacity. Every time I had to tell some scientist in some other area, "No I can't; I haven't the machine capacity," he complained. I said "Go tell your Vice President that Hamming needs more computing capacity." After a while I could see what was happening up there at the top; many people said to my Vice President, "Your man needs more computing capacity." I got it! I also did a second thing. When I loaned what little programming power we had to help in the early days of computing, I said, "We are not getting the recognition for our programmers that they deserve. When you publish a paper you will thank that programmer or you aren't getting any more help from me. That programmer is going to be thanked by name; she's worked hard." I waited a couple of years. I then went through a year of BSTJ articles and counted what fraction thanked some programmer. I took it into the boss and said, "That's the central role computing is playing in Bell Labs; if the BSTJ is important, that's how important computing is." He had to give in. You can educate your bosses. It's a hard job. In this talk I'm only viewing from the bottom up; I'm not viewing from the top down. But I am telling you how you can get what you want in spite of top management. You have to sell your ideas there also. Well I now come down to the topic, "Is the effort to be a great scientist worth it?" To answer this, you must ask people. When you get beyond their modesty, most people will say, "Yes, doing really first-class work, and knowing it, is as good as wine, women and song put together," or if it's a woman she says, "It is as good as wine, men and song put together." And if you look at the bosses, they tend to come back or ask for reports, trying to participate in those moments of discovery. They're always in the way. So evidently those who have done it, want to do it again. But it is a limited survey. I have never dared to go out and ask those who didn't do great work how they felt about the matter. It's a biased sample, but I still think it is worth the struggle. I think it is very definitely worth the struggle to try and do first-class work because the truth is, the value is in the struggle more than it is in the result. The struggle to make something of yourself seems to be worthwhile in itself. The success and fame are sort of dividends, in my opinion. I've told you how to do it. It is so easy, so why do so many people, with all their talents, fail? For example, my opinion, to this day, is that there are in the mathematics department at Bell Labs quite a few people far more able and far better endowed than I, but they didn't produce as much. Some of them did produce more than I did; Shannon produced more than I did, and some others produced a lot, but I was highly productive against a lot of other fellows who were better equipped. Why is it so? What happened to them? Why do so many of the people who have great promise, fail? Well, one of the reasons is drive and commitment. The people who do great work with less ability but who are committed to it, get more done that those who have great skill and dabble in it, who work during the day and go home and do other things and come back and work the next day. They don't have the deep commitment that is apparently necessary for really first-class work. They turn out lots of good work, but we were talking, remember, about first-class work. There is a difference. Good people, very talented people, almost always turn out good work. We're talking about the outstanding work, the type of work that gets the Nobel Prize and gets recognition. The second thing is, I think, the problem of personality defects. Now I'll cite a fellow whom I met out in Irvine. He had been the head of a computing center and he was temporarily on assignment as a special assistant to the president of the university. It was obvious he had a job with a great future. He took me into his office one time and showed me his method of getting letters done and how he took care of his correspondence. He pointed out how inefficient the secretary was. He kept all his letters stacked around there; he knew where everything was. And he would, on his word processor, get the letter out. He was bragging how marvelous it was and how he could get so much more work done without the secretary's interference. Well, behind his back, I talked to the secretary. The secretary said, "Of course I can't help him; I don't get his mail. He won't give me the stuff to log in; I don't know where he puts it on the floor. Of course I can't help him." So I went to him and said, "Look, if you adopt the present method and do what you can do single-handedly, you can go just that far and no farther than you can do single-handedly. If you will learn to work with the system, you can go as far as the system will support you." And, he never went any further. He had his personality defect of wanting total control and was not willing to recognize that you need the support of the system. You find this happening again and again; good scientists will fight the system rather than learn to work with the system and take advantage of all the system has to offer. It has a lot, if you learn how to use it. It takes patience, but you can learn how to use the system pretty well, and you can learn how to get around it. After all, if you want a decisionNo', you just go to your boss and get a No' easy. If you want to do something, don't ask, do it. Present him with an accomplished fact. Don't give him a chance to tell youNo'. But if you want a No', it's easy to get aNo'. Another personality defect is ego assertion and I'll speak in this case of my own experience. I came from Los Alamos and in the early days I was using a machine in New York at 590 Madison Avenue where we merely rented time. I was still dressing in western clothes, big slash pockets, a bolo and all those things. I vaguely noticed that I was not getting as good service as other people. So I set out to measure. You came in and you waited for your turn; I felt I was not getting a fair deal. I said to myself, "Why? No Vice President at IBM said, Give Hamming a bad time'. It is the secretaries at the bottom who are doing this. When a slot appears, they'll rush to find someone to slip in, but they go out and find somebody else. Now, why? I haven't mistreated them." Answer: I wasn't dressing the way they felt somebody in that situation should. It came down to just that � I wasn't dressing properly. I had to make the decision � was I going to assert my ego and dress the way I wanted to and have it steadily drain my effort from my professional life, or was I going to appear to conform better? I decided I would make an effort to appear to conform properly. The moment I did, I got much better service. And now, as an old colorful character, I get better service than other people. You should dress according to the expectations of the audience spoken to. If I am going to give an address at the MIT computer center, I dress with a bolo and an old corduroy jacket or something else. I know enough not to let my clothes, my appearance, my manners get in the way of what I care about. An enormous number of scientists feel they must assert their ego and do their thing their way. They have got to be able to do this, that, or the other thing, and they pay a steady price. John Tukey almost always dressed very casually. He would go into an important office and it would take a long time before the other fellow realized that this is a first-class man and he had better listen. For a long time John has had to overcome this kind of hostility. It's wasted effort! I didn't say you should conform; I said "The appearance of conforming gets you a long way." If you chose to assert your ego in any number of ways, "I am going to do it my way," you pay a small steady price throughout the whole of your professional career. And this, over a whole lifetime, adds up to an enormous amount of needless trouble. By taking the trouble to tell jokes to the secretaries and being a little friendly, I got superb secretarial help. For instance, one time for some idiot reason all the reproducing services at Murray Hill were tied up. Don't ask me how, but they were. I wanted something done. My secretary called up somebody at Holmdel, hopped the company car, made the hour-long trip down and got it reproduced, and then came back. It was a payoff for the times I had made an effort to cheer her up, tell her jokes and be friendly; it was that little extra work that later paid off for me. By realizing you have to use the system and studying how to get the system to do your work, you learn how to adapt the system to your desires. Or you can fight it steadily, as a small undeclared war, for the whole of your life. And I think John Tukey paid a terrible price needlessly. He was a genius anyhow, but I think it would have been far better, and far simpler, had he been willing to conform a little bit instead of ego asserting. He is going to dress the way he wants all of the time. It applies not only to dress but to a thousand other things; people will continue to fight the system. Not that you shouldn't occasionally! When they moved the library from the middle of Murray Hill to the far end, a friend of mine put in a request for a bicycle. Well, the organization was not dumb. They waited awhile and sent back a map of the grounds saying, "Will you please indicate on this map what paths you are going to take so we can get an insurance policy covering you." A few more weeks went by. They then asked, "Where are you going to store the bicycle and how will it be locked so we can do so and so." He finally realized that of course he was going to be red-taped to death so he gave in. He rose to be the President of Bell Laboratories. Barney Oliver was a good man. He wrote a letter one time to the IEEE. At that time the official shelf space at Bell Labs was so much and the height of the IEEE Proceedings at that time was larger; and since you couldn't change the size of the official shelf space he wrote this letter to the IEEE Publication person saying, since so many IEEE members were at Bell Labs and since the official space was so high the journal size should be changed. He sent it for his boss's signature. Back came a carbon with his signature, but he still doesn't know whether the original was sent or not. I am not saying you shouldn't make gestures of reform. I am saying that my study of able people is that they don't get themselves committed to that kind of warfare. They play it a little bit and drop it and get on with their work. Many a second-rate fellow gets caught up in some little twitting of the system, and carries it through to warfare. He expends his energy in a foolish project. Now you are going to tell me that somebody has to change the system. I agree; somebody's has to. Which do you want to be? The person who changes the system or the person who does first-class science? Which person is it that you want to be? Be clear, when you fight the system and struggle with it, what you are doing, how far to go out of amusement, and how much to waste your effort fighting the system. My advice is to let somebody else do it and you get on with becoming a first-class scientist. Very few of you have the ability to both reform the system and become a first-class scientist. On the other hand, we can't always give in. There are times when a certain amount of rebellion is sensible. I have observed almost all scientists enjoy a certain amount of twitting the system for the sheer love of it. What it comes down to basically is that you cannot be original in one area without having originality in others. Originality is being different. You can't be an original scientist without having some other original characteristics. But many a scientist has let his quirks in other places make him pay a far higher price than is necessary for the ego satisfaction he or she gets. I'm not against all ego assertion; I'm against some. Another fault is anger. Often a scientist becomes angry, and this is no way to handle things. Amusement, yes, anger, no. Anger is misdirected. You should follow and cooperate rather than struggle against the system all the time. Another thing you should look for is the positive side of things instead of the negative. I have already given you several examples, and there are many, many more; how, given the situation, by changing the way I looked at it, I converted what was apparently a defect to an asset. I'll give you another example. I am an egotistical person; there is no doubt about it. I knew that most people who took a sabbatical to write a book, didn't finish it on time. So before I left, I told all my friends that when I come back, that book was going to be done! Yes, I would have it done � I'd have been ashamed to come back without it! I used my ego to make myself behave the way I wanted to. I bragged about something so I'd have to perform. I found out many times, like a cornered rat in a real trap, I was surprisingly capable. I have found that it paid to say, ``Oh yes, I'll get the answer for you Tuesday,'' not having any idea how to do it. By Sunday night I was really hard thinking on how I was going to deliver by Tuesday. I often put my pride on the line and sometimes I failed, but as I said, like a cornered rat I'm surprised how often I did a good job. I think you need to learn to use yourself. I think you need to know how to convert a situation from one view to another which would increase the chance of success. Now self-delusion in humans is very, very common. There are innumerable ways of you changing a thing and kidding yourself and making it look some other way. When you ask, "Why didn't you do such and such," the person has a thousand alibis. If you look at the history of science, usually these days there are ten people right there ready, and we pay off for the person who is there first. The other nine fellows say, "Well, I had the idea but I didn't do it and so on and so on." There are so many alibis. Why weren't you first? Why didn't you do it right? Don't try an alibi. Don't try and kid yourself. You can tell other people all the alibis you want. I don't mind. But to yourself try to be honest. If you really want to be a first-class scientist you need to know yourself, your weaknesses, your strengths, and your bad faults, like my egotism. How can you convert a fault to an asset? How can you convert a situation where you haven't got enough manpower to move into a direction when that's exactly what you need to do? I say again that I have seen, as I studied the history, the successful scientist changed the viewpoint and what was a defect became an asset. In summary, I claim that some of the reasons why so many people who have greatness within their grasp don't succeed are: they don't work on important problems, they don't become emotionally involved, they don't try and change what is difficult to some other situation which is easily done but is still important, and they keep giving themselves alibis why they don't. They keep saying that it is a matter of luck. I've told you how easy it is; furthermore I've told you how to reform. Therefore, go forth and become great scientists! **Questions and Answers** A. G. Chynoweth: Well that was 50 minutes of concentrated wisdom and observations accumulated over a fantastic career; I lost track of all the observations that were striking home. Some of them are very very timely. One was the plea for more computer capacity; I was hearing nothing but that this morning from several people, over and over again. So that was right on the mark today even though here we are 20 � 30 years after when you were making similar remarks, Dick. I can think of all sorts of lessons that all of us can draw from your talk. And for one, as I walk around the halls in the future I hope I won't see as many closed doors in Bellcore. That was one observation I thought was very intriguing. Thank you very, very much indeed Dick; that was a wonderful recollection. I'll now open it up for questions. I'm sure there are many people who would like to take up on some of the points that Dick was making. Hamming: First let me respond to Alan Chynoweth about computing. I had computing in research and for 10 years I kept telling my management, ``Get that !&@#% machine out of research. We are being forced to run problems all the time. We can't do research because were too busy operating and running the computing machines.'' Finally the message got through. They were going to move computing out of research to someplace else. I was persona non grata to say the least and I was surprised that people didn't kick my shins because everybody was having their toy taken away from them. I went in to Ed David's office and said, ``Look Ed, you've got to give your researchers a machine. If you give them a great big machine, we'll be back in the same trouble we were before, so busy keeping it going we can't think. Give them the smallest machine you can because they are very able people. They will learn how to do things on a small machine instead of mass computing.'' As far as I'm concerned, that's how UNIX arose. We gave them a moderately small machine and they decided to make it do great things. They had to come up with a system to do it on. It is called UNIX! A. G. Chynoweth: I just have to pick up on that one. In our present environment, Dick, while we wrestle with some of the red tape attributed to, or required by, the regulators, there is one quote that one exasperated AVP came up with and I've used it over and over again. He growled that, "UNIX was never a deliverable!" Question: What about personal stress? Does that seem to make a difference? Hamming: Yes, it does. If you don't get emotionally involved, it doesn't. I had incipient ulcers most of the years that I was at Bell Labs. I have since gone off to the Naval Postgraduate School and laid back somewhat, and now my health is much better. But if you want to be a great scientist you're going to have to put up with stress. You can lead a nice life; you can be a nice guy or you can be a great scientist. But nice guys end last, is what Leo Durocher said. If you want to lead a nice happy life with a lot of recreation and everything else, you'll lead a nice life. Question: The remarks about having courage, no one could argue with; but those of us who have gray hairs or who are well established don't have to worry too much. But what I sense among the young people these days is a real concern over the risk taking in a highly competitive environment. Do you have any words of wisdom on this? Hamming: I'll quote Ed David more. Ed David was concerned about the general loss of nerve in our society. It does seem to me that we've gone through various periods. Coming out of the war, coming out of Los Alamos where we built the bomb, coming out of building the radars and so on, there came into the mathematics department, and the research area, a group of people with a lot of guts. They've just seen things done; they've just won a war which was fantastic. We had reasons for having courage and therefore we did a great deal. I can't arrange that situation to do it again. I cannot blame the present generation for not having it, but I agree with what you say; I just cannot attach blame to it. It doesn't seem to me they have the desire for greatness; they lack the courage to do it. But we had, because we were in a favorable circumstance to have it; we just came through a tremendously successful war. In the war we were looking very, very bad for a long while; it was a very desperate struggle as you well know. And our success, I think, gave us courage and self confidence; that's why you see, beginning in the late forties through the fifties, a tremendous productivity at the labs which was stimulated from the earlier times. Because many of us were earlier forced to learn other things � we were forced to learn the things we didn't want to learn, we were forced to have an open door � and then we could exploit those things we learned. It is true, and I can't do anything about it; I cannot blame the present generation either. It's just a fact. Question: Is there something management could or should do? Hamming: Management can do very little. If you want to talk about managing research, that's a totally different talk. I'd take another hour doing that. This talk is about how the individual gets very successful research done in spite of anything the management does or in spite of any other opposition. And how do you do it? Just as I observe people doing it. It's just that simple and that hard! Question: Is brainstorming a daily process? Hamming: Once that was a very popular thing, but it seems not to have paid off. For myself I find it desirable to talk to other people; but a session of brainstorming is seldom worthwhile. I do go in to strictly talk to somebody and say, "Look, I think there has to be something here. Here's what I think I see ..." and then begin talking back and forth. But you want to pick capable people. To use another analogy, you know the idea called thecritical mass.' If you have enough stuff you have critical mass. There is also the idea I used to call `sound absorbers'. When you get too many sound absorbers, you give out an idea and they merely say, "Yes, yes, yes." What you want to do is get that critical mass in action; "Yes, that reminds me of so and so," or, "Have you thought about that or this?" When you talk to other people, you want to get rid of those sound absorbers who are nice people but merely say, "Oh yes," and to find those who will stimulate you right back. For example, you couldn't talk to John Pierce without being stimulated very quickly. There were a group of other people I used to talk with. For example there was Ed Gilbert; I used to go down to his office regularly and ask him questions and listen and come back stimulated. I picked my people carefully with whom I did or whom I didn't brainstorm because the sound absorbers are a curse. They are just nice guys; they fill the whole space and they contribute nothing except they absorb ideas and the new ideas just die away instead of echoing on. Yes, I find it necessary to talk to people. I think people with closed doors fail to do this so they fail to get their ideas sharpened, such as "Did you ever notice something over here?" I never knew anything about it � I can go over and look. Somebody points the way. On my visit here, I have already found several books that I must read when I get home. I talk to people and ask questions when I think they can answer me and give me clues that I do not know about. I go out and look! Question: What kind of tradeoffs did you make in allocating your time for reading and writing and actually doing research? Hamming: I believed, in my early days, that you should spend at least as much time in the polish and presentation as you did in the original research. Now at least 50% of the time must go for the presentation. It's a big, big number. Question: How much effort should go into library work? Hamming: It depends upon the field. I will say this about it. There was a fellow at Bell Labs, a very, very, smart guy. He was always in the library; he read everything. If you wanted references, you went to him and he gave you all kinds of references. But in the middle of forming these theories, I formed a proposition: there would be no effect named after him in the long run. He is now retired from Bell Labs and is an Adjunct Professor. He was very valuable; I'm not questioning that. He wrote some very good Physical Review articles; but there's no effect named after him because he read too much. If you read all the time what other people have done you will think the way they thought. If you want to think new thoughts that are different, then do what a lot of creative people do � get the problem reasonably clear and then refuse to look at any answers until you've thought the problem through carefully how you would do it, how you could slightly change the problem to be the correct one. So yes, you need to keep up. You need to keep up more to find out what the problems are than to read to find the solutions. The reading is necessary to know what is going on and what is possible. But reading to get the solutions does not seem to be the way to do great research. So I'll give you two answers. You read; but it is not the amount, it is the way you read that counts. Question: How do you get your name attached to things? Hamming: By doing great work. I'll tell you the hamming window one. I had given Tukey a hard time, quite a few times, and I got a phone call from him from Princeton to me at Murray Hill. I knew that he was writing up power spectra and he asked me if I would mind if he called a certain window a "hamming window." And I said to him, "Come on, John; you know perfectly well I did only a small part of the work but you also did a lot." He said, "Yes, Hamming, but you contributed a lot of small things; you're entitled to some credit." So he called it the hamming window. Now, let me go on. I had twitted John frequently about true greatness. I said true greatness is when your name is like ampere, watt, and fourier � when it's spelled with a lower case letter. That's how the hamming window came about. Question: Dick, would you care to comment on the relative effectiveness between giving talks, writing papers, and writing books? Hamming: In the short-haul, papers are very important if you want to stimulate someone tomorrow. If you want to get recognition long-haul, it seems to me writing books is more contribution because most of us need orientation. In this day of practically infinite knowledge, we need orientation to find our way. Let me tell you what infinite knowledge is. Since from the time of Newton to now, we have come close to doubling knowledge every 17 years, more or less. And we cope with that, essentially, by specialization. In the next 340 years at that rate, there will be 20 doublings, i.e. a million, and there will be a million fields of specialty for every one field now. It isn't going to happen. The present growth of knowledge will choke itself off until we get different tools. I believe that books which try to digest, coordinate, get rid of the duplication, get rid of the less fruitful methods and present the underlying ideas clearly of what we know now, will be the things the future generations will value. Public talks are necessary; private talks are necessary; written papers are necessary. But I am inclined to believe that, in the long-haul, books which leave out what's not essential are more important than books which tell you everything because you don't want to know everything. I don't want to know that much about penguins is the usual reply. You just want to know the essence. Question: You mentioned the problem of the Nobel Prize and the subsequent notoriety of what was done to some of the careers. Isn't that kind of a much more broad problem of fame? What can one do? Hamming: Some things you could do are the following. Somewhere around every seven years make a significant, if not complete, shift in your field. Thus, I shifted from numerical analysis, to hardware, to software, and so on, periodically, because you tend to use up your ideas. When you go to a new field, you have to start over as a baby. You are no longer the big mukity muk and you can start back there and you can start planting those acorns which will become the giant oaks. Shannon, I believe, ruined himself. In fact when he left Bell Labs, I said, "That's the end of Shannon's scientific career." I received a lot of flak from my friends who said that Shannon was just as smart as ever. I said, "Yes, he'll be just as smart, but that's the end of his scientific career," and I truly believe it was. You have to change. You get tired after a while; you use up your originality in one field. You need to get something nearby. I'm not saying that you shift from music to theoretical physics to English literature; I mean within your field you should shift areas so that you don't go stale. You couldn't get away with forcing a change every seven years, but if you could, I would require a condition for doing research, being that you will change your field of research every seven years with a reasonable definition of what it means, or at the end of 10 years, management has the right to compel you to change. I would insist on a change because I'm serious. What happens to the old fellows is that they get a technique going; they keep on using it. They were marching in that direction which was right then, but the world changes. There's the new direction; but the old fellows are still marching in their former direction. You need to get into a new field to get new viewpoints, and before you use up all the old ones. You can do something about this, but it takes effort and energy. It takes courage to say, ``Yes, I will give up my great reputation.'' For example, when error correcting codes were well launched, having these theories, I said, "Hamming, you are going to quit reading papers in the field; you are going to ignore it completely; you are going to try and do something else other than coast on that." I deliberately refused to go on in that field. I wouldn't even read papers to try to force myself to have a chance to do something else. I managed myself, which is what I'm preaching in this whole talk. Knowing many of my own faults, I manage myself. I have a lot of faults, so I've got a lot of problems, i.e. a lot of possibilities of management. Question: Would you compare research and management? Hamming: If you want to be a great researcher, you won't make it being president of the company. If you want to be president of the company, that's another thing. I'm not against being president of the company. I just don't want to be. I think Ian Ross does a good job as President of Bell Labs. I'm not against it; but you have to be clear on what you want. Furthermore, when you're young, you may have picked wanting to be a great scientist, but as you live longer, you may change your mind. For instance, I went to my boss, Bode, one day and said, "Why did you ever become department head? Why didn't you just be a good scientist?" He said, "Hamming, I had a vision of what mathematics should be in Bell Laboratories. And I saw if that vision was going to be realized, I had to make it happen; I had to be department head." When your vision of what you want to do is what you can do single-handedly, then you should pursue it. The day your vision, what you think needs to be done, is bigger than what you can do single-handedly, then you have to move toward management. And the bigger the vision is, the farther in management you have to go. If you have a vision of what the whole laboratory should be, or the whole Bell System, you have to get there to make it happen. You can't make it happen from the bottom very easily. It depends upon what goals and what desires you have. And as they change in life, you have to be prepared to change. I chose to avoid management because I preferred to do what I could do single-handedly. But that's the choice that I made, and it is biased. Each person is entitled to their choice. Keep an open mind. But when you do choose a path, for heaven's sake be aware of what you have done and the choice you have made. Don't try to do both sides. Question: How important is one's own expectation or how important is it to be in a group or surrounded by people who expect great work from you? Hamming: At Bell Labs everyone expected good work from me � it was a big help. Everybody expects you to do a good job, so you do, if you've got pride. I think it's very valuable to have first-class people around. I sought out the best people. The moment that physics table lost the best people, I left. The moment I saw that the same was true of the chemistry table, I left. I tried to go with people who had great ability so I could learn from them and who would expect great results out of me. By deliberately managing myself, I think I did much better than laissez faire. Question: You, at the outset of your talk, minimized or played down luck; but you seemed also to gloss over the circumstances that got you to Los Alamos, that got you to Chicago, that got you to Bell Laboratories. Hamming: There was some luck. On the other hand I don't know the alternate branches. Until you can say that the other branches would not have been equally or more successful, I can't say. Is it luck the particular thing you do? For example, when I met Feynman at Los Alamos, I knew he was going to get a Nobel Prize. I didn't know what for. But I knew darn well he was going to do great work. No matter what directions came up in the future, this man would do great work. And sure enough, he did do great work. It isn't that you only do a little great work at this circumstance and that was luck, there are many opportunities sooner or later. There are a whole pail full of opportunities, of which, if you're in this situation, you seize one and you're great over there instead of over here. There is an element of luck, yes and no. Luck favors a prepared mind; luck favors a prepared person. It is not guaranteed; I don't guarantee success as being absolutely certain. I'd say luck changes the odds, but there is some definite control on the part of the individual. Go forth, then, and do great work! * * *

Image 1Image 2Image 3 Image 4: Richard Hamming: You and Your Research 1986 年 3 月 7 日于贝尔通信研究中心的演讲。我的演讲题目是 You and Your Research。这不是讲如何管理研究,而是讲你个人如何做研究。我也可以就前一个主题讲一场,但这次不是。这次讲的是你。我讲的不是普通、平常的研究,我讲的是伟大的研究。为了描述伟大的研究,我有时会说诺贝尔奖级别的工作。它不一定真的要拿到诺贝尔奖,但我指的是那类我们公认具有重大意义的工作。比如相对论,比如香农的信息论,再比如许多卓越的理论,我说的就是这种事。

那么,我为什么会来做这项研究呢。在洛斯阿拉莫斯,我被找去负责运行别人已经搭起来的计算机,好让那些科学家和物理学家回去做他们真正的工作。我看出自己只是个跑腿的。我看出,虽然在身体上我和他们没什么不同,但他们就是不一样。说得直白一点,我嫉妒。我想知道,他们为什么和我这么不同。我近距离见过费曼。见过费米和特勒。见过奥本海默。见过汉斯·贝特,他是我的上司。我见过不少非常有本事的人。于是我开始非常在意,那些真正做成事的人,与那些本来也许能做成事的人,到底差别在哪里。

后来我到了贝尔实验室,进了一个产出极高的部门。当时博德是部门主管,香农也在那里,还有其他一些人。我继续追问,为什么,差别到底是什么。再后来,我通过读传记、自传,向别人提问题,比如,你是怎么做到这件事的。我试图弄清这些差别到底是什么。我的这场演讲,说的就是这个。

为什么这场演讲重要。我觉得它重要,是因为据我所知,你们每个人都只有这一生可活。哪怕你相信轮回,这一世对下一世也帮不上什么。既然如此,为什么不在这一生里做点有分量的事,不管你怎么定义有分量。我不会替你下定义,你知道我在说什么。我主要讲科学,因为这是我研究过的领域。但据我所知,而且别人也这么告诉我,我说的很多话适用于很多领域。多数领域里的卓越工作,特征都很相似,不过我这里还是只谈科学。

为了谈到你个人,我必须用第一人称来讲。我得让你先放下谦虚,对自己说,是的,我想做一流的工作。我们的社会并不鼓励人主动立志去做真正优秀的工作。你好像不该这么想。好运应该自己落到你头上,你是碰巧才做成了大事。这种说法很蠢。我要说,为什么你不能主动去做点重要的事。你不必告诉别人,但难道不该对自己说一句,是的,我想做点重要的事吗。

为了进入第二阶段,我还得放下谦虚,用第一人称讲我见过什么、做过什么、听过什么。我会讲到一些人,其中有些你们认识。我希望我们离开这里之后,你们不要到处引述我刚才说的某些话。

我想先从心理上讲,而不是从逻辑上讲。我发现最大的反对意见是,人们认为伟大的科学都是靠运气。全是运气。那就想想爱因斯坦。注意看,他做出了多少件了不起的事。难道全是运气。是不是重复得有点太多了。再看香农。他不只是做了信息论。在那之前几年,他还做过别的好东西,还有一些至今仍被锁在密码学保密体系里的成果。他做了很多好东西。你一再看到,一个出色的人做出的不止一件事。偶尔确实有人一生只做成一件事,这个我们后面会讲,但很多时候是会反复出现的。我认为,单靠运气解释不了一切。

我会引用巴斯德的话,运气偏爱有准备的头脑。我觉得这正好说出了我的看法。运气这个因素确实存在,但又并不真是那回事。有准备的头脑,迟早会发现某个重要的问题,并且把它做出来。所以说,是的,有运气。你具体做成哪一件事,带点运气。但你会做成某件事,这不是运气。

举个例子,我到贝尔实验室后,有段时间和香农共用一间办公室。正好在他做信息论的时候,我在做编码理论。我们两个人在同一个地方、同一时间做出这些事,这件事很可疑,说明那种氛围就在空气里。你可以说,是的,这是运气。可你也可以反问,那为什么当时贝尔实验室那么多人,偏偏是这两个人做出来了。是的,一部分是运气,一部分是有准备的头脑。但这个一部分,就是我接下来还要讲的另一部分。

所以,虽然我后面还会多次回到运气这个话题,但我想先把这件事说清楚。不能把运气当成你能不能做出伟大工作的唯一标准。我认为你对它有一定控制力,虽然不是完全控制。最后我再引用牛顿的话。牛顿说,如果别人像我一样努力思考,他们也会得到类似的结果。

你会看到的一个特点,而且很多人都有,包括伟大的科学家,就是他们年轻时通常就有独立思考,并且有勇气追下去。比如爱因斯坦,大概在 12 岁或 14 岁的时候,问过自己一个问题,如果我以光速前进,去看一束光波,它看起来会是什么样子。他知道电磁理论说,不可能有一个静止的局部极大值。但如果他和光同速前进,他就会看见一个局部极大值。在 12 岁、14 岁,或者差不多那个年纪,他就能看出这里有矛盾,一定有哪里不对,光速这件事有某种古怪之处。后来他创立狭义相对论,这只是运气吗。很早以前,他就在思考这些碎片时,已经摆下了一些拼图。

不过这只是必要条件,不是充分条件。我接下来讲的所有这些因素,都是既有运气,也不只是运气。

再说脑子好不好。听起来当然不错。这个房间里大多数人,脑子大概都绰绰有余,足够做一流的工作。但伟大的工作不是只有聪明。聪明可以用很多方式衡量。在数学、理论物理、天体物理里,聪明往往在很大程度上和操纵符号的能力相关。所以典型的智商测验通常会把这些人测得很高。可在别的领域,情况就不同。

比如比尔·普凡,就是做区域熔炼的那个人。有一天他来到我办公室,脑子里模模糊糊有个想法,知道自己想要什么,手头也有一些方程。很明显,这个人不太懂数学,表达能力也不强。他的问题倒是挺有意思,于是我把它带回家,做了一点工作。后来我教会他怎么用计算机,让他自己去算答案。我给了他计算的力量。后来他一路做下去,起初在本部门几乎没得到什么认可,但最后他把这个领域的奖几乎都拿遍了。一旦起步顺了,他的羞怯、笨拙、不善表达,都慢慢退去了,他在许多方面都变得更有产出。当然,他也变得更会表达了。

我还能举另一个类似的人。我希望他今天不在场,他叫克洛格斯顿。我是在和约翰·皮尔斯小组一起做问题时认识他的,我当时觉得他不怎么样。我问那些曾和他一起上学的朋友,他读研究生时也这样吗。他们说,是的。要是我,大概会把这人开掉。但 J. R. 皮尔斯很聪明,把他留下了。后来克洛格斯顿做出了 Clogston cable。此后好点子就源源不断地出来了。一次成功给了他信心和勇气。

成功科学家的一个特征,就是有勇气。一旦你鼓起勇气,相信自己能做重要的问题,那你就能做。如果你觉得自己不行,那几乎肯定就不行。香农在这点上尤其突出。你只要想想他的那个主要定理就知道了。他想创造一种编码方法,但不知道怎么做,于是他搞了个随机码。接着他卡住了。然后他问了一个几乎不可能的问题,平均而言,一个随机码会做成什么样。接着他证明,平均码可以任意地好,因此至少存在一个好码。除了一个有无穷勇气的人,谁敢这样想。这就是伟大科学家的特点,他们有勇气。他们在难以置信的情形下也会继续往前走,继续思考,而且一直思考下去。

年龄也是一个因素,尤其物理学家特别在意。他们总说,你必须年轻时做出来,否则就永远做不出来。爱因斯坦很早就做出了成果,那些量子力学的人在做出最好工作时,年轻得令人讨厌。大多数数学家、理论物理学家和天体物理学家,在年轻时做出了我们认为最好的工作。不是说他们老了以后做不出好工作,但我们最看重的,往往是他们早年的成果。另一方面,在音乐、政治和文学里,我们常常认为他们最好的作品反而出现在晚年。我不知道你所在的领域落在这条尺度上的什么位置,但年龄确实有些影响。

不过我想解释一下,为什么年龄看起来会有这种影响。首先,一旦你做出一些好工作,你会发现自己进了各种委员会,再也没法做更多工作了。你可能会像我看到布拉顿那样。他拿诺贝尔奖那天,奖项公布后,我们都聚集在阿诺德礼堂,三位获奖者都上台讲话。第三位是布拉顿,他几乎眼含热泪地说,我知道所谓的诺贝尔奖效应,我不会让它影响我,我还是会做原来的沃尔特·布拉顿。我当时心想,这很好。可几周之后我就看出,那东西已经在影响他了。现在他只能做大问题。一个人出了名之后,就很难再去做小问题。这就是香农后来出问题的地方。做完信息论之后,你还能拿什么来加演。伟大的科学家常常犯这个错误。他们没有继续去种下那些小橡子,而大橡树恰恰是从这些橡子里长出来的。他们想一上来就做成大事。可事情并不是这么运转的。所以,这也是为什么你会发现,早早得到认可,反而像是把人给阉割了。

事实上,我愿意引用一句我多年最喜欢的话。在我看来,普林斯顿高等研究院毁掉的优秀科学家,比它培养出来的还多。这个判断,是看他们去之前做了什么,以及去之后又做了什么。不是说他们后来就不行了,而是说,他们去之前是卓越,去之后只剩下优秀。

这就引出了另一个话题,也许顺序有点乱,就是工作条件。大多数人以为最好的工作条件,其实并不是。很明显不是,因为人们在工作条件很差时,反而常常最有产出。剑桥物理实验室有一段很好的时期,当时他们几乎是在棚屋里干活,却做出了一些最好的物理。

我讲个自己的故事。很早的时候我就明白,贝尔实验室不会按传统方式,给我一大群程序员,让他们用绝对二进制去给计算机编程。很明显,他们不会给。可那时候大家都是这么干的。我完全可以去西海岸,在飞机公司找份工作,毫不费劲。但那些令人兴奋的人在贝尔实验室,而那些飞机公司里的人不是。我想了很久,我到底该不该走,我怎么才能把两个世界的好处都拿到。最后我对自己说,汉明,你不是一直觉得机器几乎什么都能干吗,那为什么不能让它们自己写程序呢。起初看起来像个缺陷的东西,逼得我很早就走进了自动编程。很多时候,一个看似缺点的东西,只要换个角度看,反而会变成你最大的资产之一。当然,你第一次看到时,多半不会这么想。你当时只会说,天哪,我永远都拿不到足够的程序员,那我还怎么做出伟大的编程。类似的故事还有很多,格蕾丝·霍珀也有。

我觉得,如果你认真看,就会发现,伟大的科学家常常是把问题稍微转了个方向,就把缺陷变成了资产。比如很多科学家在发现自己做不出来一个问题之后,最后开始研究为什么做不出来。然后他们就把问题反过来看,说,当然,这其实就是它真正的样子,于是得到一个重要结果。所以理想工作条件这件事非常奇怪。你想要的那种条件,不一定真的最适合你。

再说驱动力。你会发现,大多数伟大的科学家都有惊人的驱动力。我在贝尔实验室和约翰·图基共事了十年。他的驱动力极强。我进实验室大概三四年后,有一天突然发现,约翰·图基比我还小一点。约翰是天才,而我显然不是。于是我冲进博德的办公室,说,怎么可能有人和我差不多年纪,却懂得比约翰·图基还多。他往椅背上一靠,把手放到脑后,微微一笑,说,汉明,你要是这些年像他那样拼命工作,你知道的东西会多得让你吃惊。我灰溜溜地走出了办公室。

博德的意思是这样的。知识和产出像复利。两个人能力差不多,其中一个人比另一个人多努力 10%,那么前者的总产出会超过后者两倍还不止。你知道得越多,就学得越多。学得越多,就越能做事。越能做事,机会也越多。这几乎就是复利。我不想给你具体利率,但那是个非常高的利率。两个人能力完全一样,其中一个人如果每天都能比另一个人多挤出一个小时来思考,那么从一生来看,他的产出会高得惊人。

我把博德的话记在了心里。之后几年,我花了更多时间,努力让自己再多用点劲。结果我确实发现,工作能做得更多。我不太想当着我太太的面承认,但我有时候确实有点忽略她,因为我得学习。要是你真打算把想做的事做成,就必须忽略一些别的东西。这个毫无疑问。

说到驱动力,爱迪生讲过一句话,天才是百分之九十九的汗水,加百分之一的灵感。他可能有点夸张,但意思是,扎实的工作,持续地做,会把你带到非常远的地方。持续地付出努力,再加上一点更聪明的投入,这才有用。问题也正在这里。驱动力如果用错地方,是到不了任何地方的。我一直想不明白,为什么我在贝尔实验室那些很优秀的朋友,工作和我一样努力,甚至更努力,最后却没有多少可拿出来说的成果。努力用错地方,是很严重的事。只靠勤奋不够,必须用得明智。

还有另一个特质,我也想讲讲,那就是对模糊性的容忍。我花了一段时间才意识到它的重要性。大多数人喜欢相信某件事非真即假。伟大的科学家对模糊性容忍得很好。他们对理论的相信程度,足够让他们继续做下去;他们对理论的怀疑程度,也足够让他们注意到错误和缺陷,从而再往前迈一步,建立新的替代理论。你如果太相信,就永远看不到裂缝。你如果太怀疑,就根本不会开始。这需要一种极美的平衡。

但多数伟大的科学家,都很清楚自己的理论为什么对,同时也很清楚其中有哪些细微的不合拍之处,他们不会忘记这些地方。达尔文在自传里写过,他发现自己必须把每一条看起来和自己信念相矛盾的证据写下来,不然它们会从脑子里消失。当你发现某些表面上的漏洞时,你得足够敏感,把这些东西记住,并且一直留意,看它们能如何被解释,或者理论该怎么改才能容纳它们。这些地方,往往正是最伟大的贡献所在。伟大的贡献很少只是多加一位小数。

说到底,这是情感上的投入。大多数伟大的科学家都对自己的问题全情投入。那些没有真正投入的人,很少能做出杰出的、一流的工作。当然,再说一次,情感投入本身并不够。但它显然是必要条件。我想我可以告诉你原因。所有研究创造力的人,最后都会被逼到同一句话,创造力来自潜意识。不知怎么地,它突然就出来了。它就是突然出现。我们对潜意识知道得很少,但有一点你应该很清楚,你的梦也来自潜意识。而你也知道,你的梦在相当程度上是在重组你白天的经历。如果你一天又一天地深深沉浸在某个主题里,完全投入其中,你的潜意识除了处理这个问题,也没别的事好干。于是某天早上你醒来,或者某天下午,答案就在那里了。那些没有投入到当前问题中的人,潜意识会跑去干别的,于是出不了大成果。

所以,管理自己的办法就是,当你手上有真正重要的问题时,不要让别的东西占据你注意力的中心,你要让自己的思维一直围着这个问题转。让你的潜意识饿着肚子,逼着它去做你的问题。这样你晚上能安稳睡觉,早上起来免费拿到答案。

刚才艾伦·奇诺维思提到,我以前常在物理那桌吃饭。我原来跟数学家一起吃,后来发现数学我已经知道不少了,其实没学到太多东西。物理那桌,正如他所说,是个很刺激的地方,不过我觉得他夸大了我在那里的贡献。听肖克利、布拉顿、巴丁、J. B. 约翰逊、肯·麦凯这些人说话,非常有意思,我也学到了很多。可惜后来诺贝尔奖来了,升职也来了,剩下的只是一群残渣。没人想要那些剩下的人。那我当然没必要继续和他们一起吃。

餐厅另一边有一桌化学家。我和其中一个人,大卫·麦考尔,一起工作过。而且当时他正在追我们秘书。我走过去说,我能不能加入你们。他们总不能说不。于是我跟他们吃了一阵子。然后我开始问,你们这个领域里重要的问题是什么。过了一周左右,我又问,你们正在做哪些重要问题。再过一阵子,有一天我走进去,对他们说,如果你们做的事并不重要,而且你们自己也不觉得它会通向什么重要的东西,那你们为什么还在贝尔实验室做它。那以后我就不太受欢迎了,只好另找人一起吃饭。

那是春天。到秋天,大卫·麦考尔在走廊里拦住我,说,汉明,你那句话扎进我心里了。我整个夏天都在想,也就是我这个领域里真正重要的问题是什么。他说,我没有改变我的研究,但我觉得这件事很值得。我说,谢谢你,大卫,就走了。几个月后我注意到,他当了系主任。前几天我又注意到,他成了美国国家工程院院士。我还注意到,他成功了。而同桌其他那些人的名字,我从没再在科学圈里听见过。他们没法问自己一句,我这个领域里重要的问题是什么。

如果你不做重要的问题,那你很难做出重要的工作。这显而易见。伟大的科学家会非常认真地想清楚,他们领域里有哪些重要问题,并且一直留意该怎么下手。

我要提醒你一句,重要问题这个说法必须小心界定。某种意义上说,物理学里最突出的三个问题,在我待在贝尔实验室期间,从来没人做过。所谓重要,意思是只要做出来,诺贝尔奖和你想要的任何金额的钱都稳了。我们没有去做的是,第一,时间旅行。第二,瞬间传送。第三,反重力。它们不是重要问题,因为我们没有可行的攻击路径。一个问题之所以重要,不是因为结果有多大,而是因为你有一个合理的进攻办法。这才让它重要。我说大多数科学家没有在做重要问题,我指的是这个意义上的不重要。

据我观察,普通科学家几乎把所有时间都花在那些他们自己也不认为重要的问题上,而且他们也不相信这些问题会通向重要问题。前面我说过要种橡子,日后才会长成橡树。你不可能总是精确知道自己该站在哪,但你至少可以待在某些可能发生事情的地方。即便你相信伟大的科学只是运气,那你也可以站在会打雷的山顶上,而不必躲在安全的山谷里。可普通科学家几乎总是在做例行、安全的工作,所以产出不多。就是这么简单。你如果想做伟大的工作,就必须做重要的问题,而且你应该心里有数。

基于这个想法,在约翰·图基等人的一再催促下,我最后养成了一个习惯,我叫它 Great Thoughts Time。每周五中午去吃午饭后,我只谈伟大的想法。所谓伟大的想法,就是像这样的问题,计算机会在整个 AT&T 里扮演什么角色。计算机会怎样改变科学。比如我当时观察到,十个实验里有九个是在实验室里做的,十个里只有一个在计算机上做。我有一次对几位副总裁说,这个比例会反过来,也就是十个里有九个实验会在计算机上完成,十个里只有一个在实验室里。他们知道我是个疯数学家,毫无现实感。我知道他们错了。后来事实证明他们错了,我是对的。他们建了很多根本不需要的实验室。我之所以看出计算机正在改变科学,是因为我花了很多时间去问,计算机会对科学产生什么影响,我又能如何推动这个变化。

我问自己,这会怎样改变贝尔实验室。有一次在同一场演讲里我还说过,在我离开之前,贝尔实验室里会有超过一半的人和计算机密切交互。现在你们每个人都有终端了。我认真想的是,我的领域要往哪走,机会在哪里,什么事值得做。我应该去那些地方,这样我才有机会做出重要的事。

多数伟大的科学家都知道很多重要问题。他们手里大概有 10 到 20 个重要问题,一直在等着找到进攻路径。一旦出现一个新想法,你会听见他们说,嗯,这对那个问题有关系。然后他们就会把别的都放下,扑上去做。

我现在可以给你讲个可怕的故事。别人讲给我的,但我不能保证它是真的。有一次我在机场,和一个来自洛斯阿拉莫斯的朋友聊天,说裂变实验当年恰好先在欧洲发生真是运气,因为那促使我们在美国开始造原子弹。他说,不对。在伯克利,我们当时已经积累了一堆数据,只是因为还在搭更多设备,所以没来得及去处理那些数据。如果我们当时把那些数据处理了,我们就会发现裂变。他们已经把东西拿在手里了,却没有追下去。结果他们成了第二名。

伟大的科学家一旦机会打开,就会扑上去追。他们会把别的事都扔掉。他们能把其他东西清出去,追着一个想法不放,是因为他们早就把这件事想透了。他们的头脑已经准备好了。一看见机会,就上。很多时候当然也不会成,但你只要抓住其中少数几次,就足够做出伟大的科学。某种意义上说,这还挺容易。最大的诀窍之一,就是活得久一点。

还有一个特征,我也是过了一阵子才注意到。我观察那些开着门工作的人和关着门工作的人。我发现,如果你把办公室门关上,今天和明天你确实能做更多工作,而且你的短期产出会超过大多数人。但十年以后,不知怎么回事,你就不太知道哪些问题值得做了。你辛苦做出来的工作,在重要性上总有点偏。那个开着门工作的人,会不断被打断,但他也偶尔会得到一些线索,知道这个世界现在是什么样,什么东西也许重要。

我没法证明这里的因果关系,因为你也可以说,关门只是封闭心态的象征。我不知道。但我可以说,开门工作的人,和最后做出重要事情的人之间,相关性相当高,虽然关门工作的人常常更努力。问题就在于,他们总是差一点点做错题,不是差很多,但足够让他们错过名声。

我还想讲另一个题目。它来自一首歌,你们很多人应该都知道,不在于你做什么,而在于你怎么做。我先讲自己的一个例子。在绝对二进制时代,我被骗着用数字计算机去做一个连最好的模拟计算机都做不出来的问题。而且我还真算出了答案。后来我仔细一想,对自己说,汉明,你迟早得给这个军方项目交报告。你花了这么多钱,总得有个交代。每个模拟机单位都会拿你的报告去挑刺,看能不能找出毛病。我当时做积分的方法,说难听点,确实很烂,但答案是出来了。然后我意识到,问题的真相并不只是把答案算出来。真正的问题,是第一次并且毫无争议地证明,我能在模拟计算机最擅长的地盘上,用数字机器赢它。我于是重做了解法,建立了一套漂亮而优雅的理论,也改变了我们计算答案的方式,结果数值并没有不同。最后发表出来的报告里,是一种优雅的方法。多年以后,这个方法被称作 Hamming's Method of Integrating Differential Equations。现在它多少有点过时了,但在当时那确实是个很好的方法。通过稍微改写一下问题,我做成的是重要工作,而不是琐碎工作。

同样地,在早年用阁楼上那台机器时,我一个问题接一个问题地解。成功的不少,失败的也有几个。有个星期五,我解决完一个问题回家,奇怪的是,我并不高兴,我很沮丧。我看到的人生像是一长串一个接一个的问题。想了很久之后,我决定,不,我不该只是单件生产一个可变产品。我应该关心明年所有的问题,而不只是眼前这个。通过改变提问方式,我依然得到同样甚至更好的结果,但我改变了事情的性质,也因此做了重要的工作。我开始进攻那个更大的问题,我怎样征服机器,怎样处理明年所有的问题,哪怕我现在还不知道那些问题会是什么。我该怎么为它做准备。我该怎么做眼前这个问题,才能在未来保持领先。我怎样遵守牛顿那条规则。牛顿说,如果我比别人看得更远,那是因为我站在巨人的肩膀上。如今我们是踩在彼此的脚上。你应该以这样一种方式完成你的工作,让别人能够在上面继续搭建,好让他们真的能说,是的,我站在某某人的肩膀上,所以我看得更远。科学的本质是累积的。很多时候,只要把问题稍微改一下,你做出来的就可能是伟大的工作,而不只是好的工作。

我后来给自己定了个原则,除非一个孤立问题能代表一整个类别,否则我再也不去解孤立问题。如果你多少懂点数学,你就知道,努力去推广,常常意味着解法反而更简单。很多时候,只要停下来对自己说,这确实是他想要解决的那个问题,但它其实只是某某类问题的一个典型。是的,我完全可以用一种远优于当前个案的办法,把整类问题一起解决。因为我此前是陷在不必要的细节里了。抽象化这件事,常常会让事情变简单。而且,我也把这些方法存了起来,为未来的问题做准备。

这一部分结束前,我想提醒你一句,差劲的工人才会怪工具,好手会拿着手头现有的东西把活做下去,并尽可能给出最好的答案。我建议你通过改变问题,通过换个角度看事情,能极大改变自己最后的产出。因为你可以把工作做成一种别人真能接着往上搭的样子,也可以做成一种下一个人必须几乎从头再做一遍的样子。这不只是工作本身的问题,还包括你怎么写报告,怎么写论文,整个态度。把事情做得宽一点、一般一点,并不比只做一个很特殊的个案更难。而且满足感和回报都大得多。

现在我讲到一个很令人不舒服的话题。只把事情做好还不够,你还得把它卖出去。对科学家来说,推销这个词很别扭。它很难看。你觉得自己不该干这种事。世界本来就该在那里等着,当你做出伟大的成果时,大家应该冲出来欢迎它。可事实是,每个人都忙着做自己的事。你必须把你的成果呈现得足够好,好到别人愿意放下手头的事,来看你做了什么,把它读完,然后回来对你说,是的,这东西真不错。

我建议你翻期刊时,自己问问,为什么有些文章你会读,有些你不会读。你最好把报告写成这样,当它发表在 Physical Review 或你想发的任何地方时,读者翻页的时候,不会只是翻过你那几页,而会停下来读你的。如果他们不停下来看,你就得不到认可。

推销这件事里有三件必须做的事。你得学会写得清楚、写得好,这样别人才会读。你还得学会做比较正式的演讲。你也必须学会做非正式的表达。我们过去有很多所谓的 back room scientists. 在会议上,他们一言不发。等到三周后决策都做完了,他们再交上来一份报告,说为什么应该做这个做那个。可那时候已经晚了。他们没法在激烈会议的正中间,在事情正热的时候,站起来说,我们应该这样做,理由是这些。你也必须掌握这种沟通形式,而不只是准备好的演讲。

我刚开始时,一上台演讲几乎会生理性不适,紧张得厉害。我意识到,要么我得学会流畅地做演讲,要么我的整个职业生涯都会因此残掉一大块。第一次 IBM 请我去纽约晚上做演讲时,我决定我要讲一场真正好的演讲,一场别人想听的演讲。不是技术细节,而是一个更宽的演讲。讲完后,如果他们喜欢,我就轻描淡写地说一句,你们什么时候想听,我都可以来讲。结果,我因此得到了大量在有限听众面前练习演讲的机会,也克服了害怕。更重要的是,我也因此能够研究,什么方法有效,什么方法无效。

而在参加各种会议时,我早就在研究,为什么有些论文会被记住,大多数不会。技术人员总想讲一场范围非常窄、非常技术化的报告。可大多数时候,听众想听的是一场更宽泛的报告,他们想要比讲者愿意给的更多综述和背景。所以很多报告都没效果。讲者报出一个题目,突然就一头扎进自己解决的细节里。台下能跟上的人很少。你应该先画出一幅整体图景,说明为什么它重要,然后再慢慢勾勒你做了什么。这样更多人会说,是的,乔做了这个。或者,玛丽做了这个。我真看懂了它在哪里。是的,玛丽这场讲得真好,我明白玛丽做了什么。人们倾向于讲一种范围极小、非常安全的报告。通常这没有效果。而且,很多报告的信息量远远过大。所以我说,推销这件事,其实很明显。

我来总结一下。你必须做重要的问题。我不承认一切都只是运气,但我也承认,运气成分确实不小。我认同巴斯德那句,运气偏爱有准备的头脑。我非常赞成自己做过的那件事。多年来每个星期五下午,只想伟大的想法。这意味着我把 10% 的时间投入到理解领域里更大的问题上,也就是哪些重要,哪些不重要。早年我发现,自己明明相信的是 this,可一整周却都在朝 that 方向走。这很愚蠢。如果我真觉得行动应该在那边,为什么我却往这边走。我不是该改目标,就是该改行为。于是我改了自己的做法,开始朝我认为重要的方向走。就这么简单。

现在你可能会告诉我,你并不能控制自己被要求做什么。刚开始也许确实不能。但一旦你取得一定成功,找你出结果的人会多到你根本应付不过来。那时你就有了一些选择权,虽然不是完全的。

关于这一点,我给你讲个故事,这也关系到如何教育你的老板。我有个老板叫谢尔库诺夫,他现在仍然是我的好朋友。有个军方的人来找我,硬要我在周五前给他答案。可我那时已经把计算资源投入到为一组科学家实时处理数据上了,我正埋在一堆短小、重要的问题里。这个军方的人要我在周五下班前把他的事做完。我说,不行,我周一给你。我周末可以做,但我现在不做。他跑去找我的老板谢尔库诺夫。谢尔库诺夫对我说,你必须先给他跑,他周五前必须拿到。我说,我为什么要。他说,你必须。我说,行,谢尔盖,那你周五下午就坐在办公室里,看着这个人是怎么走出那扇门的。

我在周五下午晚些时候把答案给了那位军方人士。然后我走进谢尔库诺夫办公室坐下。那人走出去时,我说,你看见了吗,谢尔库诺夫,这个人手里什么都没拿,但我已经把答案给他了。周一早上,谢尔库诺夫给那人打电话,问,你周末来加班了吗。我几乎能听到电话那头的停顿。那个人脑子里一定在飞快盘算接下来会发生什么。但他知道真要来加班就必须签到,他最好别说谎,所以他说没有。从那以后,谢尔库诺夫就说,截止时间由你来定,你也可以改。这一课就够他明白,为什么我不想让大项目挤掉探索性研究,为什么我有理由拒绝那些会吞光全部科研计算资源的紧急活。我想做的,是用这些资源去算大量小问题。

再举一个早年的例子。那时我的计算能力非常有限,而且在我的领域里,很明显,数学家根本用不着机器。但我需要更多机器能力。每次我不得不对别的领域的科学家说,不行,我没有足够机器能力时,他们都会抱怨。我就说,你去告诉你的副总裁,汉明需要更多计算能力。过了一阵子,我能看出上面发生了什么。很多人都在对我的副总裁说,你手下那个人需要更多计算能力。结果我拿到了。

我还做了第二件事。早期计算年代里,我们把仅有的一点编程力量借给别人帮忙时,我会说,我们的程序员没有得到应得的认可。你发表论文时必须感谢那位程序员,不然以后别再来找我帮忙。那位程序员要被点名感谢,她很辛苦。过了几年,我翻了一整年的 BSTJ 文章,数有多少比例提到了某位程序员。我把结果拿给老板,说,这就是计算在贝尔实验室里扮演的中心角色。如果 BSTJ 重要,那这就说明计算有多重要。他只好让步。

你可以教育你的老板。这很难。但在这场演讲里,我只从下往上看,不从上往下看。我讲的是,哪怕高层管理挡着你,你仍然可以怎样得到自己想要的东西。你也必须在那里把你的想法卖出去。

现在我来到最后一个问题,努力成为伟大的科学家,值得吗。要回答这个问题,你得去问那些人。只要你绕过他们的谦虚,大多数人都会说,是的,做出真正一流的工作,并且自己知道它是一流的,那种感觉比酒、女人和歌加在一起还好。要是是女性,她会说,比酒、男人和歌加在一起还好。而且你看看那些老板,他们总是会回来,或者索要报告,想参与那些发现发生的瞬间。他们老挡路。所以显然,那些做过这种事的人,还想再做一次。当然,这是一个有偏样本。我从来不敢去问那些没有做出伟大工作的人,他们对此感觉如何。不过我依然认为,这个挣扎是值得的。

我非常明确地觉得,努力去做一流工作是值得的。因为真相是,价值更多在挣扎本身,而不在结果。努力把自己塑造成某种样子的过程,本身就值得。成功和名声,在我看来,只像是股息。

我已经告诉过你怎么做了。既然这么简单,为什么还有这么多有才华的人失败。比如直到今天,我仍然觉得,贝尔实验室数学部里有不少人,比我更有能力、天赋也更好,但他们的产出没有我多。当然也有人产出比我多。香农就比我多,还有其他一些人也做了很多。但和许多条件比我更好的人相比,我依然是高产的。为什么会这样。他们到底出了什么事。为什么那么多本来大有希望的人,会失败。

其中一个原因,是驱动力和投入。那些能力没那么强、但真正投入进去做伟大工作的人,往往比那些本事很大、却只是浅尝辄止的人做得更多。后者白天工作,回家干别的,第二天再回来工作。他们没有那种对真正一流工作显然必需的深度投入。他们会做出很多好工作,但别忘了,我们说的是一流工作。这里是有区别的。优秀的人、非常有才华的人,几乎总能做出好工作。我们谈的是那种突出的工作,那种能拿诺贝尔奖、能被真正记住的工作。

第二个原因,我觉得,是人格缺陷。举一个我在欧文遇见的人为例。他曾经是某个计算中心的主任,临时借调去当大学校长的特别助理。很明显,他前途极好。有一次他带我进办公室,给我展示他如何处理信件、如何管理来往文件。他指出秘书有多低效。他把信件都堆得到处都是,但他知道每样东西在哪。他还能在自己的文字处理机上把信写出来。他很得意,说这办法多妙,不受秘书干扰,他能多做多少工作。后来我背着他去找了秘书。秘书说,我当然帮不了他。他不把邮件给我,我没法登记。我不知道他把东西扔在地板的哪里。我当然帮不了他。

于是我去对他说,你看,如果你坚持现在这种方法,只靠自己一个人能做多少就做多少,那你也就只能走到你单打独斗能走到的地方。你如果学会和这个系统协作,你就可以走到整个系统能支持你走到的地方。可他再也没走得更远。他的人格缺陷在于,他想要完全控制,不愿承认你需要系统的支持。

这种事你会一再看见。优秀的科学家宁愿和系统对着干,也不肯学会怎么和系统一起工作,并利用系统能提供的一切。其实系统能给你的东西很多,只要你学会怎么用。它需要耐心,但你完全可以学会把系统用得很好,也可以学会怎么绕开它。毕竟,如果你想得到一个 No,那太容易了。你去找老板,马上就能拿到一个 No。如果你真想做成一件事,别问,直接做。把既成事实摆到他面前。别给他机会说 No。但如果你想要一个 No,那就太容易得到了。

另一个人格缺陷是自我张扬。这里我讲讲自己的经历。我从洛斯阿拉莫斯出来后,早年在纽约麦迪逊大道 590 号用一台机器,那只是我们租时间用的。我当时还穿西部风格的衣服,大斜口袋、波洛领结之类的一整套。我隐约注意到,自己得到的服务没有别人好。于是我开始测量。你走进去排队等轮到自己,我感觉自己拿不到公平待遇。我就问自己,为什么。IBM 的副总裁不可能特地交代,给汉明找麻烦。是底下那些秘书在这么做。出现空档时,她们会立刻去找人插进去,但她们出去找的是别人。为什么。我又没得罪她们。答案是,我的穿着不符合她们认为这种场合的人该有的样子。问题就这么简单,我穿得不对。

于是我得做个决定。我是要坚持自我,继续按自己喜欢的样子穿,让这件事持续不断地消耗我职业生涯中的精力。还是我要让自己的外表看起来更合规一些。最后我决定,我要努力让自己显得更符合期待。结果我一这么做,服务立刻就好多了。到了现在,我成了个上了年纪、挺有特色的怪老头,反而比别人得到更好的服务。

你应该按照听众的期待来穿。如果我要去 MIT 计算中心演讲,我就会戴波洛领结,穿旧灯芯绒夹克之类的。我很清楚,不能让衣着、外表、举止挡在我真正关心的事情前面。太多科学家觉得自己必须彰显自我,必须按自己的方式来。他们一定要这样,一定要那样,于是终生都在为此付出持续的代价。约翰·图基几乎总是穿得很随便。他走进一个重要办公室后,往往要过很久,对方才意识到,这个人是一流人物,最好认真听。从很久以前开始,约翰就一直得克服这种敌意。这完全是浪费精力。

我不是说你必须 conform。我说的是,看起来 conform,会让你轻松很多。如果你选择在各种地方自我表达,说我要按我的方式来,那你就在整个职业生涯中持续不断地付出小额代价。而这一生累积下来,就是大量根本没必要的麻烦。

我花一点心思给秘书讲笑话,待人友善,结果换来了极好的秘书支持。比如有一次,不知出于什么愚蠢原因,默里山那边所有复印服务全都卡死了。别问我怎么做到的,反正就是卡死了。我有东西急着要处理。我的秘书打电话给霍姆德尔那边的某个人,跳上公司车,花一个小时赶过去,复印完又赶回来。这就是回报。因为平时我会努力让她开心一点,给她讲笑话,待她友善。那一点额外的投入,后来都回报到我身上了。

一旦你明白自己必须利用系统,并认真研究怎样让系统替你工作,你就学会了怎样把系统调整到符合你的需要。否则你也可以终生和它持续对抗,像打一场小规模却从不宣战的战争。我觉得约翰·图基为此付出了非常惨重而没必要的代价。他本来就是天才,但我认为如果他愿意稍微配合一点,而不是不断彰显自我,事情会更好,也简单得多。他就是要一直按自己想要的样子穿。这不仅适用于穿衣,也适用于一千件别的事。人们会一直和系统对着干。当然,也不是说一次都不该干。

有次他们把图书馆从默里山中间搬到最远的一头,我一个朋友申请要一辆自行车。组织当然不傻。他们拖了一阵子,回了他一张园区地图,说请你在这张图上标出你要走哪些路径,这样我们才能替你办保险。又过了几个星期,他们又问,自行车你准备放哪里,又要怎么锁,我们才能怎么怎么样。他最后终于明白,自己当然会被文牍程序活活拖死,于是就认了。后来他升成了贝尔实验室总裁。巴尼·奥利弗是个能人。

他有一次给 IEEE 写信。当时贝尔实验室官方书架层高就是那么高,而当时 IEEE Proceedings 的刊物尺寸更高。既然你没法改官方书架层高,他就给 IEEE 出版负责人写信,说鉴于贝尔实验室里有这么多 IEEE 会员,而且官方空间高度就是这样,期刊尺寸应该改。他把这封信拿给老板签字。结果签了字的复写件倒是回来了,但直到今天他也不知道原件到底有没有寄出去。

我不是说你不该做一些改革姿态。我是说,根据我对能人的观察,他们不会把自己卷进这种战争里。他们玩一小下就收手,然后继续去做自己的工作。许多二流人物会因为和系统赌一口气而彻底陷进去,最后打成战争。他把精力浪费在愚蠢的项目上。

现在你会对我说,总得有人改变系统吧。我同意,总得有人来改。问题是,你想成为哪一种人。你是想成为改变系统的人,还是想成为做一流科学的人。你到底想成为哪一种。你得想清楚,当你和系统对着干时,你在做什么。你是出于玩笑想走多远,又要为这件事浪费多少力气。我的建议是,让别人去改系统,你去把自己变成一流科学家。你们当中极少有人有能力既改革系统,又成为一流科学家。

当然,我们也不能永远让步。有些时候,适度反叛是合理的。我观察到,几乎所有科学家都享受某种程度上捉弄系统的乐趣。问题的本质是,你不可能只在一个地方原创,而在别的地方完全不原创。原创,本来就意味着和别人不一样。你不可能成为一个原创的科学家,却在其他方面完全没有任何原创性特征。但很多科学家让自己在别处的小怪癖,付出了远远高于必要程度的代价,只是为了满足一点自我。不是说一切自我表达都不行,我反对的是其中一部分。

另一个毛病是愤怒。科学家常常会生气,而这根本不是处理事情的方式。可以拿它来取乐,但别动怒。愤怒是错位的。你应该顺着系统、配合系统,而不是一直和系统较劲。

你还应该努力去看事情积极的一面,而不是消极的一面。我前面已经给过你几个例子,还有很多很多类似的例子。面对一个既定局面,我只是换了个看法,就把一个原本像缺陷的东西变成了资产。我再给你一个例子。我是个自负的人,这毫无疑问。我知道,大多数请了学术休假去写书的人,最后都不能按时写完。所以在离开之前,我告诉了所有朋友,等我回来时,那本书一定已经写完了。对,我一定会写完。我绝不能灰溜溜地空手回来。我用自己的自尊,逼自己按想要的方式行动。我先把事情吹出去,这样我就不得不做到。后来我多次发现,像一只被逼到墙角的老鼠那样,我的能力往往比我自己以为的还强。

我发现,先说一句,哦,没问题,我周二就把答案给你,哪怕我压根不知道怎么做,也常常有用。到了周日晚,我就会非常拼命地想,周二到底怎么交差。我经常把自己的面子押上去。有时也会失败,但正如我说的,像一只被逼到墙角的老鼠一样,我很惊讶自己居然经常干得还不错。

我觉得你需要学会利用自己。你需要知道,怎样把同一个局面从一种看法切换到另一种看法,以提高成功概率。

人类的自我欺骗非常非常常见。你可以用无数种方式扭曲一件事,骗自己,让它看起来像别的样子。别人问你,为什么你没做成某某事,这个人总会有一千条借口。你去看科学史,通常总有十个人几乎同时站在那个点上,而最后拿到回报的,是第一个做到的人。剩下那九个人会说,我也想到过,但是我没去做,等等等等。借口多得很。你为什么不是第一个。你为什么没有做好。别找借口。别骗自己。你要对别人说多少借口我都不介意。但对你自己,你最好诚实一点。如果你真的想成为一流科学家,你就得了解自己,了解自己的弱点、强项,以及那些糟糕的毛病,比如我的自负。你怎样把缺点变成资产。你怎样把一个人手不足的局面,变成一个反而推动你走向正确方向的局面,而那偏偏正是你需要做的。

我再说一遍。回顾历史时,我看到的成功科学家,都是通过改变视角,把原本的缺陷变成了资产。

总结一下。我认为,为什么那么多人明明已经接近伟大却没有成功,其中一些原因是,他们没有做重要的问题,他们没有情感上的投入,他们没有努力把困难的问题改写成另一种更容易做但依然重要的局面,而且他们总是在给自己找借口。他们总说,一切只是运气。我已经告诉你,这件事有多简单。我也告诉你该怎么改。那就出发吧,去成为伟大的科学家。

问答

A. G. 奇诺维思:刚才那 50 分钟,是一场高度浓缩的智慧和观察,背后是一个非凡职业生涯积累下来的东西。我几乎数不过来有多少观点一下子戳到了要害。有些还特别应景。比如对更多计算能力的呼吁,今天早上我就从好几个人那里反复听到,都是这个。所以这话今天依然完全说中,虽然你说这些类似的话,已经是二三十年前的事了,迪克。从你的演讲里,我们每个人都能抽出很多教训。就我来说,以后在走廊里转的时候,我希望在贝尔通信研究中心能少看到一些紧闭的门。这是我觉得特别有意思的一点。非常非常感谢你,迪克,这真是一段精彩的回顾。现在我开放提问。我相信很多人都想接着问迪克刚才提到的一些点。

汉明:先回应一下艾伦·奇诺维思关于计算的事。我当时把计算放在研究部门里,整整十年我都在对管理层说,把那台 !&@#% 机器从研究部门里弄出去。我们被迫不停地跑任务。我们根本没法做研究,因为忙着操作和维护这些计算机。最后这话终于传过去了。他们决定把计算从研究部门挪到别的地方。至少可以说,我那时非常不受欢迎。我甚至有点惊讶大家没踢我的小腿,因为每个人都觉得自己的玩具被拿走了。我走进艾德·戴维的办公室,对他说,听着,艾德,你必须给研究人员一台机器。如果你给他们一台很大的机器,我们又会回到以前的麻烦里,忙着让它运转,忙到没空思考。给他们你能给的最小的机器,因为他们都是很有本事的人。他们会学会怎样在小机器上做成事情,而不是靠大规模计算。就我个人看,这就是 UNIX 诞生的方式。我们给了他们一台不算大的机器,他们决定让它去做伟大的事。于是他们必须搞出一个系统来干这个。这东西就叫 UNIX。

A. G. 奇诺维思:这一点我必须接一下。在我们现在这个环境里,迪克,当我们还在和一部分由监管者带来的、或者说监管要求下的文书流程纠缠时,有一句话是某位被逼急了的助理副总裁说出来的,我后来一用再用。他气呼呼地说,UNIX 从来就不是一个可交付物。

问题:个人压力呢。它会不会带来差别。

汉明:会,当然会。如果你没有情感投入,那倒不会。我在贝尔实验室的大多数年份里,都有将要溃疡的征兆。后来我去了海军研究生院,松了一点,现在身体好多了。但如果你想成为伟大的科学家,你就得接受压力。你可以过一种舒服日子,你可以做个好好先生,也可以当个伟大的科学家。可好好先生总是最后一个,里奥·杜罗彻就是这么说的。你如果想过一种愉快、轻松、充满娱乐的生活,那你当然能过上那样的生活。

问题:关于勇气这件事,没人会反对。但像我们这些头发灰了的,或者已经站稳脚跟的人,不用太担心这个。可现在年轻人中,我感觉到的是,在一个高度竞争的环境里,他们对冒险这件事真的很焦虑。对此你有什么建议吗。

汉明:我再引用一点艾德·戴维的话。艾德·戴维担心的是,我们社会普遍失去了某种胆气。我确实觉得,我们经历过不同的时期。从战争中出来,从我们在洛斯阿拉莫斯造出原子弹出来,从我们造出雷达出来,一批非常有胆量的人进入了数学部门和研究部门。他们刚刚亲眼见过事情被做成。他们刚刚赢下了一场非凡的战争。我们有理由有勇气,所以我们也确实做成了很多事。我没法再造出那种局面。我不能因此责怪这一代人没有那种东西,但我同意你的说法。我只是没法把责任压在他们身上。在我看来,他们似乎没有那种追求伟大的欲望,他们缺少去做这件事的勇气。但我们当时有,是因为我们身处一个特别有利于产生这种勇气的环境。我们刚刚经历了一场极其成功的战争。战争期间,有很长一段时间局势很糟,非常非常艰难,这点你也清楚。而我觉得,胜利给了我们勇气和自信。这也就是为什么你会看到,从四十年代后期到五十年代,实验室有惊人的高产,而这种高产正是被更早的那些经历点燃的。因为很多人更早时被迫学会别的东西,我们被迫学会那些自己不想学的东西,我们被迫开着门,后来才能把学到的东西用出来。这是事实。我也没法改变它,我同样没法责怪这一代人。这就是事实。

问题:管理层有没有什么能做、或者该做的事。

汉明:管理层能做的很少。如果你想谈如何管理研究,那是另一场完全不同的演讲。我可以再讲一个小时。但这场演讲说的是,不管管理层做什么,不管有什么阻力,个人怎样依然能做出非常成功的研究。你该怎么做。我只是把我观察到的人们是怎么做的说出来而已。就是这么简单,也这么难。

问题:头脑风暴应该是个日常过程吗。

汉明:有一段时间这事很流行,但看起来没什么效果。对我自己来说,我觉得和别人交谈是有益的。但正式的头脑风暴会很少值得。我确实会专门去找某个人,说,你看,我觉得这里一定有点什么。这是我看到的……然后我们就来回聊。但你得挑有本事的人。再借一个类比,你知道临界质量这个概念吧。材料够多了,就达到临界质量。还有一种东西,我以前叫它吸音棉。吸音棉一多,你抛出一个想法,他们只会说,是,是,是。你真正想要的是让临界质量转起来。对方会说,是啊,这让我想到某某。或者,你有没有想过这个,或者那个。你和别人交谈时,要把那些吸音棉清出去。他们也许是好人,但只会说,哦对对对。你要找到那些会反过来刺激你的人。比如你没法和约翰·皮尔斯聊几句而不被迅速激发。我以前还和一群别的人聊。比如艾德·吉尔伯特,我常常去他办公室问问题,听他说,然后带着被激发的状态回来。我非常小心地挑选,和谁一起头脑风暴,不和谁一起。因为吸音棉是一种诅咒。他们只是很好的人,占满了整个空间,除了把想法吸掉之外,什么也不贡献。新想法不会回响,只会死在那里。是的,我觉得和人交谈是必要的。我认为那些关着门工作的人在这点上失败了,所以他们没法把自己的想法磨得更锋利。比如别人随口说一句,你有没有注意过那边那个东西。我本来完全不知道,于是我可以过去看看。别人给你指了方向。这次来这里,我已经发现了几本回家后必须读的书。我会和别人聊,也会问问题,只要我觉得他们能回答我、能给我一些我不知道的线索。我就会出去看。

问题:在分配时间时,你是怎么在阅读、写作和真正做研究之间权衡的。

汉明:我在年轻时相信,你至少该花和原始研究一样多的时间,去打磨和呈现它。也就是说,至少 50% 的时间要花在呈现上。这个比例非常非常大。

问题:图书馆工作该投入多少精力。

汉明:这要看领域。不过我可以这么说。贝尔实验室有个人,非常非常聪明。他总在图书馆里,什么都读。你要找参考文献,就去问他,他会给你一大堆引用。但在我形成这些理论的过程中,我得出了一个判断,长期来看,不会有任何一个效应以他的名字命名。现在他已经从贝尔实验室退休,是个兼职教授。他非常有价值,我不是在否认这一点。他写过一些很好的 Physical Review 论文。但没有任何效应以他命名,因为他读得太多了。如果你总在读别人做过什么,你就会按他们的方式思考。你如果想有新的、不同的想法,那就该像很多有创造力的人那样,把问题先弄得足够清楚,然后在你自己把这个问题想透之前,拒绝去看任何答案。先自己想,你会怎么做,你怎样稍微改一下问题,让它变成真正该做的问题。所以,是的,你需要跟上进展。你更应该通过阅读去知道问题在哪里,而不是去抄答案。阅读是必要的,它让你知道正在发生什么、什么是可能的。但靠阅读去找答案,似乎不是做出伟大研究的方式。所以我给你两个答案。你要读,但关键不在于读多少,而在于你怎么读。

问题:你怎么让自己的名字和某些东西绑定在一起。

汉明:靠做出伟大的工作。我给你讲讲 hamming window 这个例子。我以前老拿图基开玩笑,挤兑过他很多次。有一次他从普林斯顿打电话到默里山找我。我知道他当时正在写功率谱的东西。他问我,介不介意他把某个窗口叫作 hamming window。我对他说,得了吧,约翰。你明明知道我只做了很小一部分,但你自己也做了很多。他说,是啊,汉明,但你贡献了很多零碎的小东西,你配得上一些认可。于是他就把它叫作 hamming window。接着我再补一句。我以前老拿真正的伟大去逗约翰。我说,真正的伟大,是当你的名字像 ampere、watt、fourier 那样,变成小写字母。hamming window 就是这么来的。

问题:迪克,你愿意谈谈做演讲、写论文和写书这三者的相对效果吗。

汉明:从短期看,如果你想明天就刺激到某个人,论文很重要。如果你想要长期的认可,在我看来,写书贡献更大,因为我们大多数人需要方向感。在这个知识几乎无限的时代,我们需要方向,才能找到路。我告诉你什么叫知识无限。从牛顿到今天,知识大致每 17 年翻一倍。我们之所以还能应付,主要是靠专业分化。照这个速度,再过 340 年,就是 20 次翻倍,也就是一百万倍。那时每一个现在的学科,都会裂成一百万个专业。这不可能发生。知识的当前增长速度,最终会把自己噎死,除非我们有新的工具。我相信,那些试图消化、协调、去掉重复、去掉低效方法,并清楚呈现底层思想的书,才会是未来一代真正看重的东西。公开演讲是必要的。私下交流是必要的。论文也是必要的。但我倾向于认为,从长期看,那些删掉不必要内容的书,比那些什么都告诉你的书更重要。因为你并不想知道一切。通常的回答是,我并不想知道那么多关于企鹅的事。你只想知道本质。

问题:你提到了诺贝尔奖的问题,以及随之而来的名望对一些职业生涯造成的影响。这是不是更广泛的名气问题。一个人能怎么办。

汉明:你可以做的一些事是这样。大概每七年左右,在自己的领域里做一次相当明显的转向,哪怕不是彻底转向。比如我就定期从数值分析转到硬件,再转到软件,等等。因为你的想法会被用完。到了新领域,你得重新像个婴儿一样开始。你不再是那个大人物。你又可以回到起点,再次开始种那些会长成大橡树的小橡子。

我觉得香农把自己毁掉了。事实上,他离开贝尔实验室时,我就说过,香农的科学生涯到此结束了。我很多朋友因此很不高兴,说香农还是和以前一样聪明。我说,是的,他还是一样聪明,但他的科学生涯结束了。我至今都真心这么认为。你必须改变。过一阵子以后,你会疲惫。你会把自己在某个领域里的原创性用光。你需要去碰一点邻近的新东西。我不是说让你从音乐跳到理论物理,再跳到英国文学。我是说,在你的领域内部换一块地方,这样你才不会变陈旧。你当然没法靠强制规定每七年一换来真正解决问题,但如果可以,我会把它设成做研究的条件之一。你必须每七年换一次研究领域,当然要有一个合理的定义说明这意味着什么。或者到了十年,管理层有权强制你换。我会坚持要求改变,因为我是认真的。老家伙们的问题在于,他们练出了一套方法,就一直沿着它走下去。他们当初朝那个方向走是对的,但世界变了。新的方向在那里,可老家伙们还在沿着旧方向前进。你需要进入一个新领域,获取新视角,而且要在旧视角还没彻底耗尽之前去做。你是可以主动处理这件事的,但它需要努力和精力。你得有勇气说,是的,我要放下我那伟大的名声。

比如当纠错码的理论已经非常成型之后,我对自己说,汉明,你要停止读这个领域的论文。你要彻底无视它。你要逼自己去做别的,而不是靠这套东西继续滑行。我是故意拒绝继续留在那个领域里的。我甚至不读论文,就是为了强迫自己有机会去做别的。这就是我在管理自己,而这也是我整场演讲一直在讲的东西。因为我知道自己有很多毛病,所以我管理自己。我缺点很多,所以我有很多问题,也就是很多可以管理的空间。

问题:你会怎样比较研究和管理。

汉明:如果你想成为伟大的研究者,那你就不会一边当公司总裁一边做到。如果你想当公司总裁,那又是另一回事。我并不反对当公司总裁。我只是不想当。我觉得伊恩·罗斯做贝尔实验室总裁做得很好。我不是反对这件事。但你得清楚自己想要什么。而且,当你年轻时,你可能选择的是想成为伟大的科学家。但随着年龄增长,你可能会改变主意。比如有一天我去找老板博德,问他,你为什么要当部门主管。你为什么不只是做个优秀科学家。他说,汉明,我对贝尔实验室的数学应该是什么样,有一个愿景。我看出来,如果这个愿景要实现,那我就必须亲手把它做成。我就必须当部门主管。

当你的愿景,是你自己单枪匹马就能完成的东西,那你就该追它。等到有一天,你的愿景,也就是你觉得该做的事,已经大到不是你一个人能完成时,那你就得往管理走。愿景越大,你就得走到越高的管理层。如果你的愿景涉及整个实验室,或者整个贝尔系统,那你就必须走到那个位置上去把它做成。从底下很难做到。这取决于你的目标和欲望是什么。而随着人生变化,它们也会变。你必须准备好改变。我当初选择避开管理,是因为我更喜欢做那些自己一个人能做成的事。但那是我的选择,所以它天然带有偏见。每个人都可以做自己的选择。保持开放的心态。但一旦你选了路,看在老天的份上,你得清楚自己做了什么,也得清楚自己做了什么选择。别想两边都占。

问题:一个人对自己的期待有多重要。或者说,待在一个对你期待伟大成果的群体里有多重要。

汉明:在贝尔实验室,每个人都期待我做出好工作。这帮了大忙。大家都期待你把事做好,如果你有自尊,你就会把它做好。我觉得身边有一流的人非常重要。我总是主动去找最好的人。物理那桌一旦没了最好的人,我就离开。化学那桌也是一样。我总是尽量待在那些能力极强的人身边,这样我可以向他们学习,他们也会期待我交出伟大的结果。我认为,通过有意识地管理自己,我比 laissez faire 的方式做得好得多。

问题:你在演讲一开始,淡化了运气的重要性。但你似乎也有点轻轻带过了那些把你带到洛斯阿拉莫斯、带到芝加哥、带到贝尔实验室的环境因素。

汉明:这里面当然有运气。另一方面,我不知道那些没有发生的分支会怎样。除非你能证明别的分支不会同样成功,甚至更成功,否则我没法下判断。你做成的具体是哪件事,是不是有运气。当然有。比如我在洛斯阿拉莫斯见到费曼时,我就知道他将来会拿诺贝尔奖。我不知道会因为什么。但我非常清楚,这个人一定会做出伟大的工作。不管未来出现什么方向,这个人都会做出伟大的工作。后来他也确实做了伟大的工作。并不是说你只会在某个特定环境下做出一点伟大的工作,然后那只是运气。机会迟早都会有,而且有很多。那是一整桶机会。你在这个情形里抓住一个,于是你在那边成了伟大人物,而不是在这边。运气因素是有,但又不是那么回事。运气偏爱有准备的头脑。运气偏爱有准备的人。我并不保证成功一定发生。我会说,运气会改变赔率,但个人一方确实有明确的控制力。

那么,出发吧,去做伟大的工作。

Image 1Image 2Image 3 Image 4: Richard Hamming: You and Your Research Talk at Bellcore, 7 March 1986 The title of my talk is "You and Your Research." It is not about managing research, it is about how you individually do your research. I could give a talk on the other subject � but it's not, it's about you. I'm not talking about ordinary run-of-the-mill research; I'm talking about great research. And for the sake of describing great research I'll occasionally say Nobel-Prize type of work. It doesn't have to gain the Nobel Prize, but I mean those kinds of things which we perceive are significant things. Relativity, if you want, Shannon's information theory, any number of outstanding theories � that's the kind of thing I'm talking about. Now, how did I come to do this study? At Los Alamos I was brought in to run the computing machines which other people had got going, so those scientists and physicists could get back to business. I saw I was a stooge. I saw that although physically I was the same, they were different. And to put the thing bluntly, I was envious. I wanted to know why they were so different from me. I saw Feynman up close. I saw Fermi and Teller. I saw Oppenheimer. I saw Hans Bethe: he was my boss. I saw quite a few very capable people. I became very interested in the difference between those who do and those who might have done. When I came to Bell Labs, I came into a very productive department. Bode was the department head at the time; Shannon was there, and there were other people. I continued examining the questions, "Why?" and "What is the difference?" I continued subsequently by reading biographies, autobiographies, asking people questions such as: "How did you come to do this?" I tried to find out what are the differences. And that's what this talk is about. Now, why is this talk important? I think it is important because, as far as I know, each of you has one life to live. Even if you believe in reincarnation it doesn't do you any good from one life to the next! Why shouldn't you do significant things in this one life, however you define significant? I'm not going to define it � you know what I mean. I will talk mainly about science because that is what I have studied. But so far as I know, and I've been told by others, much of what I say applies to many fields. Outstanding work is characterized very much the same way in most fields, but I will confine myself to science. In order to get at you individually, I must talk in the first person. I have to get you to drop modesty and say to yourself, "Yes, I would like to do first-class work." Our society frowns on people who set out to do really good work. You're not supposed to; luck is supposed to descend on you and you do great things by chance. Well, that's a kind of dumb thing to say. I say, why shouldn't you set out to do something significant. You don't have to tell other people, but shouldn't you say to yourself, "Yes, I would like to do something significant." In order to get to the second stage, I have to drop modesty and talk in the first person about what I've seen, what I've done, and what I've heard. I'm going to talk about people, some of whom you know, and I trust that when we leave, you won't quote me as saying some of the things I said. Let me start not logically, but psychologically. I find that the major objection is that people think great science is done by luck. It's all a matter of luck. Well, consider Einstein. Note how many different things he did that were good. Was it all luck? Wasn't it a little too repetitive? Consider Shannon. He didn't do just information theory. Several years before, he did some other good things and some which are still locked up in the security of cryptography. He did many good things. You see again and again that it is more than one thing from a good person. Once in a while a person does only one thing in his whole life, and we'll talk about that later, but a lot of times there is repetition. I claim that luck will not cover everything. And I will cite Pasteur who said, "Luck favors the prepared mind." And I think that says it the way I believe it. There is indeed an element of luck, and no, there isn't. The prepared mind sooner or later finds something important and does it. So yes, it is luck. The particular thing you do is luck, but that you do something is not. For example, when I came to Bell Labs, I shared an office for a while with Shannon. At the same time he was doing information theory, I was doing coding theory. It is suspicious that the two of us did it at the same place and at the same time � it was in the atmosphere. And you can say, "Yes, it was luck." On the other hand you can say, "But why of all the people in Bell Labs then were those the two who did it?" Yes, it is partly luck, and partly it is the prepared mind; but "partly" is the other thing I'm going to talk about. So, although I'll come back several more times to luck, I want to dispose of this matter of luck as being the sole criterion whether you do great work or not. I claim you have some, but not total, control over it. And I will quote, finally, Newton on the matter. Newton said, "If others would think as hard as I did, then they would get similar results." One of the characteristics you see, and many people have it including great scientists, is that usually when they were young they had independent thoughts and had the courage to pursue them. For example, Einstein, somewhere around 12 or 14, asked himself the question, "What would a light wave look like if I went with the velocity of light to look at it?" Now he knew that electromagnetic theory says you cannot have a stationary local maximum. But if he moved along with the velocity of light, he would see a local maximum. He could see a contradiction at the age of 12, 14, or somewhere around there, that everything was not right and that the velocity of light had something peculiar. Is it luck that he finally created special relativity? Early on, he had laid down some of the pieces by thinking of the fragments. Now that's the necessary but not sufficient condition. All of these items I will talk about are both luck and not luck. How about having lots of brains? It sounds good. Most of you in this room probably have more than enough brains to do first-class work. But great work is something else than mere brains. Brains are measured in various ways. In mathematics, theoretical physics, astrophysics, typically brains correlates to a great extent with the ability to manipulate symbols. And so the typical IQ test is apt to score them fairly high. On the other hand, in other fields it is something different. For example, Bill Pfann, the fellow who did zone melting, came into my office one day. He had this idea dimly in his mind about what he wanted and he had some equations. It was pretty clear to me that this man didn't know much mathematics and he wasn't really articulate. His problem seemed interesting so I took it home and did a little work. I finally showed him how to run computers so he could compute his own answers. I gave him the power to compute. He went ahead, with negligible recognition from his own department, but ultimately he has collected all the prizes in the field. Once he got well started, his shyness, his awkwardness, his inarticulateness, fell away and he became much more productive in many other ways. Certainly he became much more articulate. And I can cite another person in the same way. I trust he isn't in the audience, i.e. a fellow named Clogston. I met him when I was working on a problem with John Pierce's group and I didn't think he had much. I asked my friends who had been with him at school, "Was he like that in graduate school?" "Yes," they replied. Well I would have fired the fellow, but J. R. Pierce was smart and kept him on. Clogston finally did the Clogston cable. After that there was a steady stream of good ideas. One success brought him confidence and courage. One of the characteristics of successful scientists is having courage. Once you get your courage up and believe that you can do important problems, then you can. If you think you can't, almost surely you are not going to. Courage is one of the things that Shannon had supremely. You have only to think of his major theorem. He wants to create a method of coding, but he doesn't know what to do so he makes a random code. Then he is stuck. And then he asks the impossible question, "What would the average random code do?" He then proves that the average code is arbitrarily good, and that therefore there must be at least one good code. Who but a man of infinite courage could have dared to think those thoughts? That is the characteristic of great scientists; they have courage. They will go forward under incredible circumstances; they think and continue to think. Age is another factor which the physicists particularly worry about. They always are saying that you have got to do it when you are young or you will never do it. Einstein did things very early, and all the quantum mechanic fellows were disgustingly young when they did their best work. Most mathematicians, theoretical physicists, and astrophysicists do what we consider their best work when they are young. It is not that they don't do good work in their old age but what we value most is often what they did early. On the other hand, in music, politics and literature, often what we consider their best work was done late. I don't know how whatever field you are in fits this scale, but age has some effect. But let me say why age seems to have the effect it does. In the first place if you do some good work you will find yourself on all kinds of committees and unable to do any more work. You may find yourself as I saw Brattain when he got a Nobel Prize. The day the prize was announced we all assembled in Arnold Auditorium; all three winners got up and made speeches. The third one, Brattain, practically with tears in his eyes, said, "I know about this Nobel-Prize effect and I am not going to let it affect me; I am going to remain good old Walter Brattain." Well I said to myself, "That is nice." But in a few weeks I saw it was affecting him. Now he could only work on great problems. When you are famous it is hard to work on small problems. This is what did Shannon in. After information theory, what do you do for an encore? The great scientists often make this error. They fail to continue to plant the little acorns from which the mighty oak trees grow. They try to get the big thing right off. And that isn't the way things go. So that is another reason why you find that when you get early recognition it seems to sterilize you. In fact I will give you my favorite quotation of many years. The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, in my opinion, has ruined more good scientists than any institution has created, judged by what they did before they came and judged by what they did after. Not that they weren't good afterwards, but they were superb before they got there and were only good afterwards. This brings up the subject, out of order perhaps, of working conditions. What most people think are the best working conditions, are not. Very clearly they are not because people are often most productive when working conditions are bad. One of the better times of the Cambridge Physical Laboratories was when they had practically shacks � they did some of the best physics ever. I give you a story from my own private life. Early on it became evident to me that Bell Laboratories was not going to give me the conventional acre of programming people to program computing machines in absolute binary. It was clear they weren't going to. But that was the way everybody did it. I could go to the West Coast and get a job with the airplane companies without any trouble, but the exciting people were at Bell Labs and the fellows out there in the airplane companies were not. I thought for a long while about, "Did I want to go or not?" and I wondered how I could get the best of two possible worlds. I finally said to myself, "Hamming, you think the machines can do practically everything. Why can't you make them write programs?" What appeared at first to me as a defect forced me into automatic programming very early. What appears to be a fault, often, by a change of viewpoint, turns out to be one of the greatest assets you can have. But you are not likely to think that when you first look the thing and say, "Gee, I'm never going to get enough programmers, so how can I ever do any great programming?" And there are many other stories of the same kind; Grace Hopper has similar ones. I think that if you look carefully you will see that often the great scientists, by turning the problem around a bit, changed a defect to an asset. For example, many scientists when they found they couldn't do a problem finally began to study why not. They then turned it around the other way and said, "But of course, this is what it is" and got an important result. So ideal working conditions are very strange. The ones you want aren't always the best ones for you. Now for the matter of drive. You observe that most great scientists have tremendous drive. I worked for ten years with John Tukey at Bell Labs. He had tremendous drive. One day about three or four years after I joined, I discovered that John Tukey was slightly younger than I was. John was a genius and I clearly was not. Well I went storming into Bode's office and said, "How can anybody my age know as much as John Tukey does?" He leaned back in his chair, put his hands behind his head, grinned slightly, and said, "You would be surprised Hamming, how much you would know if you worked as hard as he did that many years." I simply slunk out of the office! What Bode was saying was this: Knowledge and productivity are like compound interest. Given two people of approximately the same ability and one person who works ten percent more than the other, the latter will more than twice outproduce the former. The more you know, the more you learn; the more you learn, the more you can do; the more you can do, the more the opportunity � it is very much like compound interest. I don't want to give you a rate, but it is a very high rate. Given two people with exactly the same ability, the one person who manages day in and day out to get in one more hour of thinking will be tremendously more productive over a lifetime. I took Bode's remark to heart; I spent a good deal more of my time for some years trying to work a bit harder and I found, in fact, I could get more work done. I don't like to say it in front of my wife, but I did sort of neglect her sometimes; I needed to study. You have to neglect things if you intend to get what you want done. There's no question about this. On this matter of drive Edison says, "Genius is 99% perspiration and 1% inspiration." He may have been exaggerating, but the idea is that solid work, steadily applied, gets you surprisingly far. The steady application of effort with a little bit more work, intelligently applied is what does it. That's the trouble; drive, misapplied, doesn't get you anywhere. I've often wondered why so many of my good friends at Bell Labs who worked as hard or harder than I did, didn't have so much to show for it. The misapplication of effort is a very serious matter. Just hard work is not enough - it must be applied sensibly. There's another trait on the side which I want to talk about; that trait is ambiguity. It took me a while to discover its importance. Most people like to believe something is or is not true. Great scientists tolerate ambiguity very well. They believe the theory enough to go ahead; they doubt it enough to notice the errors and faults so they can step forward and create the new replacement theory. If you believe too much you'll never notice the flaws; if you doubt too much you won't get started. It requires a lovely balance. But most great scientists are well aware of why their theories are true and they are also well aware of some slight misfits which don't quite fit and they don't forget it. Darwin writes in his autobiography that he found it necessary to write down every piece of evidence which appeared to contradict his beliefs because otherwise they would disappear from his mind. When you find apparent flaws you've got to be sensitive and keep track of those things, and keep an eye out for how they can be explained or how the theory can be changed to fit them. Those are often the great contributions. Great contributions are rarely done by adding another decimal place. It comes down to an emotional commitment. Most great scientists are completely committed to their problem. Those who don't become committed seldom produce outstanding, first-class work. Now again, emotional commitment is not enough. It is a necessary condition apparently. And I think I can tell you the reason why. Everybody who has studied creativity is driven finally to saying, "creativity comes out of your subconscious." Somehow, suddenly, there it is. It just appears. Well, we know very little about the subconscious; but one thing you are pretty well aware of is that your dreams also come out of your subconscious. And you're aware your dreams are, to a fair extent, a reworking of the experiences of the day. If you are deeply immersed and committed to a topic, day after day after day, your subconscious has nothing to do but work on your problem. And so you wake up one morning, or on some afternoon, and there's the answer. For those who don't get committed to their current problem, the subconscious goofs off on other things and doesn't produce the big result. So the way to manage yourself is that when you have a real important problem you don't let anything else get the center of your attention � you keep your thoughts on the problem. Keep your subconscious starved so it has to work on your problem, so you can sleep peacefully and get the answer in the morning, free. Now Alan Chynoweth mentioned that I used to eat at the physics table. I had been eating with the mathematicians and I found out that I already knew a fair amount of mathematics; in fact, I wasn't learning much. The physics table was, as he said, an exciting place, but I think he exaggerated on how much I contributed. It was very interesting to listen to Shockley, Brattain, Bardeen, J. B. Johnson, Ken McKay and other people, and I was learning a lot. But unfortunately a Nobel Prize came, and a promotion came, and what was left was the dregs. Nobody wanted what was left. Well, there was no use eating with them! Over on the other side of the dining hall was a chemistry table. I had worked with one of the fellows, Dave McCall; furthermore he was courting our secretary at the time. I went over and said, "Do you mind if I join you?" They can't say no, so I started eating with them for a while. And I started asking, "What are the important problems of your field?" And after a week or so, "What important problems are you working on?" And after some more time I came in one day and said, "If what you are doing is not important, and if you don't think it is going to lead to something important, why are you at Bell Labs working on it?" I wasn't welcomed after that; I had to find somebody else to eat with! That was in the spring. In the fall, Dave McCall stopped me in the hall and said, "Hamming, that remark of yours got underneath my skin. I thought about it all summer, i.e. what were the important problems in my field. I haven't changed my research," he says, "but I think it was well worthwhile." And I said, "Thank you Dave," and went on. I noticed a couple of months later he was made the head of the department. I noticed the other day he was a Member of the National Academy of Engineering. I noticed he has succeeded. I have never heard the names of any of the other fellows at that table mentioned in science and scientific circles. They were unable to ask themselves, "What are the important problems in my field?" If you do not work on an important problem, it's unlikely you'll do important work. It's perfectly obvious. Great scientists have thought through, in a careful way, a number of important problems in their field, and they keep an eye on wondering how to attack them. Let me warn you, "important problem" must be phrased carefully. The three outstanding problems in physics, in a certain sense, were never worked on while I was at Bell Labs. By important I mean guaranteed a Nobel Prize and any sum of money you want to mention. We didn't work on (1) time travel, (2) teleportation, and (3) antigravity. They are not important problems because we do not have an attack. It's not the consequence that makes a problem important, it is that you have a reasonable attack. That is what makes a problem important. When I say that most scientists don't work on important problems, I mean it in that sense. The average scientist, so far as I can make out, spends almost all his time working on problems which he believes will not be important and he also doesn't believe that they will lead to important problems. I spoke earlier about planting acorns so that oaks will grow. You can't always know exactly where to be, but you can keep active in places where something might happen. And even if you believe that great science is a matter of luck, you can stand on a mountain top where lightning strikes; you don't have to hide in the valley where you're safe. But the average scientist does routine safe work almost all the time and so he (or she) doesn't produce much. It's that simple. If you want to do great work, you clearly must work on important problems, and you should have an idea. Along those lines at some urging from John Tukey and others, I finally adopted what I called "Great Thoughts Time." When I went to lunch Friday noon, I would only discuss great thoughts after that. By great thoughts I mean ones like: "What will be the role of computers in all of AT&T?", "How will computers change science?" For example, I came up with the observation at that time that nine out of ten experiments were done in the lab and one in ten on the computer. I made a remark to the vice presidents one time, that it would be reversed, i.e. nine out of ten experiments would be done on the computer and one in ten in the lab. They knew I was a crazy mathematician and had no sense of reality. I knew they were wrong and they've been proved wrong while I have been proved right. They built laboratories when they didn't need them. I saw that computers were transforming science because I spent a lot of time asking "What will be the impact of computers on science and how can I change it?" I asked myself, "How is it going to change Bell Labs?" I remarked one time, in the same address, that more than one-half of the people at Bell Labs will be interacting closely with computing machines before I leave. Well, you all have terminals now. I thought hard about where was my field going, where were the opportunities, and what were the important things to do. Let me go there so there is a chance I can do important things. Most great scientists know many important problems. They have something between 10 and 20 important problems for which they are looking for an attack. And when they see a new idea come up, one hears them say "Well that bears on this problem." They drop all the other things and get after it. Now I can tell you a horror story that was told to me but I can't vouch for the truth of it. I was sitting in an airport talking to a friend of mine from Los Alamos about how it was lucky that the fission experiment occurred over in Europe when it did because that got us working on the atomic bomb here in the US. He said "No; at Berkeley we had gathered a bunch of data; we didn't get around to reducing it because we were building some more equipment, but if we had reduced that data we would have found fission." They had it in their hands and they didn't pursue it. They came in second! The great scientists, when an opportunity opens up, get after it and they pursue it. They drop all other things. They get rid of other things and they get after an idea because they had already thought the thing through. Their minds are prepared; they see the opportunity and they go after it. Now of course lots of times it doesn't work out, but you don't have to hit many of them to do some great science. It's kind of easy. One of the chief tricks is to live a long time! Another trait, it took me a while to notice. I noticed the following facts about people who work with the door open or the door closed. I notice that if you have the door to your office closed, you get more work done today and tomorrow, and you are more productive than most. But 10 years later somehow you don't know quite know what problems are worth working on; all the hard work you do is sort of tangential in importance. He who works with the door open gets all kinds of interruptions, but he also occasionally gets clues as to what the world is and what might be important. Now I cannot prove the cause and effect sequence because you might say, "The closed door is symbolic of a closed mind." I don't know. But I can say there is a pretty good correlation between those who work with the doors open and those who ultimately do important things, although people who work with doors closed often work harder. Somehow they seem to work on slightly the wrong thing � not much, but enough that they miss fame. I want to talk on another topic. It is based on the song which I think many of you know, "It ain't what you do, it's the way that you do it." I'll start with an example of my own. I was conned into doing on a digital computer, in the absolute binary days, a problem which the best analog computers couldn't do. And I was getting an answer. When I thought carefully and said to myself, "You know, Hamming, you're going to have to file a report on this military job; after you spend a lot of money you're going to have to account for it and every analog installation is going to want the report to see if they can't find flaws in it." I was doing the required integration by a rather crummy method, to say the least, but I was getting the answer. And I realized that in truth the problem was not just to get the answer; it was to demonstrate for the first time, and beyond question, that I could beat the analog computer on its own ground with a digital machine. I reworked the method of solution, created a theory which was nice and elegant, and changed the way we computed the answer; the results were no different. The published report had an elegant method which was later known for years as "Hamming's Method of Integrating Differential Equations." It is somewhat obsolete now, but for a while it was a very good method. By changing the problem slightly, I did important work rather than trivial work. In the same way, when using the machine up in the attic in the early days, I was solving one problem after another after another; a fair number were successful and there were a few failures. I went home one Friday after finishing a problem, and curiously enough I wasn't happy; I was depressed. I could see life being a long sequence of one problem after another after another. After quite a while of thinking I decided, "No, I should be in the mass production of a variable product. I should be concerned with all of next year's problems, not just the one in front of my face." By changing the question I still got the same kind of results or better, but I changed things and did important work. I attacked the major problem � How do I conquer machines and do all of next year's problems when I don't know what they are going to be? How do I prepare for it? How do I do this one so I'll be on top of it? How do I obey Newton's rule? He said, "If I have seen further than others, it is because I've stood on the shoulders of giants." These days we stand on each other's feet! You should do your job in such a fashion that others can build on top of it, so they will indeed say, "Yes, I've stood on so and so's shoulders and I saw further." The essence of science is cumulative. By changing a problem slightly you can often do great work rather than merely good work. Instead of attacking isolated problems, I made the resolution that I would never again solve an isolated problem except as characteristic of a class. Now if you are much of a mathematician you know that the effort to generalize often means that the solution is simple. Often by stopping and saying, "This is the problem he wants but this is characteristic of so and so. Yes, I can attack the whole class with a far superior method than the particular one because I was earlier embedded in needless detail." The business of abstraction frequently makes things simple. Furthermore, I filed away the methods and prepared for the future problems. To end this part, I'll remind you, "It is a poor workman who blames his tools � the good man gets on with the job, given what he's got, and gets the best answer he can." And I suggest that by altering the problem, by looking at the thing differently, you can make a great deal of difference in your final productivity because you can either do it in such a fashion that people can indeed build on what you've done, or you can do it in such a fashion that the next person has to essentially duplicate again what you've done. It isn't just a matter of the job, it's the way you write the report, the way you write the paper, the whole attitude. It's just as easy to do a broad, general job as one very special case. And it's much more satisfying and rewarding! I have now come down to a topic which is very distasteful; it is not sufficient to do a job, you have to sell it. "Selling" to a scientist is an awkward thing to do. It's very ugly; you shouldn't have to do it. The world is supposed to be waiting, and when you do something great, they should rush out and welcome it. But the fact is everyone is busy with their own work. You must present it so well that they will set aside what they are doing, look at what you've done, read it, and come back and say, "Yes, that was good." I suggest that when you open a journal, as you turn the pages, you ask why you read some articles and not others. You had better write your report so when it is published in the Physical Review, or wherever else you want it, as the readers are turning the pages they won't just turn your pages but they will stop and read yours. If they don't stop and read it, you won't get credit. There are three things you have to do in selling. You have to learn to write clearly and well so that people will read it, you must learn to give reasonably formal talks, and you also must learn to give informal talks. We had a lot of so-called back room scientists.' In a conference, they would keep quiet. Three weeks later after a decision was made they filed a report saying why you should do so and so. Well, it was too late. They would not stand up right in the middle of a hot conference, in the middle of activity, and say, "We should do this for these reasons." You need to master that form of communication as well as prepared speeches. When I first started, I got practically physically ill while giving a speech, and I was very, very nervous. I realized I either had to learn to give speeches smoothly or I would essentially partially cripple my whole career. The first time IBM asked me to give a speech in New York one evening, I decided I was going to give a really good speech, a speech that was wanted, not a technical one but a broad one, and at the end if they liked it, I'd quietly say, "Any time you want one I'll come in and give you one." As a result, I got a great deal of practice giving speeches to a limited audience and I got over being afraid. Furthermore, I could also then study what methods were effective and what were ineffective. While going to meetings I had already been studying why some papers are remembered and most are not. The technical person wants to give a highly limited technical talk. Most of the time the audience wants a broad general talk and wants much more survey and background than the speaker is willing to give. As a result, many talks are ineffective. The speaker names a topic and suddenly plunges into the details he's solved. Few people in the audience may follow. You should paint a general picture to say why it's important, and then slowly give a sketch of what was done. Then a larger number of people will say, "Yes, Joe has done that," or "Mary has done that; I really see where it is; yes, Mary really gave a good talk; I understand what Mary has done." The tendency is to give a highly restricted, safe talk; this is usually ineffective. Furthermore, many talks are filled with far too much information. So I say this idea of selling is obvious. Let me summarize. You've got to work on important problems. I deny that it is all luck, but I admit there is a fair element of luck. I subscribe to Pasteur's "Luck favors the prepared mind." I favor heavily what I did. Friday afternoons for years � great thoughts only � means that I committed 10% of my time trying to understand the bigger problems in the field, i.e. what was and what was not important. I found in the early days I had believedthis' and yet had spent all week marching in that' direction. It was kind of foolish. If I really believe the action is over there, why do I march in this direction? I either had to change my goal or change what I did. So I changed something I did and I marched in the direction I thought was important. It's that easy. Now you might tell me you haven't got control over what you have to work on. Well, when you first begin, you may not. But once you're moderately successful, there are more people asking for results than you can deliver and you have some power of choice, but not completely. I'll tell you a story about that, and it bears on the subject of educating your boss. I had a boss named Schelkunoff; he was, and still is, a very good friend of mine. Some military person came to me and demanded some answers by Friday. Well, I had already dedicated my computing resources to reducing data on the fly for a group of scientists; I was knee deep in short, small, important problems. This military person wanted me to solve his problem by the end of the day on Friday. I said, "No, I'll give it to you Monday. I can work on it over the weekend. I'm not going to do it now." He goes down to my boss, Schelkunoff, and Schelkunoff says, "You must run this for him; he's got to have it by Friday." I tell him, "Why do I?" He says, "You have to." I said, "Fine, Sergei, but you're sitting in your office Friday afternoon catching the late bus home to watch as this fellow walks out that door." I gave the military person the answers late Friday afternoon. I then went to Schelkunoff's office and sat down; as the man goes out I say, "You see Schelkunoff, this fellow has nothing under his arm; but I gave him the answers." On Monday morning Schelkunoff called him up and said, "Did you come in to work over the weekend?" I could hear, as it were, a pause as the fellow ran through his mind of what was going to happen; but he knew he would have had to sign in, and he'd better not say he had when he hadn't, so he said he hadn't. Ever after that Schelkunoff said, "You set your deadlines; you can change them." One lesson was sufficient to educate my boss as to why I didn't want to do big jobs that displaced exploratory research and why I was justified in not doing crash jobs which absorb all the research computing facilities. I wanted instead to use the facilities to compute a large number of small problems. Again, in the early days, I was limited in computing capacity and it was clear, in my area, that a "mathematician had no use for machines." But I needed more machine capacity. Every time I had to tell some scientist in some other area, "No I can't; I haven't the machine capacity," he complained. I said "Go tell your Vice President that Hamming needs more computing capacity." After a while I could see what was happening up there at the top; many people said to my Vice President, "Your man needs more computing capacity." I got it! I also did a second thing. When I loaned what little programming power we had to help in the early days of computing, I said, "We are not getting the recognition for our programmers that they deserve. When you publish a paper you will thank that programmer or you aren't getting any more help from me. That programmer is going to be thanked by name; she's worked hard." I waited a couple of years. I then went through a year of BSTJ articles and counted what fraction thanked some programmer. I took it into the boss and said, "That's the central role computing is playing in Bell Labs; if the BSTJ is important, that's how important computing is." He had to give in. You can educate your bosses. It's a hard job. In this talk I'm only viewing from the bottom up; I'm not viewing from the top down. But I am telling you how you can get what you want in spite of top management. You have to sell your ideas there also. Well I now come down to the topic, "Is the effort to be a great scientist worth it?" To answer this, you must ask people. When you get beyond their modesty, most people will say, "Yes, doing really first-class work, and knowing it, is as good as wine, women and song put together," or if it's a woman she says, "It is as good as wine, men and song put together." And if you look at the bosses, they tend to come back or ask for reports, trying to participate in those moments of discovery. They're always in the way. So evidently those who have done it, want to do it again. But it is a limited survey. I have never dared to go out and ask those who didn't do great work how they felt about the matter. It's a biased sample, but I still think it is worth the struggle. I think it is very definitely worth the struggle to try and do first-class work because the truth is, the value is in the struggle more than it is in the result. The struggle to make something of yourself seems to be worthwhile in itself. The success and fame are sort of dividends, in my opinion. I've told you how to do it. It is so easy, so why do so many people, with all their talents, fail? For example, my opinion, to this day, is that there are in the mathematics department at Bell Labs quite a few people far more able and far better endowed than I, but they didn't produce as much. Some of them did produce more than I did; Shannon produced more than I did, and some others produced a lot, but I was highly productive against a lot of other fellows who were better equipped. Why is it so? What happened to them? Why do so many of the people who have great promise, fail? Well, one of the reasons is drive and commitment. The people who do great work with less ability but who are committed to it, get more done that those who have great skill and dabble in it, who work during the day and go home and do other things and come back and work the next day. They don't have the deep commitment that is apparently necessary for really first-class work. They turn out lots of good work, but we were talking, remember, about first-class work. There is a difference. Good people, very talented people, almost always turn out good work. We're talking about the outstanding work, the type of work that gets the Nobel Prize and gets recognition. The second thing is, I think, the problem of personality defects. Now I'll cite a fellow whom I met out in Irvine. He had been the head of a computing center and he was temporarily on assignment as a special assistant to the president of the university. It was obvious he had a job with a great future. He took me into his office one time and showed me his method of getting letters done and how he took care of his correspondence. He pointed out how inefficient the secretary was. He kept all his letters stacked around there; he knew where everything was. And he would, on his word processor, get the letter out. He was bragging how marvelous it was and how he could get so much more work done without the secretary's interference. Well, behind his back, I talked to the secretary. The secretary said, "Of course I can't help him; I don't get his mail. He won't give me the stuff to log in; I don't know where he puts it on the floor. Of course I can't help him." So I went to him and said, "Look, if you adopt the present method and do what you can do single-handedly, you can go just that far and no farther than you can do single-handedly. If you will learn to work with the system, you can go as far as the system will support you." And, he never went any further. He had his personality defect of wanting total control and was not willing to recognize that you need the support of the system. You find this happening again and again; good scientists will fight the system rather than learn to work with the system and take advantage of all the system has to offer. It has a lot, if you learn how to use it. It takes patience, but you can learn how to use the system pretty well, and you can learn how to get around it. After all, if you want a decisionNo', you just go to your boss and get a No' easy. If you want to do something, don't ask, do it. Present him with an accomplished fact. Don't give him a chance to tell youNo'. But if you want a No', it's easy to get aNo'. Another personality defect is ego assertion and I'll speak in this case of my own experience. I came from Los Alamos and in the early days I was using a machine in New York at 590 Madison Avenue where we merely rented time. I was still dressing in western clothes, big slash pockets, a bolo and all those things. I vaguely noticed that I was not getting as good service as other people. So I set out to measure. You came in and you waited for your turn; I felt I was not getting a fair deal. I said to myself, "Why? No Vice President at IBM said, Give Hamming a bad time'. It is the secretaries at the bottom who are doing this. When a slot appears, they'll rush to find someone to slip in, but they go out and find somebody else. Now, why? I haven't mistreated them." Answer: I wasn't dressing the way they felt somebody in that situation should. It came down to just that � I wasn't dressing properly. I had to make the decision � was I going to assert my ego and dress the way I wanted to and have it steadily drain my effort from my professional life, or was I going to appear to conform better? I decided I would make an effort to appear to conform properly. The moment I did, I got much better service. And now, as an old colorful character, I get better service than other people. You should dress according to the expectations of the audience spoken to. If I am going to give an address at the MIT computer center, I dress with a bolo and an old corduroy jacket or something else. I know enough not to let my clothes, my appearance, my manners get in the way of what I care about. An enormous number of scientists feel they must assert their ego and do their thing their way. They have got to be able to do this, that, or the other thing, and they pay a steady price. John Tukey almost always dressed very casually. He would go into an important office and it would take a long time before the other fellow realized that this is a first-class man and he had better listen. For a long time John has had to overcome this kind of hostility. It's wasted effort! I didn't say you should conform; I said "The appearance of conforming gets you a long way." If you chose to assert your ego in any number of ways, "I am going to do it my way," you pay a small steady price throughout the whole of your professional career. And this, over a whole lifetime, adds up to an enormous amount of needless trouble. By taking the trouble to tell jokes to the secretaries and being a little friendly, I got superb secretarial help. For instance, one time for some idiot reason all the reproducing services at Murray Hill were tied up. Don't ask me how, but they were. I wanted something done. My secretary called up somebody at Holmdel, hopped the company car, made the hour-long trip down and got it reproduced, and then came back. It was a payoff for the times I had made an effort to cheer her up, tell her jokes and be friendly; it was that little extra work that later paid off for me. By realizing you have to use the system and studying how to get the system to do your work, you learn how to adapt the system to your desires. Or you can fight it steadily, as a small undeclared war, for the whole of your life. And I think John Tukey paid a terrible price needlessly. He was a genius anyhow, but I think it would have been far better, and far simpler, had he been willing to conform a little bit instead of ego asserting. He is going to dress the way he wants all of the time. It applies not only to dress but to a thousand other things; people will continue to fight the system. Not that you shouldn't occasionally! When they moved the library from the middle of Murray Hill to the far end, a friend of mine put in a request for a bicycle. Well, the organization was not dumb. They waited awhile and sent back a map of the grounds saying, "Will you please indicate on this map what paths you are going to take so we can get an insurance policy covering you." A few more weeks went by. They then asked, "Where are you going to store the bicycle and how will it be locked so we can do so and so." He finally realized that of course he was going to be red-taped to death so he gave in. He rose to be the President of Bell Laboratories. Barney Oliver was a good man. He wrote a letter one time to the IEEE. At that time the official shelf space at Bell Labs was so much and the height of the IEEE Proceedings at that time was larger; and since you couldn't change the size of the official shelf space he wrote this letter to the IEEE Publication person saying, since so many IEEE members were at Bell Labs and since the official space was so high the journal size should be changed. He sent it for his boss's signature. Back came a carbon with his signature, but he still doesn't know whether the original was sent or not. I am not saying you shouldn't make gestures of reform. I am saying that my study of able people is that they don't get themselves committed to that kind of warfare. They play it a little bit and drop it and get on with their work. Many a second-rate fellow gets caught up in some little twitting of the system, and carries it through to warfare. He expends his energy in a foolish project. Now you are going to tell me that somebody has to change the system. I agree; somebody's has to. Which do you want to be? The person who changes the system or the person who does first-class science? Which person is it that you want to be? Be clear, when you fight the system and struggle with it, what you are doing, how far to go out of amusement, and how much to waste your effort fighting the system. My advice is to let somebody else do it and you get on with becoming a first-class scientist. Very few of you have the ability to both reform the system and become a first-class scientist. On the other hand, we can't always give in. There are times when a certain amount of rebellion is sensible. I have observed almost all scientists enjoy a certain amount of twitting the system for the sheer love of it. What it comes down to basically is that you cannot be original in one area without having originality in others. Originality is being different. You can't be an original scientist without having some other original characteristics. But many a scientist has let his quirks in other places make him pay a far higher price than is necessary for the ego satisfaction he or she gets. I'm not against all ego assertion; I'm against some. Another fault is anger. Often a scientist becomes angry, and this is no way to handle things. Amusement, yes, anger, no. Anger is misdirected. You should follow and cooperate rather than struggle against the system all the time. Another thing you should look for is the positive side of things instead of the negative. I have already given you several examples, and there are many, many more; how, given the situation, by changing the way I looked at it, I converted what was apparently a defect to an asset. I'll give you another example. I am an egotistical person; there is no doubt about it. I knew that most people who took a sabbatical to write a book, didn't finish it on time. So before I left, I told all my friends that when I come back, that book was going to be done! Yes, I would have it done � I'd have been ashamed to come back without it! I used my ego to make myself behave the way I wanted to. I bragged about something so I'd have to perform. I found out many times, like a cornered rat in a real trap, I was surprisingly capable. I have found that it paid to say, ``Oh yes, I'll get the answer for you Tuesday,'' not having any idea how to do it. By Sunday night I was really hard thinking on how I was going to deliver by Tuesday. I often put my pride on the line and sometimes I failed, but as I said, like a cornered rat I'm surprised how often I did a good job. I think you need to learn to use yourself. I think you need to know how to convert a situation from one view to another which would increase the chance of success. Now self-delusion in humans is very, very common. There are innumerable ways of you changing a thing and kidding yourself and making it look some other way. When you ask, "Why didn't you do such and such," the person has a thousand alibis. If you look at the history of science, usually these days there are ten people right there ready, and we pay off for the person who is there first. The other nine fellows say, "Well, I had the idea but I didn't do it and so on and so on." There are so many alibis. Why weren't you first? Why didn't you do it right? Don't try an alibi. Don't try and kid yourself. You can tell other people all the alibis you want. I don't mind. But to yourself try to be honest. If you really want to be a first-class scientist you need to know yourself, your weaknesses, your strengths, and your bad faults, like my egotism. How can you convert a fault to an asset? How can you convert a situation where you haven't got enough manpower to move into a direction when that's exactly what you need to do? I say again that I have seen, as I studied the history, the successful scientist changed the viewpoint and what was a defect became an asset. In summary, I claim that some of the reasons why so many people who have greatness within their grasp don't succeed are: they don't work on important problems, they don't become emotionally involved, they don't try and change what is difficult to some other situation which is easily done but is still important, and they keep giving themselves alibis why they don't. They keep saying that it is a matter of luck. I've told you how easy it is; furthermore I've told you how to reform. Therefore, go forth and become great scientists! **Questions and Answers** A. G. Chynoweth: Well that was 50 minutes of concentrated wisdom and observations accumulated over a fantastic career; I lost track of all the observations that were striking home. Some of them are very very timely. One was the plea for more computer capacity; I was hearing nothing but that this morning from several people, over and over again. So that was right on the mark today even though here we are 20 � 30 years after when you were making similar remarks, Dick. I can think of all sorts of lessons that all of us can draw from your talk. And for one, as I walk around the halls in the future I hope I won't see as many closed doors in Bellcore. That was one observation I thought was very intriguing. Thank you very, very much indeed Dick; that was a wonderful recollection. I'll now open it up for questions. I'm sure there are many people who would like to take up on some of the points that Dick was making. Hamming: First let me respond to Alan Chynoweth about computing. I had computing in research and for 10 years I kept telling my management, ``Get that !&@#% machine out of research. We are being forced to run problems all the time. We can't do research because were too busy operating and running the computing machines.'' Finally the message got through. They were going to move computing out of research to someplace else. I was persona non grata to say the least and I was surprised that people didn't kick my shins because everybody was having their toy taken away from them. I went in to Ed David's office and said, ``Look Ed, you've got to give your researchers a machine. If you give them a great big machine, we'll be back in the same trouble we were before, so busy keeping it going we can't think. Give them the smallest machine you can because they are very able people. They will learn how to do things on a small machine instead of mass computing.'' As far as I'm concerned, that's how UNIX arose. We gave them a moderately small machine and they decided to make it do great things. They had to come up with a system to do it on. It is called UNIX! A. G. Chynoweth: I just have to pick up on that one. In our present environment, Dick, while we wrestle with some of the red tape attributed to, or required by, the regulators, there is one quote that one exasperated AVP came up with and I've used it over and over again. He growled that, "UNIX was never a deliverable!" Question: What about personal stress? Does that seem to make a difference? Hamming: Yes, it does. If you don't get emotionally involved, it doesn't. I had incipient ulcers most of the years that I was at Bell Labs. I have since gone off to the Naval Postgraduate School and laid back somewhat, and now my health is much better. But if you want to be a great scientist you're going to have to put up with stress. You can lead a nice life; you can be a nice guy or you can be a great scientist. But nice guys end last, is what Leo Durocher said. If you want to lead a nice happy life with a lot of recreation and everything else, you'll lead a nice life. Question: The remarks about having courage, no one could argue with; but those of us who have gray hairs or who are well established don't have to worry too much. But what I sense among the young people these days is a real concern over the risk taking in a highly competitive environment. Do you have any words of wisdom on this? Hamming: I'll quote Ed David more. Ed David was concerned about the general loss of nerve in our society. It does seem to me that we've gone through various periods. Coming out of the war, coming out of Los Alamos where we built the bomb, coming out of building the radars and so on, there came into the mathematics department, and the research area, a group of people with a lot of guts. They've just seen things done; they've just won a war which was fantastic. We had reasons for having courage and therefore we did a great deal. I can't arrange that situation to do it again. I cannot blame the present generation for not having it, but I agree with what you say; I just cannot attach blame to it. It doesn't seem to me they have the desire for greatness; they lack the courage to do it. But we had, because we were in a favorable circumstance to have it; we just came through a tremendously successful war. In the war we were looking very, very bad for a long while; it was a very desperate struggle as you well know. And our success, I think, gave us courage and self confidence; that's why you see, beginning in the late forties through the fifties, a tremendous productivity at the labs which was stimulated from the earlier times. Because many of us were earlier forced to learn other things � we were forced to learn the things we didn't want to learn, we were forced to have an open door � and then we could exploit those things we learned. It is true, and I can't do anything about it; I cannot blame the present generation either. It's just a fact. Question: Is there something management could or should do? Hamming: Management can do very little. If you want to talk about managing research, that's a totally different talk. I'd take another hour doing that. This talk is about how the individual gets very successful research done in spite of anything the management does or in spite of any other opposition. And how do you do it? Just as I observe people doing it. It's just that simple and that hard! Question: Is brainstorming a daily process? Hamming: Once that was a very popular thing, but it seems not to have paid off. For myself I find it desirable to talk to other people; but a session of brainstorming is seldom worthwhile. I do go in to strictly talk to somebody and say, "Look, I think there has to be something here. Here's what I think I see ..." and then begin talking back and forth. But you want to pick capable people. To use another analogy, you know the idea called thecritical mass.' If you have enough stuff you have critical mass. There is also the idea I used to call `sound absorbers'. When you get too many sound absorbers, you give out an idea and they merely say, "Yes, yes, yes." What you want to do is get that critical mass in action; "Yes, that reminds me of so and so," or, "Have you thought about that or this?" When you talk to other people, you want to get rid of those sound absorbers who are nice people but merely say, "Oh yes," and to find those who will stimulate you right back. For example, you couldn't talk to John Pierce without being stimulated very quickly. There were a group of other people I used to talk with. For example there was Ed Gilbert; I used to go down to his office regularly and ask him questions and listen and come back stimulated. I picked my people carefully with whom I did or whom I didn't brainstorm because the sound absorbers are a curse. They are just nice guys; they fill the whole space and they contribute nothing except they absorb ideas and the new ideas just die away instead of echoing on. Yes, I find it necessary to talk to people. I think people with closed doors fail to do this so they fail to get their ideas sharpened, such as "Did you ever notice something over here?" I never knew anything about it � I can go over and look. Somebody points the way. On my visit here, I have already found several books that I must read when I get home. I talk to people and ask questions when I think they can answer me and give me clues that I do not know about. I go out and look! Question: What kind of tradeoffs did you make in allocating your time for reading and writing and actually doing research? Hamming: I believed, in my early days, that you should spend at least as much time in the polish and presentation as you did in the original research. Now at least 50% of the time must go for the presentation. It's a big, big number. Question: How much effort should go into library work? Hamming: It depends upon the field. I will say this about it. There was a fellow at Bell Labs, a very, very, smart guy. He was always in the library; he read everything. If you wanted references, you went to him and he gave you all kinds of references. But in the middle of forming these theories, I formed a proposition: there would be no effect named after him in the long run. He is now retired from Bell Labs and is an Adjunct Professor. He was very valuable; I'm not questioning that. He wrote some very good Physical Review articles; but there's no effect named after him because he read too much. If you read all the time what other people have done you will think the way they thought. If you want to think new thoughts that are different, then do what a lot of creative people do � get the problem reasonably clear and then refuse to look at any answers until you've thought the problem through carefully how you would do it, how you could slightly change the problem to be the correct one. So yes, you need to keep up. You need to keep up more to find out what the problems are than to read to find the solutions. The reading is necessary to know what is going on and what is possible. But reading to get the solutions does not seem to be the way to do great research. So I'll give you two answers. You read; but it is not the amount, it is the way you read that counts. Question: How do you get your name attached to things? Hamming: By doing great work. I'll tell you the hamming window one. I had given Tukey a hard time, quite a few times, and I got a phone call from him from Princeton to me at Murray Hill. I knew that he was writing up power spectra and he asked me if I would mind if he called a certain window a "hamming window." And I said to him, "Come on, John; you know perfectly well I did only a small part of the work but you also did a lot." He said, "Yes, Hamming, but you contributed a lot of small things; you're entitled to some credit." So he called it the hamming window. Now, let me go on. I had twitted John frequently about true greatness. I said true greatness is when your name is like ampere, watt, and fourier � when it's spelled with a lower case letter. That's how the hamming window came about. Question: Dick, would you care to comment on the relative effectiveness between giving talks, writing papers, and writing books? Hamming: In the short-haul, papers are very important if you want to stimulate someone tomorrow. If you want to get recognition long-haul, it seems to me writing books is more contribution because most of us need orientation. In this day of practically infinite knowledge, we need orientation to find our way. Let me tell you what infinite knowledge is. Since from the time of Newton to now, we have come close to doubling knowledge every 17 years, more or less. And we cope with that, essentially, by specialization. In the next 340 years at that rate, there will be 20 doublings, i.e. a million, and there will be a million fields of specialty for every one field now. It isn't going to happen. The present growth of knowledge will choke itself off until we get different tools. I believe that books which try to digest, coordinate, get rid of the duplication, get rid of the less fruitful methods and present the underlying ideas clearly of what we know now, will be the things the future generations will value. Public talks are necessary; private talks are necessary; written papers are necessary. But I am inclined to believe that, in the long-haul, books which leave out what's not essential are more important than books which tell you everything because you don't want to know everything. I don't want to know that much about penguins is the usual reply. You just want to know the essence. Question: You mentioned the problem of the Nobel Prize and the subsequent notoriety of what was done to some of the careers. Isn't that kind of a much more broad problem of fame? What can one do? Hamming: Some things you could do are the following. Somewhere around every seven years make a significant, if not complete, shift in your field. Thus, I shifted from numerical analysis, to hardware, to software, and so on, periodically, because you tend to use up your ideas. When you go to a new field, you have to start over as a baby. You are no longer the big mukity muk and you can start back there and you can start planting those acorns which will become the giant oaks. Shannon, I believe, ruined himself. In fact when he left Bell Labs, I said, "That's the end of Shannon's scientific career." I received a lot of flak from my friends who said that Shannon was just as smart as ever. I said, "Yes, he'll be just as smart, but that's the end of his scientific career," and I truly believe it was. You have to change. You get tired after a while; you use up your originality in one field. You need to get something nearby. I'm not saying that you shift from music to theoretical physics to English literature; I mean within your field you should shift areas so that you don't go stale. You couldn't get away with forcing a change every seven years, but if you could, I would require a condition for doing research, being that you will change your field of research every seven years with a reasonable definition of what it means, or at the end of 10 years, management has the right to compel you to change. I would insist on a change because I'm serious. What happens to the old fellows is that they get a technique going; they keep on using it. They were marching in that direction which was right then, but the world changes. There's the new direction; but the old fellows are still marching in their former direction. You need to get into a new field to get new viewpoints, and before you use up all the old ones. You can do something about this, but it takes effort and energy. It takes courage to say, ``Yes, I will give up my great reputation.'' For example, when error correcting codes were well launched, having these theories, I said, "Hamming, you are going to quit reading papers in the field; you are going to ignore it completely; you are going to try and do something else other than coast on that." I deliberately refused to go on in that field. I wouldn't even read papers to try to force myself to have a chance to do something else. I managed myself, which is what I'm preaching in this whole talk. Knowing many of my own faults, I manage myself. I have a lot of faults, so I've got a lot of problems, i.e. a lot of possibilities of management. Question: Would you compare research and management? Hamming: If you want to be a great researcher, you won't make it being president of the company. If you want to be president of the company, that's another thing. I'm not against being president of the company. I just don't want to be. I think Ian Ross does a good job as President of Bell Labs. I'm not against it; but you have to be clear on what you want. Furthermore, when you're young, you may have picked wanting to be a great scientist, but as you live longer, you may change your mind. For instance, I went to my boss, Bode, one day and said, "Why did you ever become department head? Why didn't you just be a good scientist?" He said, "Hamming, I had a vision of what mathematics should be in Bell Laboratories. And I saw if that vision was going to be realized, I had to make it happen; I had to be department head." When your vision of what you want to do is what you can do single-handedly, then you should pursue it. The day your vision, what you think needs to be done, is bigger than what you can do single-handedly, then you have to move toward management. And the bigger the vision is, the farther in management you have to go. If you have a vision of what the whole laboratory should be, or the whole Bell System, you have to get there to make it happen. You can't make it happen from the bottom very easily. It depends upon what goals and what desires you have. And as they change in life, you have to be prepared to change. I chose to avoid management because I preferred to do what I could do single-handedly. But that's the choice that I made, and it is biased. Each person is entitled to their choice. Keep an open mind. But when you do choose a path, for heaven's sake be aware of what you have done and the choice you have made. Don't try to do both sides. Question: How important is one's own expectation or how important is it to be in a group or surrounded by people who expect great work from you? Hamming: At Bell Labs everyone expected good work from me � it was a big help. Everybody expects you to do a good job, so you do, if you've got pride. I think it's very valuable to have first-class people around. I sought out the best people. The moment that physics table lost the best people, I left. The moment I saw that the same was true of the chemistry table, I left. I tried to go with people who had great ability so I could learn from them and who would expect great results out of me. By deliberately managing myself, I think I did much better than laissez faire. Question: You, at the outset of your talk, minimized or played down luck; but you seemed also to gloss over the circumstances that got you to Los Alamos, that got you to Chicago, that got you to Bell Laboratories. Hamming: There was some luck. On the other hand I don't know the alternate branches. Until you can say that the other branches would not have been equally or more successful, I can't say. Is it luck the particular thing you do? For example, when I met Feynman at Los Alamos, I knew he was going to get a Nobel Prize. I didn't know what for. But I knew darn well he was going to do great work. No matter what directions came up in the future, this man would do great work. And sure enough, he did do great work. It isn't that you only do a little great work at this circumstance and that was luck, there are many opportunities sooner or later. There are a whole pail full of opportunities, of which, if you're in this situation, you seize one and you're great over there instead of over here. There is an element of luck, yes and no. Luck favors a prepared mind; luck favors a prepared person. It is not guaranteed; I don't guarantee success as being absolutely certain. I'd say luck changes the odds, but there is some definite control on the part of the individual. Go forth, then, and do great work! * * *

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